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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~N 1 ~ 1.974 
UNITED HOUSI NG FOUNDATION, INC., ET AL. v. 
MILTON FORMAN ET AL.; and 
STATE OF NEW YORK AND THE NEW YORK 
STATE HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY 
v. MILTON FORMAN E'r AL. 
ON PETITIONS FOR WRI'rS OF CERTIORARI TO 'l'HE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS .!<'OR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
No:,;, 74-157 and 74-647. Decided January -, 1974 
MR JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
These cases involve a question of national importauce 
as to the application of the Federal Securities Laws of 
1933 and 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 77a et seq.; 78a et seq. 
Respondents are tenants of Co-op City, a housing 
cooperative in New York City which was built as part 
of a s~ate SQonsored pro~am to develop decent living 
quarters for low and low-middle-income people. N. Y. 
Private Housing Finance Law §§ lP-37. The State sub-
sidizes the building of such cooperatives, places income 
limitations on those eligible for tenancy, and provides 
preferences for veterans, the aged, and the handicapped. 
Petitioner, the United Housing Foundation, is a non-
profit corporation, comprised of labor unions and ciViC 
orgamzabons dedicatecl to the development of decent low-
cost housing, which was chosen as the promoter for 
Co-op City. To purchase an apartment a buyer must 
pay $450 per room (each room being considered as one 
"share") . All tenants receive one vote in cooperative -.. - .__ 
matters. If a tenant wants to sell his apartment he 
must offer his shares back to thEO cooperative which , to 
date, has accepted all such offers. In any event, the 
tenant may sell his shares only at the initial purchasmg 
price. 
] 
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Respondents sued in Federal District Court on behalf 
of all tenants, alleging that the ''Information Bulletin" 
circulated by petitioners to encourage sales in Co-op City 
violated the securities laws. 'They requested $30 million 
in damages claiming that the Information Bulletin mis .. 
stated the monthly maintenance charges which proved to · 
be significantly greater than had been estimated. 
The District Court held that it was without jurisdiction 
to entertain these claims since the securities laws did not 
apply to the purchase o~mbershiP," in a housi~g coop-
erative such as Co-op City. The Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit reversed, finding that petitioners' 
denomination of the sale of membership in Co-op City 
as "stock" was conclusive for purposes of the securities 
laws. The Court also thought that the substance of the 
purchase agreement brought it within the intended scope 
of the securities laws.'! 
The effect of this holding is far reaching. By its terms 
the decision applies to hundreds of thousands of govern-
ment subsidized or supported cooperatives.2 Its rationale 
also plainly covers private cooperatives 3 LJld condomin.:.. 
iums. Thus, the decision requires application of the 
extensive regl1-1atory provisions of the securities laws to 
a whole new area of economic activity, and opens the 
federal courts to hear grievances that heretofore had been 
cognizable, if at all, in state courts.4 For these reasons 
alone, I thin~ the decision merits review. 
1 The Court further held that the State of New York and its 
Housing Agency were not immune from liability under the Eleventh 
Amendment. 
2 Petitioners assert, without contradiction, that there are "ap-
proximately 100,000 such cooperatives m New York State alone . , ."· 
Petn. in No. 74-157, at 13. 
3 Th1~ much has already been acknowledged by the Second Circuit 
in a subsequent decision, 10/iO TenantB Corp v. Jakobson, 503 F . 2d 
1375 (1974) . 
4 IndPed, respondents in t his case have included 10 claims under 
state law along with their Securities Acts claims, urging the federat 
court to hear them uuder the doctriue of pendent jurisdiction, 
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I am further persuaded to this view because the Second 
Circuit's opinion reflects a npvel, and in my view, an 
erroneous interpretation of the governing law. Relying 
on this Court's decisions in SEC v C. M. Joiner Leasing 
Co., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943), and Tcherpnin v. Knight, 
389 U. ~. 332, 339 (1967), the court held that a literal 
interpretation of the ·securities Acts requires their appli-
cation to this oase since petitioners have labeled the sale 
of apartments ai a purchase of "stock." But the Acts i 
themselves explicitly reject such a wooden approach by 
indicating that the iiteral designation controls "unless 
the context otherwise requires." 15 U. S. C. § 77b; 
§ 78c (a). And the Court's opinions in Joiner and 
Tcherpnin make clear that the application of these stat-
utes turns on the economic reality of the transaction and 
not the label appended thereto: 
"in searching for the rpeaning and scope of the 
word 'security' in the Act[s], form should be dis-
regarded for substance and emphasis should be on 
economJ!; reality." Tcherpnin, supra, at 336 (em-
priasis supplied) .5 
The Second Circuit, however, went beyond the literal 
designation and, applying SEC v. J. W. Howery Co., Inc., 
328 U. S. 2!}3, 298 (1946), concluded that the economic 
reallty of the sale of membership in Co-op City was such 
as to make the transaction an "investment contract" 
within the reach of the securities laws. Howey aeftnes 
an "investment contract'' as 
"a contract. transaction or scheme whereby a per-
ROll invests his money in a common enterpnse and 
--.,.----
5 L1kewi~e. in Jomer the Court stated that to defiue a "::;ecurity» 
a. court must look not only to "what charactt>r the mstrument is 
given in commerce by the terms of tht> offer" but also to "the plan 
of d1stribut10n, and the economic mducements ht'ld out to the pros-
pect '' 320 U. S., at 852, 353 See also I Loss, Secur1ties Regulation 
493 (2d ed. 1961) ("::;uhstance governs rather than form: . . ju::;t 
as ;;orne things which look hke real estate are securities, some thmgs 
which look like :>f>CI.trities ate real estate."). 
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is lead to expect pro ts solely frorn the efforts of the 
promoter or a trd party, .. . " Id., at 298 (empha-
sis supplied). 
The Court of Appeals found that in this case there was 
an ~fit from the income that might 
result from operation of commercial facilities at Co-op 
City. Such facilities are maintained for the convenience 
of the cooperative tenants and any profits derived there-
from are applied to the overall operating expenses of the 
cooperative. Thus, it was thought that these profits may 
broadly be considered "income" to the tenants since 
potentially they may reduce the monthly maintenance 
charge. 6 This is a strained, even fanciful view of "prof-
its," without support in economic fact or theory and con-
trary to the assumptions underlying the Securities Acts. 
In this case members of Co-op City have not bought 
stock or real estate for investment purposes but rather 
have purchased living quarters generously subsidized by/ I 
the State of New York. Certainly there was no profit 
motive, as no rational person would purchase an apart-
ment in this nonprofit housing co-op as an investment 
for profit. Moreover, a tenant takes no risk with respect 
to his purchase since, if dissatisfied, he may withdraw 
from the cooperative and retrieve his initial investment 
in full. Nor can it even be suggested that the 
promoters of the cooperative, including the State of New 
Y Ol'k, sold shares in Co-op City as a means of raising 
venture capital for a profitmaking operation. Indeed, 
the promoter is a nonprofit corporation. Nothing in the 
instant transaction partakes of the kind of investment 
traditionally found to be within the scope and purpose of 
the securities laws. 
This view is supported by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the agency charged with administering the 
'6 It would follow, presumably, that this reduction in operating 
expenses-if in fact it occurs and can be computed-would be tax-
able income to these heneficia.ries of nonprofit, low-cost housing. 
, ' 
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securities laws. In a release pertaining to the sales of 
conventional residential developments generally, the 
Commission ruled that such sales were not within the 
Acts unless : 
"The offeror is offering an opportunity through 
which the purchaser may earn a return on his invest-
ments through the managerial efforts of the pro-
moters or a third party . .. " Securities Act Release 
No. 33-5347 (1-4-73). 
The release further states that "where commercial facili-
ties are a part of a reside~tial project," the Acts do not 
apply when : 
" (a) the income from such facilities is used only 
to offset common area expenses and (b) the opera-
tion of such facilities is incidental to the project as 
a whole .... " 
These are precisely the conditions that exist at Co-op 
City. 
In view of the significance of the issues decided, and 
the doubtfulness of the result reached below, I would 
grant the writs of certiorari. 
Preliminary Memo 
Conf. of Oct. 25, 1974 _;::;~-L-J £~[)_ ~ io /-~ )z~ ~ 
List 1, Sheet 4 '"Z"c.--./.2 ~ ~ c;fJ__#~ ~/-r-L.u-£ ~--
NOe 74-157 
( LL'<.-~~~--P~ r1-u-d~~"--'G; ~) 1 
~~is.,__ II :52_ ~~/-
~ ~~a-~u-U-
UNITED HOUSING FOUNDATION Cert. to CA 2 cfe~-v-z-{ ~ f.rLt (7 Timely 
(Oakes, Hays, Christensen) { -~ 
v. ~cr~-~~ 
FORMAN Federal/Civil H---- P-ilhi & 1 ~~ 
..k'~~ol-  1-<:J 
~~~~~
Summary: Resps, residents in a cooperative housing development · - -
subsidized and regulated by the State of New York in order to provide 
low cost housing, brought suit against petr United Housing Foundation 
[USF], a non-profit corporation organized by civic groups and labor 
unions to provide low cost cooperative housing, and its subsidiad es 
in USDC alleging that resps' shares in the co-op const:ituted 
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securities as defined in §3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1~34 [15 U.S.C. §78c(a)] and its counterpart in the Securjties 
Act of 1933 [15 u.s.c. §77b(l)], that the sale of such shares to 
them by petr and its subsidiaries violated §17 of the 1933 Act 
and §lO(b) of the 1934 because of failures to disclose. They 
also alleged 10 state law claims under pendent jurisdiction. The 
USDC dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the resp residents' 
shares were not securities within the 1933 and 1934 Acts. The 
Second Circuit reversed holding that the shares did constitute 
securities as defined ~n th~cts and remanded the case for a trial 
\ on the merits. Petrs now seek cert to review the CA judgment 
arguing that the co-op shares were not §3(a) (10) securities. 
Facts: Resps are residents of Co-op City, the largest co-
operative housing project in the United States, which was organized 
by petr in 1951 in order to provide inexpensive housing for low 
and middle income families. The project was financed and regulated 
by the New York State Housing Authority . pursuant to New York's 
Mitchell-Lama Act providing for state aid to mutual companies formed 
for the purpose of managing co-ops on a non-profjt basis, whose 
shares are wholly owned by the actual tenants of the co-op and 
transferable only back to the mutual company upon leavjng the 
project. There are income limitations on those who may live in 
the project and preferences to certain disadvantaged groups. 
: 
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If a tenant is accepted for occupancy in one of the co-op areas, 
he purchases $425 worth of mutual company shares for each room in the 
apartment that he will occupy. However, each tenant gets only one 
vote in the company no matter how many shares he holds. The shares 
cannot be owned apart from actual occupancy in the co-op nor may 
--------------. 
·t hey be pledged, encumbered or transferred in any way save by 
I 
r epurchas e by the mutual company for the same amount paid when the 
t enant l e aves the project either voluntarily or for breach of his 
. \ l ease. 
t he right to occupancy under the terms of a standardized lease, the 
r ight to an equal voice in the non-profit mutual company's 
The shares pay no dividends and confer no value except for 
management of the project, and the right to redemption upon departure -
at the purchase price. 
The carrying charges or monthly rentals under the lease vary 
depending on expenses incurred by the mutual company in its 
management of the project (e.g. the carrying charges on the 
construct i on mortgage and maintenance/repair costs) and income 
realized by the company from such activities as parking fees and 
renting certain areas for shops. The tenants can deduct interest 
paid by the company on the mortgage under certain IRC provisions 
designed to extend this benefit of home ownership to co-op residents. 
The gravamen of the resps' complaint in this case is that an 
information bulletin given to them at the time that they signed 
share subscription agreements for shares in the under-construction 
co-op failed to adequately disclose that increases in construction 
' ' 
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costs of the co-op and increases in interest rates could result 
i n an increase in estimated monthly carrying charges or rental 
·------------------------------------~----~--~----~~ 
and that as, a result of such factors, rentals did in fact increase 
f rom $23/month to $39/month per room. Resps, filing in behalf of 
all similarly situated tenants, therefore claim in excess of $30 
million in damages from various eleemosynary institutions. 
Section 3{a) (10) of the 1934 Act provides that: 
"When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise 
requires -- • • • • (10) The term 'security' means any 
note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate 
of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agree-
ment or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty orlease, 
an:Y collateral trust certificate, pre-organization certi-
ficate or subscription, transferable share, investment 
contract, voting trust certificate, certificate ofdeposit · 
for a security, or in general, any instrument commonly 
known as a security. • • • " 
Contention: The sole question presented by this petition is 
~ _,..,.,. _,. 
whether the bundle of rights encompassed by the co-op shares 
constituted a "security" within the meaning of the above cited 
---- .. :w=::= 
section.!/ Petr argues that this is the first decision in the 
h istory of these acts extending them to the purchase and sale of 
residences, citing the widespread criticism of the decision by the 
~
securities bar and others [Pet. at 13] and states that it extends 
the acts to the sale of several million condominium and cooperatjve 
!/The definition of "security" under the 1933 Act [15 u.s.c. §77 (b) (1)] 
is almost identical and has been construed as being interchangeable wi t h 
the above section. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-336. 
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units each year, many of which are publically financed and regulated. 
It adds the intricate and expensive web of federal securities 
regulation, designed in the 1930's for regulation of major money 
markets, to already extensive state regulation of this area which 
is peculiarly unsuited to application of existent federal securjties 
laws. It frustrates state regulation of the area, allows forum 
sho~ng in violation of Erie, creates uncertainty as to whether 
registration of such sales is required and, for example, eliminates 
the practice of arbitration of disputes arising in connection with 
sales of such units since violations of the federal security laws 
a re not subject to mandatory arbitration provisions. Wilko v. 
Swan, 346 U.S. 427. 
Although the co-op shares sold were denominated "stock" and 
§3 (a) (10) includes in its definition of a security "stock", the 
-,1 · literal reading given the statute by the CA was error. The statute 
111s ~s 
' ) 
T +kt~) specifically states ". • • unless the context otherwise requires. 
+ke- ,, ~- d h . 1. t d . d. ff t d . +-4-+ ·• of an ere econom1c rea 1 y oes requ1re a 1 eren rea 1ng. 
~ s~+. Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra. The legislative history of the Acts . ) 
~o+ the-
shows that they were not intended to apply to the sale of residences 
II 
especially where such sales were regulated and financed by the states 
themselves. The literalist approach has been rejected by two CA 
decisions. Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3rd Cir. 1973); 
McClure v. First National Bank of Lubbock, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cjr. 
1974). 
TheCA's application of the Howey test (SEC v. w. J. Howey, 
328 U.S. 293, 298-299] to find the shares an investment contract 
and hence within §3(a) {10) was error. Howey requires that the 
investor be led to expect profits from the efforts of a third 
party as does SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 u.s. 344, 
352. This element of the test has been restated many times. In 
the immediate case, there is no profit in any conventional sense 
since the shares are redeemed at a fixed price and the CA decision 
which found "profit" in reduced rentals and federal tax benefits 
was simply error. 
The decision of the CA is in direct conflict with the position 
of the SEC as expressed in Securities Act Release No. 33-5347 [pet. 
at D5] which exempts cooperatives such as that in issue from 
registration requirements on the grounds that they are not a security. 
The USDC opinion repeated many of the above arguments of petr 
and was grounded on a finding that Howey was not met since from an 
examination of all relevant circumstances the USDC concluded that 
the resp residents did not invest with an expectation of profit. 
The CA opinion was bottomed on a two-fold analysis. First, 
instruments denominated as one of the categories enumerated in 
the statute are a security. Stock is an enumerated category and 
these shares were called stock. "Instruments may be included 
within any of these definitions, as a matter of law, if on their 
face they answer to the name or description. II SEC v. 
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c. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., supra at 351. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 
supra at 339. Second, the shares constituted an investment 
contract under Howey since there was an expectation of profit by 
t he investor -- such profit being in the form of reduced rentals 
and tax benefits. 
Resps generally repeats the CA reasoning and argues that "profit" 
a s used in the Howey test requires only the expectation of economic 
benefit and not a direct return in the form of a capital gain on 
s ale or dividends or other conventional payment as petr implies. He 
a rgues that the SEC's exemption of cooperative unit sales from 
r egistration in SEC Rule 235 shows that the SEC regards such units 
a s securities since it wouldn't otherwise be necessary to exempt 
them. 
Discussion: Inasmuch as the decision below stands on the 
l iteralist view of §3(a) (10) that because the shares were denominated 
" stock") they were within the statute, it isn't particularly novel 
and reflects the widespread interpretation of c. M. Joiner's dicta. 
As evidenced by the cited CA opinions, the literalist view is under 
some attack in this are~· paralleling the subjective move under 
Section 16 (b) ·because of the irrational results it produces. It j s 
difficult to justify the notion that because the tenant's rights were 
labeled "stock" rather than a membership they were subject to an 
entire body of regulatory legislation designed for the protection 
of major money markets and not residence sales. It would be possible 
-8-
to distinguish Joiner on the grounds suggested by petr. 
The alternate grounds for theCA's holding (that Howey was 
satisfied by the expectation of "profit" in the form of tax 
savings and lower rent) would simply make any form of investment 
a "security" subject to federal regulation and certainly would 
reach all condominium and cooperative sales in the United States. 
If the federal security laws are other than a regulation of all 
not expressly exempt commercial transactions, then the holding 
that "profit" as used in Howey means expectation of economic 
benefit is wrong. 
This petition seeks review of an interlocutory CA judgement 
-----~ 
so that petitioner carries a laboring oar in convincing the Court 
that the questions presented are fundamental to resolution of the 
d f . . . y h . '1 .. case an o extr·1ns1.c 1.mportance. A somew at SJ.m1. ar petJ t1.on present-
ing the question of §3{a) (10) 's reach was presented in Equity Securitjes 
Corp. v. El Khadem, No. 74-46; was on the discuss list for the October 
7 conference; and has not yet been disposed of. This case would not 
be an appropriate hold for Equity (if that petition is granted) 
given the alternate holdings here and the somewhat different facts 
presented. 
YR. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice §4.19 at 180-81 
(4th ed. 1969). 
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Cert should be granted in the instant case only if the Court 
i s willing to modify the literalist view of §3(a) (10) expressed j n 
Joiner. 
There is a response. 
10/15/74 O'Neill Ops in Pet. 
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Burger, Ch. J ................ . 
. · 
CERT. JURISDICTIONAL MERITS MOTION AB- NOT 
~---.--+---rST_A_T_E-rM_E_N_T.,.---1-----,--+---.---lsENT VOT-
G D N POST DIS AFF REV AFF G D lNG 
.iu:prttttt <!ltturlttf tlft ,-mttb .itatts 
jtulfington.. ~. <II· 21lc?'1~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
January 16, 1975 
Re: Nos. 74-157 and 74-747 -United Housing Foundation, 
et al. v. Forman, et al. 
Dear Lewis: 
Your opinion dissenting from denial of certiorari in 
these cases has persuaded me to change my vote and I will 
vote to grant certiorari. I will not, however, break my 
sacred tradition of not dissenting from denial. 
Sincerely, 
~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
~mtt ~(tltri 41f tlrt ~ttittb .itaftg 
Jl'uJrington. ~. ~· 2llgi.l!~ 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
January 16, 1974 
Re: No. 74-157 - United Housing Foundation, Inc. 
v. Forman 
No. 74-647 - New York v. Forman 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in your dissent from the anticipated 
denial of certiorari in these cases. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
Court ................... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 1 B . . . No. 74-157 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . A nnounc,ed ................ , 19 . . . 
UNITED HOUSING FOUNDATION, INC. 
vs. 
FORMAN RELIST 
HOLD JURISDICTIONAL NOT 
CERT. MERITS MOTION AB-
FOR t----,.--t---SrT_A_TE,M,-E_N,T_-t---,---t--r---fSENT VOT-
G D N POST DIS AFF REV AFF G D ING 
Rehnquist, J ................. . ·.; ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.··.·.·.· ..... 
Powell, J .................... . 
Blackmun, J ................. . 
Marshall, J .................. . 
White, J ..................... . 
Stewart, J ................... . 
Brennan, J ................... . 
v ::; :;::: 
·:; ········ 
. . . . . . . . . . . 
../ 
''''/ ''''' 
Douglas, J .................... . 
Burger, Ch. J ................ . 
·;; ........ 
. . . . . . . . . . . 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Joel Klein DATE: April 14, 1975 
No. 74-157, New York, et al. v. Forman 
In view of your position, as expressed in the proposed 
dissent from denial that we prepared, I feel quite assured that 
we will not have to address the innnunity issue raised by the 
state petitioners in this case. If, for some reason, however, 
you are required to express your views on that issue I would 
find that there is no innnunity here, either for the State of 
New York or its Housing Agency. I will briefly outline my 
views. 
1. With respect to the State itself, the New York 
statutes, referring to the present housing laws, provides: 
'~ith regard to duties and liabilities 
arising out of this article the state, the 
commissioner or the supervisory agency may 
be sued in the same manner as a private person." 
This is, I would assume, an explicit waiver of innnunity 
applicable to the State. New York's argument, that this 
provision does not waive innnunity in federal court, is hollow. 
* Nothing in the statute suggests this distinction. Indeed, if 
"I< In other statutes, the New York legislature has 
made clear that it intended only a limited waiver of innnunity. 
2. 
a private person can be sued in federal court, as CA 2 erroneously 
held, then the State can be so sued. 
2. This explicit waiver provision does not apply to 
petitioner, the State Housing Finance Agency since it is not 
a "supervising agency" as required by the statute. Nevertheless, 
as petitioner virtually concedes, this Agency is wholly distinct 
from the state. By statute, the state is exempted from liability 
for the debts of the Agency. In this situation the Agency is 
not protected by the Eleventh Amendment. 
3. Since the first two points would resolve the 
Lmmunity issue in this case, I would certainly avoid the 
alternative ground relied on by CA 2 below, since I think it 
raises difficult and confusing issues. The alternative ground 
is that states which sell securities after the passage of the 
1933 and 1934 Acts are liable to suit on the theory that they 
have implicitly consented to Congressional abrogation of 
Lmmunity since the Securities Acts apply against the States. 
In essence this question boils down to whether Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U.S . 651 cuts back on Parden v. Terminal R. of Ala., 
377 U.S. 184. It would seem that Edelman probably does erode 
somewhat the holding in Parden but I would hardly decide that 
issue here; rather I would wait for a case in which I thought 
the Securities Act did apply to the stocks at issue, and then 
decide whether those Acts intended to abrogate state Lmmunity . 
JK 
74-157 UNITED HOUSING v. FORMAN 
74-647 NEW YORK v. FORMAN Argued 4/22/75 
~-------~----~-------------------------------
Tt0f1~~ 




2-, ~ ~ ~y·~ ~-v~~~ - ) 
~ )'1--,:f-f~-r 
-= / c<:_ s~ HCtu w~~ ~ ~ 
~t.__~~c~~ 
~ ~d1AAA~~~~- ~~ 
~ _.12-t-~~ .:x~~~ ~~ ~ ~ 




1-ru ~~ ~, :;;-~ ldM/ .~ 
L,~~J~~~ ~ ~R~F-
~ £dd-. 
z c-<-t~~~ ~ ~ -C2-:z ML ~ 
3 • Eff.-t-l.A.(.~~__j;:;,IAJ t7 ~~~~-vg: J -~~{b. 
~~~ -
~. 'lv-h, . ~ ~~ ~ tl'v-L. ¥oM~ 
AJ;!' 1--lu·z..(_ / ~<..$~ ~r-Jr ..£>-z<-4:.-t'_()~-f!_ .~.-R~ 
tcf ~J.r; c~#'iLJ(I ju·-..---_..'-<-"7 .. ,_. . , 
9z.~% 7' c~ (/f'oo~--e.e~-v~ 
L<-!?'-:- ~4--etR ,f'y .J"f.tt:tc .. d'-L--?~t~ /~ 
I.--c..~~~ ;r-e < f-er; ' 
~~- uf ~":""~·,_; 9'- c7 
~ ~~ ~1, ~'~~~ 
~~ tl __./-rz-!Vv . 
-u~~~ Ah~~~ c:, ~/ .-~ ~~/1.~ -
4~J... ,1A.A-<t-J~~ ~<-() ~~f2U. L4 c:/4c4--4. 
77V!!> 
Cf.c.e 2/l ... ~ 1 ~a~~-C / tc--e-""c..cc £'-f-1--e.~..,~ 
f.-v~ C'-f'-ft..-,_ ~~'-<-/4_{ /-., _.~, "' -t:&'")."'-''::? . 
~ _5) c.-'7_- t.d~/ j -1t. '-<-~ ~-CJ~""'--
M4~y-J ~ 
t-a-t4- ~ ~ 
~--G r-"-' 
~-d Cf t:~ - ~.c~ u-vv~c, 
'!5' /~.::tu CJ f L«~fJ_p~ 
~;~ R~ 
C-ve--~-z.4- .£'_._..-.(_ ~·;f (~2 ,to 
~~~ ~ ~---'-~ ; · 
r~~--L-/ 
"-
U.,_~j(__ ~ t~~-·"~ .- u,J''-<44 
L-1.-----" .,. , .. ~"'-..-/ L~'"'--<- l .tJ...t__ d?.-(f) 'IA..t~ .;f ~~ ..... -~tv '0 
~< . d-<'-f L--t... , t#-q(;f- d-ft4'~~~A- • 
.. 
11~ /(rx!"'-;~J 
1(t_L ... ' <-tt-~.!~ tYL-T -<kt-ee-=~ 
c· M ~ ~ ~kvv· '--~ ~ 
~Z.£~) \ 
~l '"-~ ( s ~c) - a- ;-e~. 
r2Lf!•~ ( ~t21) 
~ ~:,..--(../ c ;If: (. J-l't~, 
-----
"5 EC I~ cl'-<'f~..t~,i.. L~ ftM--u~'.._ 
- //{_ L6ctj ,....._ L"L '7<' v.-e ...._____. 'K...(? ,_ C'·•-c./~ .-.._) 
--<{;IT c.,. -'L{ /l-(. L <;" e { -t' -'\._;_L 0 
April 22, 1975 
No. 74-157 N.Y. v. Foreman 
Characteristics of Common Stock 
1. Transferability - must offer back to co-op. 
2. Voting Rights - here each Tenant had one vote regard-
less of number of shares (one share for each room). 
3. Opportunity to Profit - Tenant may not profit, as 
must sell only at initial purchasing price.~d~~i1~Ai~~ 
4. A stock corporation by definition is different from (St:c...,q·B~ 
a nonstock-nonprofit corporation. How could a member of a 
nonprofit corporation profit, if corporation is not allowed 
to make any profits. (Joel - What about farm, milk and 
rurual electric co- ops). 
5. Dividends - none. 
(Reduction in operating expenses is not a profit. No 
tax is paid on this. If fuel costs went down, and operating 
costs decreased, would there be a profit?) 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
April 22, 1975 
No. 74-157 New York v. Foreman 
As described by the District Court, the central facts 
in this case include: 
The project, Coop City, was authorized by New York's 
Mitchell-Lamar Act designed to provide housing for low-income 
fami lies. Pursuant to the Act, the defendant New York State 
Housing Finance Agency (the Agency) provides subsidized 
mortgaged financing; another defendant, New York State 
Division of Housing and Community Renewal (the State Division) 
is responsible under New York law for the construction and 
operation of the project. United Housing Foundation (UHF) 
initiated and sponsored Coop City. It is a nonprofit, 
charitable corporation (see charter) comprised of housing 
cooperatives, civic groups . and labor unions. 
River Bay Corporation (River Bay) is the cooperative 
housing corporation in which these plaintiffs purchased shares, 
and which owns and operates Coop City. River Bay was organized 
under the Mitchell-Lamar Act. By virtue of that Act and the 
chart er of the corporation, it shares of "stock" have the 
following unique characteristics: 
1. The shares are tied to rooms in apartments at the 
rate of $450 per room - 18 shares at $25 per share entitled 
the purchaser to one room. 
2. May not be pledged or otherwise encumbered. 
3. May not be inherited except by a surviving spouse 
(who would have the right to occupancy). 
4. The stock purchase transaction is rescindable by 
either party. 
5. The shares may not be owned separate and apart from 
actual occpancy in Coop City. 
6. If the tenant leaves Coop City, he is required to 
divest himself of the stock: Offering it first to the 
corporation for repurchase at the exact.* 
2. 
7. Voting rights are limited to one vote per apartment, 
regardless of the number of the shares. 
8. No dividends. 
9. No opportunity to make a profit. The charter, pursuant 
to New York law, provides expressly that shares may be sold 
only at the initial purchase price. 
*In the unlikely event that the corporation does not repurchase 
the shares, the owner may sell them elsewhere but only at the 
original purchase price, plus a fraction of the mortgage 
amortization which he paid during his tenure at Coop City. 
The coop has a reserve fund (totaling some $900,000 at Dec. 
31, 1972) for repurchase purposes - a reserve not needed 
because several thousand families are on the waiting list for 
apartments, and the turnover is slight. 
April 22, 1975 
No. 74-157 New York v. Foreman 
As described by the District Court, the central facts 
in this case include: 
Th~ project, Coop City, was authorized by New York's 
/ 
Mitchell-Lamar Act designed to provide housing for low-income 
I 
I 
ffav.fil:lie;. Pursuant to the Act, the defendant New York State 
I 
Hous~ng Finance Agency (the Agency) provides subsidized 
I 
mor~gaged financing; another defendant, New York State 
I 
Division of Housing and Community Renewal (the State Division) 
' 
is respon&·i.ble, under New York law for the construction and 
I 
~peration of the project. United Housing Foundation (UHF) 
initiated and sponsored Coop City. It is a nonprofit, 
charitable corporation (see charter) comprised of housing 
cooperatives, civic groups and labor unions. 
River Bay Corporation (River Bay) is the cooperative 
housing corporation in which these plaintiffs purchased shares, 
and which owns and operates Coop City. River Bay was organized 
under the Mitchell-Lamar Act. By virtue of that Act and the 
chart:er of the corporation, it shares of "stock" have the 
following unique characteristics: 
1. The shares are tied to rooms in apartments at the 
rate of $450 per room - 18 shares at $25 per share entitled 
the purchaser to one room. 




' . •, 
3. May not be inherited except by a surviving spouse 
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4. The stock purchase transaction is rescindable by 
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original purchase price, plus a fraction of the mortgage 
amortization which he paid during his tenure at Coop City. 
The coop has a reserve fund (totaling some $900,000 at Dec. 
31, 1972) for returchase purposes - a reserve not needed 
because several thousand families are on the waiting list for 
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Characteristics of Common Stock 
1. Transferability - must offer back to co-op. 
2. Voting Rights - here each Tenant had one vote regard-
less of number of shares (one share for each room). 
3. Opportunity to Profit - Tenant may not profit, as 
must sell only at initial purchasing price. 
4. A stock corporation by definition is different from 
a nonstock-nonprofit corporation. How could a member of a 
nonprofit corporation profit, if corporation is not allowed 
to make any profits. (Joel - What about farm, milk and 
rurual electric co~ops). 
5. Dividends - none. 
(Reduction in operating expenses is not a profit. No 
tax is paid on this. If fuel costs went down, and operating 
costs decreased, would there be a profit?) 
L.F.P., Jr. 
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Mr. Joel Klein 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
"7'( ~I .r7 
DATE: May 26, 1975 
No. 7-•!1 United Housing 
I deliver back to you herewith the draft of May 9, which 
I have reviewed carefully. 
It is totally convincing (at least to me), and well organized 
and drafted. l have, as usual, made a number of editing changes 
to reflect my own taste and style. 
In aclil1tion, I have suggested revisions of certain portions 
by dictating riders which are attached. 
All of my changes are subject, of course, to further dis-
cussion. After you have reviewed them, I suggest we talk 
about any points or changes which you think should be 
discussed. 





~tmt Qfourl .ltf ttr~ ~b ~fa:Ug 
._.asltingflm. ~. <!f. 21l.;i~~ · 
,JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
June 2, 1975 
Re: No. 74-157 - United Housing Foundation v. Forman 
No. 74-647 - New York v. Forman 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.iu:pumt <!J~urt ~f tqt 'Jifuitt~ .iWtg 
Jfagqmghm. ~. <!J. 2ll~J!.~ 
JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN , JR. 
June 2, 1975 
RE: Nos. 74-157 & 74-647 - United Housing Foundation 
& State of N.Y. and N.Y. State Housing, etc. v. 
Milton Forman et al. 
Dear Lewis: 
In due course I shall circulate a dissent in the 
above . 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~u.prtmt <!fo-nrl o-f tlrt ~ta ~tatts 
-as!p:ngton. ~. <!f. 2llgt,.~ 
June 2, 1975 
Re: Nos. 74-157 and 74-647 - United Housing v. Forman 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
-
.juprmu <!fcu.ri cf t!rt~~ ,jb.tftg 
Jl'Mlfi:ngLm, ~. <!f. 2llgl)!~ 
June 2, 1975 
Re: Nos. 74-157, United Housing Fd., Inc. 
and 74-647, New York v. Forman 
Dear Lewis, 
I am glad to join your opinion for 
the Court in these cases. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
(/(1 I 
I I :J 
/ 
/ 
.ju:vrtntt <!}llltrt cf tlr~ b .jtaftg 
'IJM~tt, ~. <!}. 2ll,?'!.;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL June 2. 197 5 
No. 74-157 --United Housing Foundation. Inc. v. 
Milton Forman 
74-647 -- State of New York and the New York State 
Housing Finance Agency v. Milton Forman 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely. 
T.M. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
,jttpt"tmt <!fond of tlft ~tb ,jtatts 
Jfaslfi:ttgron. ~. <!f. 21l&iJI.~ 
June 3, 1975 
Re: Nos. 74-157 & 74-647 - United Housing 
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman 
Dear Lewis: 
I shall await Bill Brennan's dissent. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
,jUFttttt <q~ of tJrt J'nifta ,jmttg 
Jfasfti:nghtn. ~. <q. 20p'!$ 
June 6, 1975 
Re: 74-157 - United Housing Foundation v. Forman 
74-647 - State of New York v. Forman 
Dear Lewis: 
I join you. 
Regards, 
Lvtr:> 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
P. S. (LFP only) 
/ 
This is an excellent job and I particularly welcome the 
addition of note 15~ 
' 
nvr rrr l!fVl ' rrr tmrr- ,.. nnr: 
').11n t:~l1in ~'ttm. !D. <q. 2tlJ>1·;3 
CHA~.o10CJ1G Of 
JUSTICE BYRON R WI-'ITE 
J une 10, 1975 
Re: Nos. 74-157 & 74-647 -United Housing 
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman 
Dear Bill: 
Please add my name to your dissenting 
opinion in these cases. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 




JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 
.;§ttpumt <G"ottd of tire- 2Jlttitt1t .:%fr~fl's 
~aulyington, gl. <!f. 20pJ!,~ 
June 11, 1975 
Re: United Housing Foundation v. Forman, No. 74-157 
State of New York v. Forman, No. 74-647 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your dissenting opinion. 
Sincerely, 
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
June 11, 1975 
No. 74-157 United Housing v. Forman 
No. 74-647 New York v. Forman 
Dear Mr. Putzel: 
Tbe line-up in the above case is as follows: 
Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in 
which Burger, c. J. , Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun and 
Rehnquiat, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which Douglas and White, JJ., joined. 
Mr. Henry Putzel, jr. 
lfp/aa 
cc: Mr. Comio 
. . , 
Sincerely, 
-. 
lfp/ss 6/13/75 United Housing 
This case, here on certiorari to the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, involves a large 
cooperative housing project in New York known as Co-Op 
City. This nonprofit project was financed and 
constructed under a New York Law designed to provide 
low-cost cooperative housing for low income tenants. 
The project was heavily subsidized by long-term, low-
interest mortgage loans and tax exemptions. 
Co-Op City solicited prospective tenants by an 
Information Bulletin which described the project, and 
included estimates of construction costs and monthly 
rental charges. To acquire an apartment, the prospective 
tenant had to buy prescribed shares of stock in the 
project. 
Construction costs greatly exceeded estimates, 
resulting in substantial increases in the rental charges. 
The plaintiffs in this suit are tenants who claim that 
the Information Bulletin contained false and misleading 
statements. The defendants are the various parties that 




Suit was brought in the federal court on the 
theory that sale of the shares was subject to the 
anti-fraud provisions of the federal Securities Acts. 
The sole issue in this case is whether these shares 
constitute securities within the meaning of the federal 
Acts. 
The shares at issue cannot be transferred to a 
non-tenant; they cannot be bequeathed except to a 
surviving spouse; they cannot be encumbered; and voting 
rights are limited to one vote per apartment. More 
important, there can be no capital appreciation on the 
shares, and they carry no dividend rights. 
Plaintiffs, nevertheless, contend that profits 
may be derived indirectly in terms of low-cost housing, 
possible reduction in rental charges from the operation 
of shops and services within the co-op, and from certain 
tax benefits. 
The Court of Appeals agreed with the plaintiffs, 
and held that these shares are securities within 
the meaning of the federal Acts . 
.. ~ 
We t ake a different view. The plaintiffs were 
not investing in stock with the view to making a 
3~ 
profit thereon; they were acquiring the right to occupy 
housing on exceptionally favorable terms. These shares 
possessed none of the characteristics of instruments 
commonly known as securities. Accordingly, we concluded 
that they are not within the purview of the federal 
Securities Acts, and we reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. 
Mr. Justice Brennan has filed a dissenting opinion, 
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, . urt paid /! C~-Op Share~ Hdd 
· .. Notto:Be Securities 
powell sai.~ the \.~o urgings 
l ·ttle at\.entlo~ · \.·lcs and Ex· 1 sccun port-
Irorn the rnmission suP {cd-
chanl!:c c~pplicalion of oop-
By Margaret Gentry 
Associated Press 1 
The Supreme Court 'yes- calling something stock does 
terday refused to extend the not make it so. 
protection of .the federal se- · The ownership shares pur-
curitiesbws to )lundreds of chased by the tenants of-
thousands of owners of co- fcred no prospect of profit 
operative apartments. and have none <Jf the other 
In a 6-to-3' decision, the features common to securi-
court ruled that stock ,pur- ties laws, Powell said. 
chased in cooperative hous- \The Co-Op City residents 
ing projects dods not qualify filed the class action suit to 
as a security subject to fed- · challenge increases in ·their 
eral regulation. monthly maintenance costs. 
The decision reversed a They argued that the -proj-
U.S. circuit court ruling in a ect sponsors, United Hous-
case involving the 50,000 ing Foundation, and its op-
tenants of Co-Op City in erating arm, Riverbay, were 
The Bronx, N.Y., the 'largest bound by a 1965 information 
housing cooperative in the bulletin which said the aver; . 
nation. ·. · / age :q1onthly cost would be 
The appellate ,·court · in about $92 for a four-room 
New , York. ' had ruled tha~ apartment. , : , ; , , 
federai' · regulations apply, · ~ By' July 1974, the 'average 
;partly because tenants pur- monthly rate Qlad t exceeded 
. chased what was called $156 for the same space. 
· stpck. . . The Co-Op City residents 
Writing · for the Supreme argued that the 1965 predic-
qourt' . majority, . _Justice tion amounted to a solicita-
Lewis . F. Powell said that • tion to buy stock and that 
' \ ' the project operators were 
· , , bound by i~ by tederal secu- . 
' rities law. . . , 
If that position lhad pre- , 
vailed, it' could have set' oft 
similar suit's .,to force rental 
reductions in many other co-
operative · housing projects 
across the, country~ : .. u'r ) -
ucommon ° sense suggests ' 
that people who intended to 
· -acq\1ir~ . ortly _a residenti~l­
apartll),ent in ·_,.a state-sub~I­
dized c'oopera~ve for their . 
·personal use are not' likely 
· to believe that; in reality ' 
they are •purchasing ·invest- · 
. ment securities 1-,simply be, , 
cause the transaction is evi-· 
denc~d by something called 
a share of . stoc~," · Powell ' 
wrote. . . · w ~· • .... .•• ' 
De'spite the name, .he con-
tinued,• shares in' Co-Op City ' 
lack ·~the mos-t common .. fea-
ture · of stock," '' the ,right to ·. 
receive dividends from · the 
company's pr'Ofits. · · 
"In short, the. inducemen.t · 
to purchase was solely. .to ac- ; 
quire ., subidized low-cost 'liv· 1 
· ing sp'ace; it was :not to in-
-vest for profit," .he COl}· 
eluded. 
1ng the -·ues laws \.o c 
1 secun 
era . housing. \.hC op-
erative taken 
sEC haS fiect \.0 
Tne ·uon withe "this 
nosite pos~ ·and . , 
" domin1ums • tradictlon 
~;explained -~~n influence 
d'mi.nishcd 1 . this case, 
1_ th the court lU 
WI ll said. . t ma)or-
poW~ . "\1' 111 Ill t1~ War-
Jollllllt> C~icf JuS\.ICe rccs 
' ty were . and Jus 1 d 
1 E nurget . 'l'hurgoo 
rPentte~ stewar\ -BlacK.mun 
0 ll r'LY n-- · t Marshall, a H l'l,chnC1UlS . 
and wHli.a~~,n\i.arn J . I'.l·end 
Ju:s ticc~ I Doug1as an 
1 Wilham C?· dissented. nat , It Wh1\.e 
Byr~n · ___ __ .. _. --=-
Co-Op. 9ity.:T ~rr.ants Lose 
High Cqu.~tPlea. o.n,. Cos.ts 
Spec!&! to The New Yon Tlmu 
•'•·WASHINGTON, June 16-The Supreme Court ruled to-
day that stqc~ purchased by prospective tenants in coope·ra-
tive ho~sing projectJs to ,qualify for apartments was not sub-
, ject to Federal regulation that •- ,. · · -- · · .. · · .. 
1 ,might! hav~ held monthly car-
: rying !charges down to origi-
nally ~dvertised· figures. ,· .j ,, 
;oi~ding 6 to' 'a, the justices· . 
held that' 50,000 tenants of· Cor · 
Op; C.iW ·in the Bronx, the larg- ' 
'est copper&tive in the , country, 
were ·not entitled · to Federal 
court trial of their request· foP : 
a banr_on many ·of their 1 0arry~ 1 
ing-charge increases above the i 
1965level. They had also sought i 
more than $30-milli!)n .. in dam: J 
ages1 .• ; ·' 
' ~d the · .high. ,court . decided 
otlierwfse, ,. htinr:i'reds' of 'thou:· 
SiallldS: of other ten~nts \across 
the COUntry: iri cooperatives and 
perhaps in condominiums, might 
have been able to hold the de-
:velopers of these projects . to 
their original' estimates of 
monthly carrying charges, in• 
' dependent of subsequent co.n-
, struction-cost inflation. 
I ' In concluding that sh4res · ~ 
. a cooperative are not'stock sub-
, joct to Federal regulations, the 
' majority rejected the views of 
: the Securities ·and 1 Excpange 
· 'Commission and the . United 
i Court of Appeals for the.Second 
: Circuit. , 
· The Supreme\ Court majority ·, 
t left ope]. the possibility· that l 
' Co-Op City' ten~ts·, might be ·. 
· able to pursue' their claims . of 
Continued on Page :.l2, Column' 
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fraud in the state courts. 
f Associate Justice ,Willi~ J . 
.• Brennan Jr. maintained for the 
1 minority that stock bought by 
.e cooperative tenants represented 
:- "securities"· subject to Federal . -- . 
'· oversight because it was 'called _Federal District .c~urt dts-~. 
d. " k" d · 1 d "' nssed the . lawsUirt: on the e stoc an -mvo ve an In· round tha:t cooperative shares 
e vestment contract" from which1ere not stock. But the Court 
~ the tenants might profit inf Appeals reversed, · holdi_ng 
1 
various ways. ~at the tenants had been m-
, Joining in the dissent were;olved in- an investment con-
t Associate Justices William o.ract whe~ they bought ~e . 
· . hares w1th "an expectation 
r Douglas and Byron R. W?tte. ~ pr~fits" in terms of .low 
. To get an apartment m the ·ousing costs, tax deductiOns 
' state-aided, nonprofit Co-Op 1 the ~nterest and realty-tax 
City project, which opened in art !Of ~eir carrying char_ges, 
1968 a tenant had to buy 18 nd po-ss1ble rent reducttons 
shar~s of $25 stock for each esulting. from i~come from 
$1 800 th f ommerc1al franch1ses -at Co-Op room, or , wor or a1ity 
four-ro?m apartm'ent. In a ~ir· f ' Majority yiew · 
cular m 1965, the operatmg Associate Justtce Le~s F. 
corporation said the averagePowell Jr. wrote for the mHjor-
monthly carrying charge wouldity today -that "there can be 
then be $23 a room. . · ~o doubt that investors 'were 
The stodk requirement re"llttracte~ ~olely by the pros~ct 
. of acqumng a place to hve 
roamed steady, but the monthlymd no& by f.inancial returns 
carrying charge, with inflation 0n their investment." 
driving up construction costst Franchise income, from store 
by $125-inillion rose to m01·e~nd office rental and parking 
than $40 a roo~ by 1974, and~_arages ~as "far ~o~, specula-
th te ants filed suit in Federalpve andmsubstantlal to m~ke 
· _e . n to-Op C1ty shares an · attractive 
D1stnct Court. Investment such as common 
: " The~, con ten de~ that their stock, the majority declared. 
. stock w_a:; no different from Such cooperative stock, Jus-
the secunt1es traded on ex·uce Powell noted, does not 
cha~ges - across the co~:~ntry 'give purchasers the night to 
and that they had been m1sled,:lividends based on profit is 
in violation of · S.E.C. regula- , ' 
tions as to their prospective ' 
monthly charges. They also 
contended that operators of the 
project had withheld several 
· important financial facts from 
: the beginnil)g. 
· The• suit did not challenge 
those .increases in carryingi===::;::=======-~-
charges resulting from ·rising , 
maintenance and operating not negotiable, cannot bel 
~osts. 1t challenges only those pledged against a debt and 
mcreases t~a~ . resulted from ~he cannot appreciate in value un· 
sharply nsmg constructiOn d th t -~ th 
costs while the 35-building, er e erms v• e purchase 
300-acre project went up be- contr-act. 
tween 1'965 and 1972. The orig- · "What distinguishes a securi· 
ina! cost estimate was about ty transaction and what is ab· 
$280-million; · the final cost was sent here," the majority said, 
more than $420-million. "•is an investment where one 
Currently the Co-op City parts wi-th his money in the 
residents are being asked to hope of I'eceiving profits from 
pay 25 per cent increase in the efforts · of others and not 
carrying charges, . stemming where he purcha·ses a ·commodi· 
from rising operating and main- ty for personal consumption 
tenance ·costs, state of(icials or living quarters for pel1Sonal 
say. This .request lias led to a use." 1 • 
withholdil'lg of carrying charges Ju·stice Powell said the rna· 
and a stat~ take-over . . of the jority gave ~·no special weight'~ 
'
management of 'the project. to the Securities and Exchange 
Prominent Counsel Commiss-ion's contention, an· 
The Federal ·suit pitted two nounced in the case only this 
prominent lawyers ~gainst each yea·r that cooperabive stock 
?th,~r-Louis Nizer for the su- was ',a federally regulatable se· 
mg cooperator~. and f?rf!ler curity, since the agency had 
Federal Jud~e S1mon H. R1fkmd taken the opposi-te position in 
for the proJect's sponsor, the a policy statement in 1973. 
United Housing Foundation, 
1 
and its builder, Community · ---· "'"~~w CAMP. KIDS. 
Services, Inc. 
June 16, 1975 
case Held for No. 74-647, New York v. Forman 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
No. 74-1190 MacKethan v. Virginia 
I will vote to deny this petition. The basic issue is 
whether a state can be held liable under the federal Securities 
Acts for activities that it undertakes while regulating a 
savings and loan institution. USDC and CA4 found the action 
barred by the Eleventh ~mendment. Although a vaguely similar 
issue was presented in the state's petition in Forman, our 




July 9, 1975 
No. 74-157, United Housing v. Forman 
MEMORANDUM TO MR. PUTZEL 
Although the change from "purchasers" etc. 
to "tenants' may clarify things, on balance I 
think the present arrangement is preferable. 
Joel Klein 
LFP/gg · i-10-75 
~ Respondents are referred to herein variously as 
"purchasers", "owners", or 11tenants". Respondents do not 
hold legal title to their respective apartments, but they are 
purchasers and owners of the shares of Riverbay which entitle 
them to occupy the apartments. By virtue of their right 








4. Respondents are referred to herein variously 
as "purchasers", "owners", or "tenants". Respondents 
do not bold legal title to their respective apartments, 
but they are purchasers and owners of the shares of 
Riverbay which entitle them to occupy the apartments. 
By virtue of their right of occupancy, Respondents are 














July 14, 1975 
Memorandum to Mr. Putzel: 
Please insert this footnote at page 3, first 
paragraph, line 2, and renumber the following footnotes, 
including the infra and supra cites. 
Joel Klein 
,. 
,., .· ,.' . . ' ~· .. 
'· ... ... 
CHAMBERS DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 74-157 AND 74-647 
United Housing Founda-
tion, Inc., et al., 
Petitioners, 
74-157 v. 
Milton Forman et al. 
State of New York and the 
New York State Hous-
ing Finance Agency, 
Petitioners, 
.74-647 v. 
Milton Forman et al. 
On Writs of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second 
Circuit. 
[June -, 1975] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
'Court. 
The issue in this case is whether shares of stock en-
titling a purchaser to lease an apartment in Co-Op City, 
a state subsidized and supervised nonprofit housing co-
operative, are "securities" within the purview of the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934. 
I 
Co-Op City is a massive housing cooperative in New 
York City. Built between 1965 and 1971, it presently 
houses approximately 50,000 people on a 200-acre site 
containing 35 high rise buildings and 236 town houses. 
The project was organized, financed, and constructed 
under the New York State Private Housing Finance Law, 
J 
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commonly known as the Mitchell-Lama Act, enacted to 
ameliorate a perceived crisis in the availability of decent 
low income urban housing. In order to encourage pri-
vate developers to build low cost cooperative housing, 
New York provides these developers with large long-term, 
low-interest mortgage loans and substantial tax exemp-
tions. Receipt of such benefits is conditioned on a will-
ingness to have the State review virtually every step in 
the development of the cooperative. See N. Y. Private 
Housing Finance Law §§ 11-40, as amended (McKinney 
Supp. 1974- 1975). The developer also must operate the 
facility strictly "on a nonprofit basis," id., at§ 11-a (2a), 
and he may lease apartments only to people below a 
certain income level and who have been approved by the 
State.1 
The United Housing Foundation (UHF), a nonprofit 
membership corporation established for the purpose of 
"aiding and encouraging" the creation of "adequate, safe 
and sanitary housing accommodations for wage earners 
al).d other persons of low and moderate income," 2 Appen-
p.ix, at 95a, was responsible for initiating and sponsoring 
the development of Co-Op City. Acting under the 
Mitchell-Lama Act, UHF organized the Riverbay Cor-
poration (River bay) to own and operate the land and 
buildings comprising Co-Op City. Riverbay, a non-
profit cooperative housing corporation/\issued the stock 
which is the subject of this litigation/ UHF also con-
1 Eligibility is limited to families whose monthly income does not 
exceed six times the monthly rental charge (or, for famili es of four 
or more, seven times the rental charge). N. Y. Private Housing 
Finance Law § 31 (2) (a) (McKinney Supp. 1974--1975). Preference 
in admission must be given to veterans, handicapped people and 
the elderly. !d., at§ 31 (7)-(9). 
2 UHF is comprised of labor unions, housing cooperatives and 
civic groups. It has sponsored the building of several major housing 
cooperatives in New York City. 
I 
v 
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tracted with Community Services, Inc. (CSI), its wholly 
owned subsidiary, to become the general contractor and 
·sales agent for the project.3 As required by the Mitchell~ 
Lama Act, these decisions were approved by the State 
Housing Commissioner. 
To acquire an apartment in Co-Op City a prospective 
purchaser, assuming he meets the eligibility requirements 
and is approved by the State, is required to buy 18 shares 
of stock in Riverbay for each room desired. The cost 
per share is $25, making the total cost $450 per room, or 
, $1,800 for a four-room apartment. The sole purpose of 
acquiring these shares is to enable the purchaser to 
occupy an apartment ,in Co-Op City; in effect, their 
purchase is a recoveraple deposit on an apartment. The 
shares are explicitly ,;tied to the apartment: they cannot 
be transferred to a nontenant; nor can they be pledged 
or encumbered; a a they descend, along with the apart-
ment, only to a rv1vmg spouse. No votin ri hts at-
tach to the sha es as such; in,(a;ffiilrs of the 
cooperative ap ertains to the apartment, each tenant 
being
1 
entitled o one vote irrespective of the number of 
sha es he own . 
3 CSI is a business corporation that has acted as the contractor 
on several UHF -sponsored housing cooperatives. 
4 A tenant can be forced to move out if he violates the provis~ons 
of his "occupancy agreement," which is essentially a lease for the 
apartment, or if his income grows to exceed the eligibility standards. 
5 To date every family that has moved out of Co-Op City has 
received back its initial payment in full. Indeed, at the time this 
suit was filed there were 7,000 families on the waiting list for apart-
ments in this cooperative. In addition, a special fund of nearly 
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the initial purchase price plus a fraction of the mortgage 
that he has paid off, and then only to a prospective tenant 
satisfying the statutory income eligibility requirements. 
See N. Y. Private Housing Finance Law § 31-a (McKin-
ney Supp. 1974-1975). 
In May 1965, subsequent to the completion of the 
initial planning, Riverbay circulated an Information 
Bulletin seeking to attract tenants for what would some-
day be apartments in Co-Op City. After describing the 
nature and advantages of cooperative housing generally 
and Co-Op City in particular, the Bulletin informed pros-
pective tenants that the total estimated cost of the proj-
ect, based largely on an anticipated construction contract 
with CSI, was $283,695,550. Only a fraction of this 
sum, $32,795,550, was to come from the purchase of 
shares by tenants. The remaining $250,900,000 was to 
be financed by a 40-year low-interest mortgage loan from 
the New York Private Housing Finance Agency. After 
the project was built, the setvicing of the mortgage and 
current operating expenses would be defrayed from 
monthly rental charges paid by the tenants. While 
these rental charges were to vary, depending on the size, 
nature, and location of an apartment, the 1965 Bulletin 
estimated that the "average" monthly cost would be 
$23.02 per room, or $92.08 for a four-room apartment.' 
Several times during the construction of Co-Op City, 
Riverbay, with the approval of the State Housing Com-
_missioner, revised its contract with CSI by allowing for 
increased construction costs. In addition, Riverbay also 
incurred other expenses that had not been reflected in the 
1965 Bulletin. To meet these increased expenditures, 
Riverbay, with the Commissioner's approval, repeatedly 
$1 million had been established by small monthy contributions from 
nil tenants to insure that those who wanted to sell their apartments 
would be able to do so. 
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secured increased mortgage loans from the State Housing 
Agency. Ultimately the construction loan was $125 
million more than the figure estimated in the 1965 Bul-
letin. As a result, while the initial purchasing price 
remained at $450 per room, the average monthly carry-
ing charges were increased periodically, reaching a figure 
of $39.68 per room as of July 1974.6 
These increases in the rental charges precipitated the 
present lawsuit. Respondents, 57 residents of Co-Op 
City, sued in federal court on behalf of all 15,372 apart-
ment owners, and derivatively on behalf of Riverbay, 
seeking upwards of $30 million in monetary damages, 
forced rental reductions and other "appropriate" relief. 
Named as defendants (petitioners herein) were UHF, 
CSI, Riverbay, several individual directors of these orga-
nizations, the State of New York, and the State Private 
Housing Finance Agency. The heart of respondents' 
claim was that the 1965 Co-Op City Information Bulletin 
falsely represented that CSI would bear all subsequent 
cost increases due to"unanticipated facto'rs such as infla-
tion. Respondents further alleged that they were misled 
in their purchases of shares since the Information Bul-
letin failed to disclose several critical facts. 7 On these 
6 As the rental charges increased, the income eligibility require-
ments for residents of Co-Op City expanded accordingly. See n. 1, 
sup.ra. 
7 Respondents maintained that the following material facts were 
omitted: (i) the original estimated cost had never been adhered to 
in any of the previous Mitchell-Lama projects sponsored by UHF 
and built by CSI; (ii) petitioners knew that the initial estimate 
would not be followed in the present project; (iii) CSI was a wholly 
owned subsidiary of UHF; (iv) CSI's net worth was so small that 
it could not have been legally held to complete the contract within 
the original estimated costs; (v) the State Housing Commissioner 
had waived his own rule regarding liquidity requirements in approv-
ing CSI as the contractor; and (vi) there was an additional undis- (! 
closed $200,000 agreement between CSI and Riverbay. 
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bases, respondents asserted two claims under the fraud 
provisions of the Federal Securities Acts of 19·33 and 
1934, 15 U. S. C. § 77g (a); 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b), and 
17 CFR § 240.10b-5. They also presented a claim 
against the State Financing Agency under the Civil Rights 
Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and 10 pendent state law claims. 
Petitioners, while denying the substance of these alle-
gations,8 moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground 
that federal jurisdiction was lacking. They maintained 
that shares of stock in Riverbay were not "securities" 
within the definitional sections of the Federal Securities 
Acts. In addition, the state parties moved to dismiss on 
sovereign immunity grounds. 
The District Court granted the motion to dismiss. 
366 F. Supp. 1117 (1973). It held that the denomina-
tion of the shares in Riverbay as "stock" did not, by 
itself, make them securities under the federal acts. The 
court further ruled, relying primarily on this Court's 
decisions in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 
344 (1943), and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 
( 1946), that the purchase in issue was not a security 
since it was neither induced by an offer of tangible ma-
terial profits, nor could such profits realistically be ex-
pected. In the District Court's words, it was "the 
fundamental nonprofit nature of this transaction" which 
presented "the insurmountable barrier to [respondents'] 
claims in the federal court." I d., at 1128.0 
8 Petitioners asserted that the Information Bulletin warned pur-
chasers of the possibility of rental increases, and denied it omitted 
material facts. They also argued that prior to occupancy all tenants 
were informed that rental charges had increased. In any event, 
petitioners claimed that respondents have suffered no damages since 
they may move out and retrieve their initial investments in full. 
9 The District Court also dismissed the § 1983 claim finding that 
the securities laws claims were "the only well-plea.ded underlying 
'basis for jurisdiction" under the Civil Rights Act. !d., at 1132. Iri 
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. 
500 F. 2d 1246 ( 197 4). It rested its decision on two 
alternative grounds. First, the court held that since the 
shares purchased were called "stock" the Securities Acts, 
which explicitly include "stock" in their definitional sec-
tions, literally applied. Second, the Court of Appeals 
concluded that the transaction was an investment con-
tract, within the meaning of the Acts and as defined by 
Howey, since there was an expectation of profits from 
three sources: (i) rental reductions resulting from the 
income produced by the commercial facilities established 
for the use of tenants at Co-Op City; (ii) tax deductions 
for the portion of the monthly rental charges allocable 
to interest payments on the mortgage; and (iii) savings 
based on the fact that apartments at Co-Op City cost 
substantially less than comparable nonsubsidized hous-
ing. The court further ruled that the immunity claims 
by the state parties were unavailing.10 Accordingly, the 
case was remanded to the District Court for consideration 
of respondents' claim on the merits. 
In view of the importance of the issues presented we 
granted certiorari. - U. S. - (1975). As we con-
clude that the disputed transactions are not securities 
within the contemplation of the federal statutes, we 
reverse. 
view of these rulings the court did not reach the sovereign immunity 
claims. 
10 The Circuit Court held that the State Agency was independent 
and distinct from the State itself and therefore it was a "person" 
for purposes of § 1983, that both the Agency and the State had 
waived immunity under § 32 (5) of the Private Housing Finance 
Act, and that the State had also implicitly waived its immunity by 
voluntarily participating in the sale of securities, an area subject to 
plenary federal regulations. See Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Alabama 
Docks Dept., 377 U. S. 184 (1964). In view of our disposition of 
this case we do not reach these immunity issues. 
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The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77b (1), de. 
fines a "security" as 
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, 
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or 
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, col-
lateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or 
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, 
voting-trust certificate of deposit for a security, frac-
tional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral 
rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument 
commonly known as a "security," or any certificate 
of interest or participation in, temporary or interim 
certificate for , receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant 
or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the 
foregoing." 11 
In providing this definition Congress did not attempt to 
articulate the relevant economic criteria for distinguish-
ing "securities" from "non-securities." Rather it sought 
to define "the term 'security' in sufficiently broad and 
general terms so as to include within that definition the 
many types of instruments that in our commercial world 
fall within the ordinary concept of a security." H. R. 
Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1933). The task 
has fallen to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) , the body charged with administering the Securi-
ties Acts, and ultimately to the federal courts to decide 
which of the myriad of financial transactions in our so-
ciety come within the coverage of these statutes. 
In making this determination in the present case we 
do not write on a clean slate. Well-settled principles 
n The definition of a security in the 1934 Act is virtually identical 
and, for present purposes, the coverage of the two Acts may be 
C(/nsidered equivalent. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 
336, 342 (1967); S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (1934). 
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enunciated by this Court establish that the sale of shares 
which entitle the purchaser to an apartment in Co-Op 
City is not one of the "countless and variable schemes 
devised by those who seek the use of the money of others 
on the promise of profits," Howey, supra, 328 U. S., at 
!299, and therefore it does not fall within "the ordinary 
concept of a security." 
A 
We reject at the outset any suggestion that the present 
<transaction, evidenced by the sale of shares called "stock," 
must be considered a security simply because the statu-
tory definition of a security includes the words "any ... 
stock." Rather we adhere to the basic principle that 
has guided all of the Court's decisions in this area: 
"In searching for the meaning and scope of the word 
'security' in the Act[s], form should be disregarded 
for substance and the emphasis should be on eco-
nomic reality." Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S., 
332, 336 ( 1967). 
See also Howey, supra, 328 U.S., at 298. 
The primary purpose of the Securities Acts of 1933 
and 1934 was to eliminate serious abuses in a largely 
unregulated securities market by providing for the regu-
lation of the sale of securities and the operation of 
securities exchanges. The focus of the Acts are on the 
capital market of the enterprise system: the raising of 
capital for profit-making purposes by the sale of securi-
ties, the providing of trading exchanges therefor, and the 
regulation thereof to prevent fraud and to protect the 
interest of investors. Transactions within the securities 
market, broadly defined, are economic in character; they 
necessarily turn on economic reality rather than form.12 
~2 While the record does not indicate precisely why the term stock 
was used for the instant transaction, it appears that this form is 
generally used as a matter of tradition and convenience. See 
? , 
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Thus, in construing these Acts against the background 
of their purpose, we bear in mind a traditional canon of 
statutory construction 
"that a thing may be within the letter of the statute 
and yet not within the statute, because not within 
its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers." 
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 
U. S. 457, 459 (1892). See also United States v. 
American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 543 
( 1940) .13 
Respondents' reliance on Joiner as support for a "lit-
eral approach" to defining a security is misplaced. The 
issue in J oinet was whether assignments of interests in 
oil leases, coupled with the promoters' offer to drill an ex-
ploratory well, were securities. Looking to the econohlic 
inducement provided by the proposed exploratory well, 
the Court concluded that these leases were securities 
even though "leases" as such were not included in the 
list of instruments mentioned in the statutory defini-
tions. In dictum the Court noted that "[i]nstruments 
may be included within [the definition of a security], as 
[a] a matter of law, if on their face they answer to the 
name or description." 320 U. S., at 351 (emphasis sup-
plied). And later, again in dictum, the Court stated 
P. Rohan & M. Reskin, Cooperative Housing Law & Practice, 
§ 2.01 ( 4) ( 1973). 
13 With the exception of the Second Circuit, every court of ap-
peals to consider the issue recently has rejected the literal approach 
urged by respondents. See C. N. S. Enterprises-, Inc. v. G&G Enter-
prises, Inc., 508 F. 2d 1354 (CA7 1975); McClure v. First National 
City Bank of Lubbock, 497 F. 2d 490 (CA5 1974), cert. denied, -
U. S. - (1975); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F. 2d 689 (CA3 
1973). See also 1 Loss, Securities Regulation 493 (2d ed. 1961) 
("substance governs rather than form: ... just as some things 
which look like real estate are securities, some things which look like 
securities are real estate."). 
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that a security "might" be shown "by proving the docu-
ment itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond or 
a share of stock." I d., at 355 (emphasis supplied). By 
using the conditional words "may" and "might" in these 
dicta the Court made clear that it was not establishing 
an inflexible rule barring inquiry into the economic reali-
ties underlying a transaction. On the contrary, the 
Court intended only to make the rather obvious point 
that, in contrast to the instrument before it which was 
not included within the explicit statutory terms, most 
instruments bearing these traditional titles are likely to 
be covered by the statutes.14 
In holding that the name given to an instrument is not 
dispositive, we do not suggest that the name is wholly 
irrelevant to the decision whether it is a security. There 
may be occasions when the use of a traditional name 
such as "stocks" or "bonds" will lead a purchaser justi-
fiably to assume that the federal securities laws apply. 
This would clearly be the case when the underlying 
transaction embodies some of the significant character-
istics typically associated with the named instrument. 
In the present case respondents do not contend, nor 
could they, that they were misled by use of the word 
· "stock" into believing that the federal securities laws gov-
erned their purchase. Common sense suggests that peo-
ple who intend to acquire only a residential apartment in 
·a state-subsidized cooperative, for their personal use, are 
14 Nor can respondents derive any support for a literal approach 
from Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra, which cited the Joiner dictum. 
Indeed in Tcherepnin the Court explicitly stated that "form should 
be disregarded for substance," id., at 336, and, only after analyzing 
the economic realities of the transaction at issue did it conclude that 
an instrument called a "withdrawable capital share" was, in sub-
stance, an "investment contract," a share of "stock," a "certificate 
of interest or participation in a profit sharing agreement," and a 
"transferable share." 
74-157 & 74-647-0PINION 
12 UNITED HOUSING FOUNDATION, INC. v. FORMAN 
not likely to believe that in reality they are purchasing 
investment securities simply because the transaction is 
evidenced by something called a share of stock. Even 
had there been reliance in this case on the nomenclature 
used, it would have been misplaced because the stock 
at issue had none of the characteristics "that in our 
commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a 
security." H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 11 
(1933). It should have been obvious to respondents 
that the interest which they purchased, although de-
nominated "stock," lacked what the Court in Tcherep-
nin deemed the most essential feature of stock: the right 
to receipt of "dividends contingent upon an apportion-
ment of profits." 289 U. S., at 339. Since Riverbay 
was a nonprofit corporation, there could be no profits and 
hence no distribution of profits by way of dividends. 
These shares also lack the other characteristics tradition-
ally associated with stock: they are not negotiable; they 
cannot be pledged or hypothecated; they confer no vot-
ing rights in proportion to the number of shares owned; 
and they cannot appreciate in value. In short, the 
inducement to purchase was solely to acquire subsidized 
low-cost living space; it was not to invest for profit. 
We conclude that the designation of the instruments 
transferred as "stock" cannot control their legal effect or 
bring the transaction within the federal securities laws. 
Viewing economic reality rather than mere form, we hold 
that the shares purchased by respondents were not stock 
within the meaning of these laws. 
B 
The Court of Appeals, as an alternative ground for its 
decision , concluded that a share in Riverbay was also an 
"investment contract" as defined by the Securities Acts. 
Respondents also argue, in the alternative, that in any 
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event what they agreed to purchase is "commonly known 
as a 'security' " within the meaning of these laws. In 
making this determination we again must examine the 
substance-the economic realities of the transaction-
rather than the names that may have been employed 
by the parties. We perceive no distinction, for present 
purposes, between an investment contract or a security. 
In either case, the basic test for distinguishing the in-
strument from other commercial dealings is 
"whether the scheme involves an investment of 
money in a common enterprise with profits to come 
solely from the efforts of others." 328 U. S., at 301. 
This test, in shorthand form, embodies the essential attri-
butes that run through all of the Court's decisions defin-
ing a security. The touchstone is the presence of an 
investment in a common venture premised on a reason-
able expectation of profits to be derived from the entre-
prenurial or managerial efforts of others. By profits, the 
Court has meant either capital appreciation resulting 
from the development of the initial investment, see 
Joiner, supra (sale of oil leases conditioned on promoters' 
agreement to drill exploratory well); Howey, supra (sale 
of orange groves coupled with service contract to culti-
vate, harvest and sell the crops), or a participation in 
earnings, typically called "dividends," resulting from the 
use of investors' funds, see SEC v. Variable Annuity Life 
Insurance Co., 359 U. S. 65 (1959) (annuity payments 
fluctuate with value of insurance company's investment 
portfolio); Tcherep1tin v. Knight, supra (dividends on 
the investment based on savings and loan association's 
profits). The investor is "attracted solely by the pros-
pects of a return" on his investment. Howey, supra, 
328 U. S., at 300. By contrast, when a purchaser is 
motivated by a desire to use or consume the item pur-
74-157 & 74-647-0PINION 
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chased-"to occupy the land or to develop it themselves," 
as the Howey Court put it, 328 U.S., at 300-the securi-
ties laws do not . apply. See Joiner, supra.15 
In the present case there can be no doubt that investors 
were attracted solely by the prospect of acquiring a place 
to live, and not by financial returns on their invest-
ments?6 The Information Bulletin used to interest pros-
pective residents emphasized the fundamental nature and 
purpose of the undertaking: 
"A cooperative is a nonprofit enterprise controlled 
democratically by its members-the people who are 
using its services .... 
"People find living in a cooperative community 
-enjoyable for more than one reason. Most people 
join, however, for the simple reason that it is a way 
to obtain decent housing at a reasonable price. 
However, there are other advantages. The purpose 
of a cooperative is to provide home ownership, not 
just apartments to rent. The community is de-
15 In Joiner, the Court stated: 
"Undisputed facts seem to us, however, to establish the conclusion 
that defendants were not, as a practical matter, offering naked 
leasehold rights. Had the offer mailed by defendants omitted the 
economic inducements of the proposed and promised exploration 
well, it would have been quite a different proposition." 320 U. S., 
at 348. 
This distinction was critical because the exploratory drillings gave 
the investments "most of their value and all of their lure." Id., 
at 349. The land itself was purely an incidental consideration in 
the transaction. 
16 In some transactions the investor is offered both a commodity 
for use and an expectation of profits. See SEC Release No. 33-5347 
in 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (Jan. 18, 1973). See generally Rohan, The 
Securities Law Implications of Condominium Marketing Programs 
Which Feature a Rental Agency or Rental Pool, 2 Conn. L. Rev. 1 
(1969). The application of the federal securities laws to these trans~ 
actions may raise difficult questions that are not present in this case. 
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signed to provide a favorable environment for family 
and community living .... 
"The common bond of collective ownership which 
you share makes living in a cooperative different. 
It is a community of neighbors. Home ownership, 
common interests and the community atmosphere 
make living in a cooperative like living in a small 
town. As a rule there is very little turnover in a 
cooperative." Appendix, at 162a-164a. 
Now here does the Bulletin seek to attract investors by 
the hope of profits resulting from the efforts of the pro-
moters or third parties. On the contrary, the Bulletin 
repeatedly emphasizes the "nonprofit" nature of the en-
,deavor. It explains that if rental charges exceed ex-
penses the difference will be returned as a rebate, not 
invested for profit. It also informs purchasers that they 
will be unable to resell their apartments at a profit since 
the apartment must first be offered back to Riverbay "at 
the price paid for it." 17 In short, neither of the kinds 
of profits traditionally associated with securities were 
offered to respondents. 
The Court of Appeals recognized that there must be 
an expectation of profits, and conceded that there is "no 
possible profit on a resale of [this] stock." 500 F. 2d, 
17 This requirrment effectively insures that no apartment will be 
sold for more than its original cost. Consonant with the purposes 
of the Mitchell-Lama Act, whenever there are prospective pur-
chasers willing to pay as much as the initial purchase price for an 
apartment in Co-Op City, Riverbay will purchase back the apart-
ment and resell it at its original cost. See Appendix, at 138a. 
Indeed if, for some reason, Riverbay does not repurchase these 
apartments, a tenant is prohibited by law from reselling his apart-
ment for more than the purchase price plus a fraction of the mort-
gage amortization that he has paid, and then only to an approved 
tenant. See N. Y. Private Housing Finance Law § 31-a. (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1974-1975). 
L 
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at 1254. The court correctly noted, however, that profit 
may be derived from the income yielded by an invest-
ment as well as from captia,] appreciation, and then pro-
ceeded to find "an expectation of 'income' in at least 
three ways." Ibid. Two of these supposed sources of 
income or profits may be disposed of summarily. We 
turn first to reliance by the Court of Appeals on the 
deductibility for tax purposes of the portion of the 
monthly rental or "occupancy charge" that is applied to 
interest on the mortgage. We know of no basis in law 
( or economics for the view that payment of interest, with 
v 2 the consequent deductibility for tax purposes, constitutes · 
mcome or _profits. The tax ' benefit here relied upon is 
available to any homeowner who pays interest on his 
mortgage. See Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S. C. § 216; 
·Eckstein v. United States, 452 F. 2d 1036 (Ct. Cl. 1971). 
'This is a function of the tax laws that is wholly unrelated 
to any concept of profits from an investment.u 
The Court of Appeals also found support for its notion 
·of profits in the fact that Co-Op City offered space at 
a cost substantially below the going rental charges for 
comparable housing. Again, this is a wholly novel 
theory of "profits" and one we cannot accept. The low 
rent derives from the substantial financial subsidies pro-
. vided by the State of New York. This benefit cannot be 
liquidated into cash; nor does it result from the mana-
gerial efforts of others. In a real sense, it no more 
embodies the attributes of income or profits than do wel-
fare benefits, food stamps or other government subsidies. 
The final source of profit relied on by the Court of 
Appeals was the possibility of net income derived from 
18 See Rosenbaum, The Resort Condominium and the Federal 
Securities Law-a Case Study in Government Inflexibility, 60 Va. L. 
n.ev. 785, 795-796 (1974); Casenote, 62 Geo. L. Rev. 1515, 1524-
1526. 
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the leasing of Co-Op City of commercial facilities, pro~ 
fessional offices and parking spaces, and its operation 
c0f community washing machines. The income, if any, 
from these conveniences, all located within the common 
areas of the housing project, was to be used to reduce 
tenant rental cost. Conceptually, one might readily 
.agree that net income from the leasing of commercial 
and professional facilities is the kind of profit tra-
ditionally associated with a security investment.19 See 
Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra. But in the present case 
this income-if indeed there is any-is far too specula-
tive and insubstantial to bring the entire transaction 
within the Securities Acts. 
Initially we note that the prospect of such income as 
a means of offsetting rental costs is never mentioned in I . I ~ f I 
the Information Bulletin. T_hus it is clear that investors ', 'I• 
were not attracted to Co-Op Ci~ by the offer ..2f_p_9t~n-
1a rental reductions resulting from the leasing of these ~ ,J 
tacllitles. Moreover, there is nothing in the record to 
s uggest tbat these facilities do in fact return a profit in 
the sense that the leasing fees are greater than the actual 
cost to Co-Op City of the space rented. 20 The short of 
the matter is that the stores and services in question 
were established not as a means of returning profits to 
1.9 The "income" derived from the rental of parking spaces and the 
operation of washing machines clearly was not profits for respond-
ents since these facilities were provided exclusively for the use of 
tenants. Thus when the income collected from the use of these 
facilities exceeds the cost of their operation the t enants simply 
receive the return of an initial overcharge in the form of a rent 
rebate. 
20 The Court of Appeals quoted the gross rental income received 
from these facilities . But such figures by themselves are irrelevant 
since the record does not indicate the cost to Co-Op City of pro-
viding and maintaining the rented space. There can be no profits 
in the absence of net income. 
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tenants, but for the purpose of making available essen-
tial services for the residents of this enormous complex.21 
Without stores in which to shop, and medical and dental 
offices in which to receive treatment, this development 
seeking to house 50,000 people would hardly be a viable 
community. See generally Miller, Cooperative Apart-
ments: Real Estate or Securities? 45 B. U. L. Rev. 464, 
500 (1965). In sum, these commercial facilities are 
simply incidental to the project. Undoubtedly they 
make Co-Op City a more attractive housing opportu-
nity, but the possibility of some rental reduction is not an 
"expectation of profit" in the sense found necessary 
in Howey. 22 
21 By statute these commercial facilities could only be "incidental 
and appurtenant" to the housing project. N. Y. Private Housing 
Law§ 12 (5) (McKinney Supp. 1974-1975). 
22 Respondents urge us to abandon the element of profits in the 
tlefinition of securities and to adopt the "risk capital" approach 
articulated by the California Supreme Court in Silver Hills Country 
Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P. 2d 906 (1961). Cf. El 
Kahadem v. Equity Securities Corp., 494 F. 2d 1224 (CA9 1974), 
cert. denied, - U. S. - (1974). See generally Coffey, The Eco-
nomic Realities of a Security: Is There a More Meaningful For-
mula?", 18 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 367 (1967); Long, "An Attempt to 
Return 'Investment Contracts' to the Mainstream of Securities 
ltegulations,'l 24 Okla. L. Rev. 135 (1971); Hannan & Thomas, 
The Importance o£ Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal 
Securities, 25 Hast. L. Rev. 219 (1974). Even if we were inclined 
to adopt such a "risk capital" approach we would not apply it in 
the present case. Purchasers of apartments in Co-Op City take no 
risk in any significant sense. If dissatisfied with their apartments, 
they may recover their initial investment in full. See n. 6, supra. 
Respon~s assert that if Co-Op City becomes bankrupt they 
stand to lose their whole investment. But, in view of the fact 
t.hat the State has financed over 92% of the cost of construction 
and carefully rl:lgulates the development and operation of the project, 
bankruptcy in the normal sense is an unrealistic possibility. In 
any event, the risk of insolvency of an ongoing housing cooperative 
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There is no doubt that purchasers in this housing 
cooperative sought to obtain a decent home at an attrac-
tive price. But that type of economic interest charac-
izes every form of commercial transaction. What 
distinguishes a security transaction-and what is absent 
here-is an investment where one parts with his money 
in the hope of receiving profits from the efforts of others, 
·and not where he purchases a commodity for personal 
consumption or living quarters for personal use.23 
"differ[s] vastly" from the kind of risk of "fluctuating" value 
:associated with securities investments. SEC. v. Variable Annuity 
Life Insurance Co., supra, 395 U. S., at 90-91 (BHENNAN, J., con-
curring). See Hannan & Thomas, supra, at 242-249; Long, Intro-
duction to Symposium: Interpreting The Statutory Definition of a 
Security: Some Pragmatic Considerations, 6 St. Mary's L. J. 96, 
126-128 (1974). 
23 The SEC has filed an amicus brief urging us to hold the federal 
securities laws applicable to this case. Traditionally the views of 
an agency charged with administering the governing statute would 
be entitled to considerable weight. See, e. g., United States Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers, -U.S.- (1975)(slp op., 
at 22); Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U. S. 65 (1974); Investment Company 
.Institute v. Camp,401 U.S. 617, 626-627 (1971). But in this case the 
SEC's position flatly contradicts what would appear to be a rather 
careful statement of the Commission's views in a recent release. 
In Release No. 33-5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (Jan. 18, 1973), appli-
cable to "the sale of condominium units and other units in a real 
tlstate development," the SEC stated its view that only those real 
estate investments that are "offered and sold with emphasis on the 
economic benefits to the purchaser to be derived from the man-
agerial efforts of the promoter, or a third party designated or 
arranged for by the promoter," are to be considered securities. Id., 
at 1736. In particular, the Commission explained that the Securi-
ties Acts do not apply when "commercial facilities are a part of a 
residential project" if 
"(a) the income from such facilities is used only to offset common area 
expenses and (b) the operation of such facilities is incidental to the 
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III 
In holding that there is no federal jurisdiction, we 
do not address the merits of respondents' claim. Nor do 
we indicate any view as to whether the type of claims 
here involved should be protected by federal rather than 
state law. 24 We decide only that the type of transaction 
source for the individual owners of a condominium or cooperative 
unit." 
See also SEC Real Estate Advisory Committee Report 74-91 
(1972); Dickey & Thorpe, Federal Security Regulation of Condo-
minimum Offerings, 19 N.Y. L. F. 473 (1974). 
Several commentators have noted the inconsistency between the 
SEC's position in the above release and the decision by the Court of 
Appeals in this case, which the SEC now supports. See Berman 
& Stone, Federal Securities Law and the Sale of Condominiums, 
Homes and Homesite, 30 Bus. Law. 411, 420-425 (1975); Note, 
Condominium Regulation: Beyond Disclosure, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
'639, 654-655 (1975). In view of this unexplained contradiction in 
the Commission's position we accord no special weight to its views. 
See Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 404 U. S. 418, 
426 (1972); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, - U. S.-
(1975) (slip op., at 21 n. 8). 
24 Several commentators have suggested that the sale of housing 
·developments such as condominiums and cooperatives is in need of 
federal regulation and therefore that the securities laws should be 
·stretched to reach these transactions. See, e. g., Note, Federal Se-
curties Regulation of Condominiums: A Purchaser's Perspective, 62 
Geo. L. J. 1403 (1974); Note, Cooperative Housing Corporations 
and the Federal Securities Laws, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 118 (1971). 
Others have disagreed, claiming that the extensive body of regula-
tion developed over more than four decades under these acts would 
be in appropriate and also costly to the sellers and buyers of resi-
dential housing. See Berman & Stone, supra, n. 23; Note, Condo-
minimum Regulation: Beyond Disclosure, supra, n. 23. Moreover, 
extension of the coverage of the securities laws to real estate trans-
actions would involve important questions as to the appropriate 
balance between state and federal responsibility. In any event, the 
determination of whether and in what manner federal regulation 
may be required for housing transactions, where the character-
Istics of an investment in securities are not present, is better left 
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before us, in which the purchasers were interested in 
acquiring housing rather than making an investment for 
profit, is not within the scope of the federal securities 
laws. 
Since respondents' claims are not cognizable in federal 
court, their complaint must be dismissed.25 The judg-
ment below is ther~OI:e 
Reversed. 
to tho Congress which can assess both the costs and benefits of any 
such regulation. Indeed, only recently, Congress instructed the 
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development "to conduct a full 
and complete investigation and study ... with respect to ... the 
problems, difficulties and abuses or potential abuses applicable to 
condominium and cooperative housing." Pub. L. 93-383, 88 Stat. 
740 (Aug. 22, 1974). See also Real Estate Settlement Procedures 
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-533; Interstate Land Sales Full Dis-
closure Act, 15 U.S. C. §§ 1701-1720. 
25 Besides the Securities Acts claims, respondents also included 
a vague and conclusory allegation under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against 
petitioner, the New York State Housing Finance Agency. We 
agree with the District Court that "the federal securities allegations 
represent the only well pleaded underlying basis for jurisdiction 
under [§ 1983]." 366 F. Supp., at 1132. Thus that count must 
also be dismissed. The remaining counts in the complaint were all 
predicated on alleged violations of state law, not independently cog-
nizable in federal court. 
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tion, Inc., et aL, 
Petitioners, 
.74-157 v. 
Milton Forman et al. 
State of New York and the 
New York State Hous~ 
ing Finance Agency, 
Petitioners, 
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Milton Forman et aL 
On Writs of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second 
Circuit 
[June -, 1975] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The issue in this case is whether shares of stock en-
titling a purchaser to lease an apartment in Co-Op City, 
a state subsidized and supervised nonprofit housing co-
operative, are "securities" within the purview of the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934. 
I 
Co-Op City is a massive housing cooperative in New 
York City. Built between 1965 and 1971 , it presently 
houses approximately 50,000 people on a 200-acre site 
containing 35 high rise buildings and 236 town houses. 
The project was organized, financed , and constructed 
under the New York State Private Housing Finance Law, 
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commonly known as the Mitchell-Lama Act, enacted to 
ameliorate a perceived crisis in the availability of decent 
low-income urban housmg. In order to encourage pri -
vate developers to build low cost cooperative housing, 
New York prcvides thfm with large long-term, low-
interest mortgage loans and substantial tax exemptious. 
Receipt./'"Of such benefits is conditioned on a will-
ingness to have the State review virtually every step in 
the development of the coopera.tive. See N. Y. Private 
Housing Finance Law ~§ 11-40 (McKinney Supp. 1974-
1975). The developer also must agree to operate the 
facility "on a nonprofit basis," id., at ~ 11-a (2a), and he 
may lease apartments only to people whose incomes fall 
below a certain level and who have been approved by the 
State.1 
The United Housing Foundation (UHF), a nonprofit 
membership corporation established for the purpose of 
"aiding and encouraging" the creation of "adequate, safe 
and sanitary housing accommodations for ws,ge earners 
and other persons of low and moderate income," 2 Appen-
dix, at 95a, was responsible for initiating and sponsoring 
the development of Co-Op City. Acting under the 
Mitchell-Lama Act, UHF organized the Riverbay Cor-
poration (Riverbay) to own and operate the land and 
buildings constituting Co-Op City. Riverbay, a non-
profit cooperative housing corporation, issued the stock 
that is the subject of this litigation. UHF also con-
1 Eligibilit:v is limited to familie:; whose monthly income does not 
exceed s1x time:,; thP monthly rental charge (or for famil!e::; of fonr 
or more, seven times the rental charge) . N . Y Private Hou~ing 
Finance Law § 31 (2) (a) (McKmney Supp. 1974-1975) Preference 
in admissiOn must be g1ven to vrteran::; , the hand1cappef!, and t hi' 
elderly ld., at § 31 (7)-(9) 
2 UHF is composed ot labor unions, housing cooperative~, and 
civic group~ . H has <~pon::;orrrt thr ronHt ructiOn of ~evera 1 ma,10r 
housing cooperatJVe~-< in New York Cny. 
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tracted with Community Serv1ces, Inc. ( CSI), its wholly 
owned subsidiary, to serve as the general contractor and 
sales agent for the project.~ As required by the Mitchell-
Lama Act, these decisions were approved by the State 
Housing Commissioner. 
To acquire an apartment in Co-Op City an eligible 
prospective purchaser must buy 18 shares of stock in 
Riverbay for each room desired. The cost per share 
is $25, making the total cost $450 per room, or $1,800 
for a four-room apartment. The sole purpose of ac-
quiring these shares is to enable the purchaser to 
occupy an apartment in Co-Op City; in effect, their 
purchase is a recoverable deposit on an apartment. The 
shares are explicitly tied to the apartment: they cannot 
be transferred to a nontenant; nor can they be pledged 
or encumbered; and they descend, along with the apart-
ment, only to a surviving, spouse. No voting rights at-
tach to the shares as such: participation in the affairs of 
the cooperative appertains to the apartment, with the 
residents of each apartment being entitled to one vote 
irrespective of the number of shares owned. 
Any tenant who wants to terminate his occupancy, or 
who is forced to move out.j must offer his stock to River-
hEW at its initial selling price of $25 per share. In the ex-
tremely unlikely event that Riverbay declines to repur-
chase the stock/ the tenan~; cannot sell it for more than 
3 CSI is a business corporation that has acted a~ the contractor 
on several UHF-~ponsored honsmg cooprratives. 
4 A tenant can be forced to move out if he violates the provi:;ions 
of h1:; "occupancy ngreemrnt," wh1ch 1s essentially a lease for the 
aJJartment, or if h1s mconw grows to exrred the eligibihty standards. 
~To datr evrry family that ha:; Withdrawn from Co-Op City hao 
received back Its mmal payment m full. Indeed, at the time this 
8Uit was filed thrre wen• 7,000 families on the waiting list for apart-
mentl:l in this cooperative. In addition, a ~:>perwl fund of m•arly 
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the initial purchase price plus a fractiOn of the portion 
of the mortgage that he has paid off, and then only to a 
prospective tenant satisfying the statutory income eligi-
bility requirements. See N. Y. Private Housing Finance 
Law § 31-a (McKinney Supp. 1974-1975). 
In May 1965, subsequent to the completion of the 
initial planning, Riverbay circulated an Information 
Bulletin seeking to attract tenants for what would some-
day be apartments in Co-Op Cit.y. After describing the 
nature and advantages of cooperative housing generally 
and of Co-Op City in particular, the Bulletin informed 
prospective tenants that the total estimated cost of the 
project, based largely on an anticipated construction con-
tract with CSI, was $283,695,550. Only a fraction of this 
sum, $32,795,550, was to come from the purchase of 
shares by tenants. The remaining $250,900,000 was to 
be financed by a 40-year low-interest mortgage loan from 
the New York Private Housing Finance Agency. After 
construction of the project the mortg2.ge payments and 
current operating expenses would be met by monthly 
rental charges paid by the tenants. While these rental 
charges were to vary, depending on the size, na-
ture, and location of an apartment, the 1965 Bulletin 
estimated that the "average" monthly cost would be 
$23.02 per room, or $92.08 for a four-room apartment. 
Several times during the construction of Co-Op City, 
Riverbay, with the approval of the State Housing Com-
missioner, revised its contract with CSI to allow for 
increased construction costs. In addition, Riverbay 
incurred other expenses that had not been reflected in the 
1965 Bulletin. To meet these increased expenditures, 
Riverbay, with the Commissioner's approval, repeatedly 
$1 million had been e~tabhshed by :;mall monthy contributiom; from 
all tenant;; to insure that those wnnhng to movr out would receive 
full compensation for theJr share!:'. 
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secured increased mortgage loans from the State Housing 
Agency. Ultimately the construction loan was $125 
million more than the figure estimated in the 1965 Bul-
letin. As a result, while the initial purchasing price 
remained at $450 per room, the average monthly rental 
charges increased periodically, reaching a figure of $39.68 
per room as of July 1974.0 
These increases in the rental charges precipitated the 
present lawsuit. Respondents, 57 residents of Co-Op 
City, sued in federal court on behalf of all 15,372 apart-
·ment owners, and derivatively on behalf of Riverbay, 
seeking upwards of $30 million in damages, forced rental 
reductions and other "appropriate" relief. Named as 
defendants (petitioners herein) were UHF, CSI, River-
bay, several individual directors of these organiza-
tions, the State of New York, and the State Private 
Housing Finance Agency. The heart of respondents' 
claim was that the 1965 Co-Op City Information Bulletin 
falsely represented that CSI would bear all subsequent 
cost increases due to factors such as inflation. Respond .. 
ents further alleged that they were misled in their 
purchases of shares since the Information Bulletin 
failed to disclose several critical facts.7 On these bases, 
6 As the rental charges increased, the income eligibility require-
ments for resident8 of Co-Op City expanded accordingly. See n. I, 
sup.ra. 
7 Respondents maintained that the following material facts w~re 
omitted: (i) the original est1mated cost had never been adhered to 
in any of the previous Mitchell-Lama projects sponsored by UHF 
and built by CSI; (ii) petitioners knew that the initial estimate 
would not be followed in the present project ; (iii) CSI was a wholly 
owned ~ubsidiary of UHF; ( iv) CSI's net worth was so small tha.t 
it could not have been legally held to complete the contract within 
the original estimated costs ; ( v) the State Housing Commissioner 
had waived his own rule regarding liquidity requirements in approv-
ing CSI as the contractm; and (vi) there was an additional undis~ 
elosed contract between CST and Rivf:'rbay 
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respondents asserted two claims under the fraud pro~ 
visions of the federal Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, 
15 U. S. C. § 77q (a); 15 U. S. C. § 78j (h), and 
17 CFR § 240.10b-5. They also presented a claim 
against the State Financing Agency under the Civil Rights 
Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and 10 pendent state law claims. 
Petitioners, while denyin6 the substance of these alle-
gations,8 moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground 
that federal jurisdiction was lacking. They maintained 
that shares of stock in Riverbay were not "securities" 
within the definitional sections of the federal Securities 
Acts. In addition, the state parties moved to dismiss on 
sovereign immunity grounds. 
The District Court granted the motion to dismiss. 
366 F. Supp. 1117 (1973). It held that the denomina-
tion of the shares in Riverbay as "stock" did not, by 
itself, make them securities under the federal acts. The 
court further ruled, relying primarily on this Court's 
decisions in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 
344 (1943), and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 
(1946), that the purchase in issue was not a security 
transaction since it was neither induced by an offer of 
tangible material profits, nor could such profits realis-
tic~:~lly be expected. In the District Court's words, it was 
"the fundamental nonprofit nature of this transaction" 
which presented "the msurmountable barrier to lrespond-
ents'] claims in the federal court.'' ld., at 1128.9 
8 Petitioners asserted that the Information Bulletin warned pur-
chasers of the posi:nbihty of rental mcreases, and demed that it 
omitted material facts. They also argued that pnor to occupancy all 
tenants were mformed that rental charges had increased. In any 
event, p('tit10ners clauned that rPspondents have suffered no damages 
since they may move out and retneve thtlr uutial mvestments in full. 
11 The Distnct Court also dism1ssed the § J9&'3 claim finding that 
the securities laws cla1ms were ''the only well-pleaded underlying 
bas1s for junsdict10n under the Civil Rights Act " !d., at 1132. In 
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. 
500 F. 2d 1246 (1974). It rested its decision on two 
alternative grounds. First, the court held that since the 
shares purchased were called "stock" the Securities Acts, 
which explicitly include "stock" in their definitional sec-
tions, were literally applicable. Second, the Court of Ap-
peals concluded that the transaction was an investment 
contract within the meaning of the Acts and as defined by 
Howey, since there was an expectation of profits from 
three sources: ( i) rental reductions resulting from the 
income produced by the commercial facilities established 
for the use of tenants at Co-Op City; (ii) tax deductions 
for the portion of the monthly rental charges allocable 
to interest payments on the mortgage; and (i1i) savings 
based on the fact that apartments at Co-Op City cost 
substantially less than comparable nonsubsidized hous-
ing. The court further ruled that the immunity claims 
by the State parties were unavailing. 111 Accordingly, the 
case was remanded to the District Court for consideration 
of respondents' claim on the merits. 
In view of the importance of the issues presented we 
granted certiorari. 419 U. S. 1120 ()975). As we con-
clude that the disputed transactions are not purchases of 
securities within the contemplation of the federal stat-
utes, we reverse. 
view of these rulings the court did not reach the sovereign immunity 
claims. 
10 The Circuit Court held that the State Agency was independent 
and distinct from the Stat~ iis~lf and therefore was a "person" 
for purposes of § 1983, that both the Agency and the State had 
waived immumty under § 32 (5) of the Private Housing Finance 
Act, and that the State had also implicitly wa1ved its immunity by 
voluntarily participating in the sale of securities, an area subject to 
plenary federal regulation. See Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Alabama 
Docks Dept., 377 U. S. 184 (1964) . In view of our disposition of 
this case we do not reach these issues. 
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H 
The Securities Act of 1933, 15 Uo S.C. § 77b (1), de~ 
fines a "security" a.s 
uany note, ~tock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, 
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or 
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, col~ 
lateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or 
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, 
voting-trust certificate of deposit for a security, frac~ 
tiona] undivided interest in oil, gas. or other mineral 
rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument 
commonly known as a "security," or any certificate 
of interest or participation in, temporary or interim 
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant 
or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the 
foregoing." 11 
In providing this definition Congress did not attempt to 
articulate the relevant economic criteria for distinguish-
ing "securities" from "non-securities." Rather it sought 
to define "the term 'security' in sufficiently broad and 
general terms so as to iucl ude within that definition the 
many types of instruments that in our commercial world 
fal: within the ordinary concept of a security." H. R. 
Rep. No. 85, 73d Coug., 1st :Sess., 11 (1933). The task 
has fallen to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), the body charged with administering the Securi-
ties Acts, and ultimately to the federal courts to decide 
which of the myriad financial transactions in our so~ 
ciety come wit.hin the eoverage of these statutes. 
:n The definition of a Hecurity in the 1934 Act i& virtually identical 
and, for present purpose:;, the coverage of the two Acts may be 
considered the Bame. See Tcherepnin v Kmght, 389 U S. 332, 
336, :342 (1967) ; S. Rep. No. 792, 7:3d Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (1934). 
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In making this determination in the present case we 
do not write on a clean slate. Well-settled principles 
enunciated by this Court establish that the sale of shares 
which entitle the purchaser to an apartment in Co-Op 
City is not one of the "countless and variable schemes 
devised by those who seek the use of the money of others 
on the promise of profit~S," Howey, supra, 328 U. S., at 
299, and therefore these shares do not fall within "the 
ordinary concept of a security." 
A 
We reject at the outset any suggestion that the present 
transaction, evidenced by the sale of shares called 
"stock," 12 must be considered a security transaction sim-
ply because the statutory definition of a security includes 
the words "and . .. stock." Rather we adhere to the 
basic principle that has guided all of the Court's deci-
sions in this area: 
"In searching for the meaning and E;Cope of the word 
'security' in the Act[s], form should be disregarded 
for substance and the emphasis should be on eco-
nomic reality." Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S., 
332, 336 (1967) . See also Howey, supra, 328 U. S., 
at 298. 
The primary parpose of the Securities Acts of 1933 
and 1934 was to eliminate serious abuses in a largely 
unregulated securities market by providing for the regu~ 
lation of the sale of securities and the operation of 
securities exchanges. Plainly the need for this regula-
+,wn depends on the economic realities underlying certain 
iuvestment transactions, and not on the names given to 
these transactions. Thus, m construing these Acts 
12 While the record does not indicate prt'cisely why the term stock 
was used for the instant transaction, it appear~ that this form is 
generally Ubed as a, matter of tradition and convenience. See 
74-157 & 74-U47-0PINION. 
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against the background of their purpose, we are guide<.l 
by a traditional canon of statutory construction: 
"that a thing may be within the letter of the statute 
and yet not within the statute, because not within 
its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers." 
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 
U. S. 457, 459 (1892). See also United States v. 
American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 543 
(1940) .13 
Respondents' reliance on Joiner as support for a "lit--
eral approach" to defining a security is misplaced. The 
issue in Joiner was whether assignments of interests in 
o~l leases, coupled with the promoters' offer to drill an ex-
ploratory well, were securities. Looking to the economic 
inducement provided by the proposed exploratory well, 
the Court concluded that these leases were securities 
even though "leases" as such were not included in the 
list _.?yinstruments mentioned in the otatutory defini-
tionl" In dictum the Court noted that "[i] nstruments 
may be included within [the definition of a security], as 
[a] matter of law, if on their face they answer to the 
name or description." 320 U. S., at 351 (emphasis sup-
plied). And later, again in dictum, the Court stated 
P. Rohan & M. Reskin, Cooperative Housing Law & Practice, 
§ 2.01 (4) (1973) . 
13 With the exception of the Second Circuit, every court of ap-
peals recently to consider the issue has rejected the literal approach 
urged by respondents . See C. N. S. EnterrYriseSJ, Inc. v. G&G Enter-
prises, Inc., 508 F. 2d 1354 (CA7 1975); McClure v. First National 
Bank of Lubbock, 497 F . 2d 490 (CA5 1974), cert. demed, 420 
U. S. 930 (1975); Lino v. City hvesting Co., 487 F. 2d 689 (CA3 
1973). See also 1 Loss, Securities Regulation 493 (2d ed. 1961) 
("substance governs rather than form: ... just as some things: 
which look like real estate are securities, some things which look like· 
Becurities are real estate.") . 
. ' 
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that a security "mtght" be shown "by proving the docu" 
ment itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond or 
a share of stock.'' !d., at 355 (emphasis supplied). By 
using the conditional words "may" and "might" in these 
dicta the Court made clear that it was not establishing 
an inflexible rule barring inquiry into the economic reali-
ties underlying a transaction. On the contrary, the 
Court intended only to make the rather obvious point 
that, in contrast to the instrument before it which was 
not included within the explicit statutory terms, most 
instruments bearing these traditional titles are likely to 
be covered by the statutes. 14 
In holding that the name given to an instrument is not 
dispositive, we do not suggest that the name is wholly 
irrelevant to the decision whether it is a security. There 
may be occasions when the use of a traditional name 
such as "stocks" or "bonds" will lead a purchaser justi-
fiably to assume that the federal securities laws apply. 
This would clearly be the case when the underlying 
transaction embodies some of the significant character-
istics typically associated with the named instrument. 
In the present case respondents do not contend, nor 
could they, that they were misled by use of the word 
"stock" into believing that the federal securities laws gov-
erned their purchase. Common sense suggests that peo-
ple who intend to acquire only a residential apartment in 
a state-subsidized cooperative, for their personal use, are 
14 Nor can re;pondents derive any support for a literal approach 
from Tcherepnin v. Knight , supra, which cited the Joiner dictum, 
Indeed in Tcherepnin the Court explicitly :stated that ''form should 
be di~regarded for substance,' uf., at 336, and, only after analyzmg 
the economic realitie;; of the tram-action at i:ssue did It conclude that 
an in:strument called a "withdrawable capital :share" was, in sub-
stance, an "investment contract,'' a share of "stock," a "certificate 
of interest or participatiOn in a profit sharmg agreement," and a 
"transferable share." 
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not likely to believe that ir1 reality they are purchasing 
investment securities simpiy because the transaction is.: 
evidenced by something called a share of stock. These 
shares lack what the Court in Tcherepnin deemed the 
most common feRtun~ of stock: the right to receipt of 
"dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits." 
289 U.S., at 339. :Nor do they possess the other charac~ 
teristics traditionally associated with stock: they are not 
negotiable; they cannot be pledged or hypothecated; 
they confer no voting rights in proportion to the number 
Of shares owned; and they cannot appreciate in value. 
In short, the inducement to purchase was solely to ac-
quire subsidized low-cost living space i it was not to 
invest for profit. · 
B 
· The Court of Appeals, as an alternative ground for its 
decision, concluded that a share in Riverbay was also an 
"investment contract" as defined by the Securities Acts. 
Respondents further argue that in any event what they 
agreed to purchase is "commonly known as a 'security'" 
within the meaning of these laws. In making this de-
termination we again must examine the substance-the 
economic realities of the transaction-rather than the 
names that may have been employed by the parties. 
We perceive uo distinction , for present purposes, be-
tween an investment contract and an instrument com-
monly known as a security. In either case, the basic 
test for distinguishing the instrument from other com-
mercia] dealings is 
"whether the scheme involves an investment of 
money in a common enterprise with profits to come 
solely from the efforts of others!' Howey, supra,. 
328 U.S., at :30L 
This test, in shorthand form, embodies the essential attri .. 
' . 
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butes that run through all of the Court's decisions defin-
ing a security. The touchstone is the presence of an 
investment in a common venture premised on a reason-
able expectation of profits to be derived from the entre-
prenurial or managerial efforts of others. By profits, the 
Court has meant either capital appreciation rAsulting 
from the development of the initial investment, see 
Joiner, supra (sale of oil leases conditioned on promoters' 
agreement to drill exploratory well), or a participation in 
earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds, see 
Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra (dividends on the invest-
ment based on savings and loan association's profits) . 
In such ca'tles the investor is "attracted solely by the pros-
pects of a return" on his investment. Howey, supra, 
328 U. S., at 300. By contrast, when a purchaser is 
motivated by a desire to use or consume the item pur-
chased-"to occupy the land or to develop it themselves," 
as the Howey Court put it, 328 U.S., at 300-the securi-
ties laws do not apply.15 See Joiner, supra.16 
15 In some transactions the invrstor is offered both a commodity or 
real estate for use and an expectation of profits. See SEC Release 
No. 33-5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (Jan . 18, 1973). See generally 
Rohan, The Securities Law Implications of Condominium Marketing 
Programs Which Feature a Rental Agency or Rental Pool, 2 Conn. 
L. Rev. 1 ( 1969) . The applica t10n of the federal securities Ia ws to 
these transactions may ra.Jse difficult questions that are not, present 
in this case. 
16 In Joiner, the Court stat('d : 
'·Undisputed facts seem to us, however, to establish the conclusion 
that defendants were not, as a practical matter, offering naked 
leasehold rights. Had the offer mailed by defendants omitted the 
economic inducements of the proposed and promised exploration 
well, it would have been qlllte a different proposition." 320 U .. S ., 
at 348. 
This distinction was critical becam;e the exploratory drillings gave 
"the investments 1'll10f'lt of their value and all of their lure." Id., 
·. 
' ' 
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In the present case there can be no doubt that investors 
were attracted solely by the prospect of acquiring a place 
to live, and not by financial returns on their invest-
ments. The Information Bulletin distributed to pros-
pective residents emphasized the fundamental nature and 
purpose of the undertaking : 
"A cooperative is a nonprofit enterprise controlled 
democratically by its members-the people who are 
using its services. . . . 
"People find living in a cooperative community 
enjoyable for more than one reason. Most people 
join, however, for the simple reason that it is a way 
to obtain decent housing at a reasonable price. 
However, there are other advantages. Tile purpose 
of a cooperative is to provide home ownership, not 
just apartments to rent. The community is de-
signed to provide a favorable environment for family 
and community living .... 
"The common bond of collective ownership which 
you share makes living in a cooperative different. 
It is a community of neighbors. Home ownership, 
common interests and the community atmosphere 
make living in a cooperative like living in a small 
town. As a rule there is very little turnover in a 
cooperative." Appendix, at 162a-164a. 
Nowhere does the Bulletin seek to attract investors by 
the prospect of profits resulting from the efforts of the 
promoters or third parties. On the contrary, the Bulletin 
repeatedly emphasizes the "nonprofit" nature of the en-
deavor. lt explains that if rental charges exceed ex-
penses the difference will be returned as a rebate, not 
invested for profit. It also informs purchasers that they 
at 349. The land itself was purely an mcidental con<Jideration in 
the transaction. 
74-iM' & 74-647-6f>fNION 
UNITED HOUSING FOUNDATION, INC. v. FORMAN 15 
will be unable to resell their apartments at a profit since 
the apartment must first be offered back to Riverbay "at 
the price paid for it." l7 In short, neither of the kinds 
of profits traditionally associated with securities were 
offered to respondents. 
The Court of Appeals recognized that there must be 
an expectation of profits for these shares to be securities, 
and conceded that there is "no possible profit on a resale 
of [this] stock." 500 F. 2d, at 1254. The court cor-
rectly noted, however, that profit may be derived from 
the income yielded by an investment as well as from 
capital appreciation, and then proceeded to find "an 
expectation of 'income' in at least three ways." Ibid. 
Two of these supposed sources of income or profits may 
be disposed of summarily. We turn first to the Court 
of Appeals' reliance on the deductibility for tax purposes 
of the portion of the monthly rental charge applied to 
interest on the mortgage. Even if these deductions 
could be considered profits they are not the kind of 
profits associated with a security transaction since they 
do not derive from the managerial efforts of others.18 
Rather these deductions are tax benefits available to any 
17 This requirement effectively insures that no apartment will be 
sold for more than its original cost . Consonant with the purposes· 
of the Mitchell-Lama Act, whenever there are prospective pur-
chasers willmg to pay as much as the initial purC'hase price for an 
apartment in Co-Op City, Riverbay will repurchase the apartment 
and resell it at its original cost. See Appendix, at 138a. If, for 
some reason, Riverbay does not purchase the apartment the tenant 
~till cannot make a profit on his sale. See pp. 3-4, supra. 
18 See Rosenbaum, The Resort Condommium and the Federaf 
Securities Law-a Case Study in Government Inflexibility, 60 Va. L .. 
Rev. 7"85, 795-796 (1974); Casenote, 62 Georgetown L. Rev. 1515,. 
1524-1526 (1974}. 
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homeowner who pays interest on his mortgage. See 
Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. § 216; Eckstein v. 
United States, 452 F. 2d 1036 (Ct. Cl. 1971). 
The Court of Appeals also found support for its con-
cept of profits in the fact that Co-Op City offered space 
at a cost substantially below the going rental charges 
for comparable housing. This is a wholly novel 
theory of "profits" and one we cannot accept. The low 
rent derives from the substantial financial subsidies pro-
vided by the State of New York. This benefit cannot be 
liquidated into cash; nor does it result from the mana-
gerial efforts of others. In a real sense, it no more 
embodies the attributes of income or profits than do wel-
fare benefits, food stamps or other government subsidies. 
The final source of profit relied on by the Court of 
Appeals was the possibility of net income derived from 
the leasing by Co-Op City of commercial facilities, pro-
fessional offices and parking spaces, and its operation 
of community washing machines. The income, if any, 
from these conveniences, all located within the common 
areas of the housing proJect, is to be used to reduce 
tenant rental costs. Conceptually, one might readily 
agree that net income from the leasing of commercial 
and professional facilities is the kind of profit tra-
ditionally associated with a security investmentY See 
1'cherepnin v. Knight, supra. But in the present case 
this income-if indeed there is any-is far too specula-
10 The "income" derived from the rental of parking spaces and the 
operation of washmg machmcs clearly was not profit for respond-
ent~; since these facilities wen' provided exclusively for the use of 
tenants Thus when the income collected from the use of these 
facilities exceeds the cost of the1r operation the tenants simply 
receive the return of an initwl ovf'rcharge m the form of a rent 
rebate. 
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tive and insubstantial to brmg the entire transaction 
within the Securities Acts. 
Initially we note that the prospect of such income as 
a means of offsetting rental costs is never mentioned in 
the Information Bulletin. Thus it is clear that investors 
were not attracted to Co-Op City by the offer of these 
potential rental reductions. Moreover, nothing in the 
record suggests that the facilities in fact return a profit in 
the sense that the leasing fees are greater than the actual 
cost to Co-Op City of the space rented.20 The short of 
the matter is that the stores and services in question 
were established not as a means of returning profits to 
tenants, but for the purpose of making essential services 
available for the residents of this enormous complex. 
Without stores in which to shop, and medical and dentai 
offices in which to receive treatment, this development 
seeking to house 50,000 people would hardly be a viable 
community.21 By statute these facilities could only be· 
"incidental and appurtenant" to the housing project," 
N. Y. Private Housing Law § 12 (5) (McKinney Suppr 
1974-1975). Undoubtedly they make Co-Op City a 
more attractive housing opportunity, but the possibility 
of some rental reduction is not an "expectation of profit"' 
in the sense found necessary in Howey 22 
20 The Court of Appeals quoted the gross rental income received 
from these faciliti es. But ;;uch .figures by themselves are irrelevant 
since the record does not indirate the eost to Co-Op City of pro-
viding and maintaining the rented Hpace. 
21 See Miller, Cooperat1ve Apartments Real E~tate or Securities?, 
45 B. U. L. Rev. 4H4, 500 (191:i5). 
22 Respondents urge us to abandon the element of profits in the 
definition of securitic::; and to adopt the '' nsk capital" approach 
articulated by the California Supreme Court m Silver Hills Country 
Cl~tb v. Sobteski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P. 2d 906 (1961). Cf. Er 
Khadem v Equity 8ecurtttes Corp., 494 F. 2rl 1224 (CA9 1974), . 
cert. denied, 419 U .. S. 900 (1974) Se<' gmerally Coffey, The Eco-
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There is no doubt that purchasers in this housing· 
cooperative sought to obtain a decent home at an attrac-
tive price. But that type of economic interest charac-
izes every form of commercial transaction. What 
distinguishes a security transaction-and what is absent 
here-is an investment where one parts with his money 
in the hope of receiving profits from the efforts of others, 
and not where he purchases a commodity for personal 
consumption or living quarters for personal use.23 
nomic Realities of a Security : Is There a More Meaningful For-
mula?, 18 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 367 (1967); Long, An Attempt to 
Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mamstream of Securities 
Regulations, 24 Okla. L. Rev. 135 (1971); Hannan & Thomas, 
The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal 
Securities, 25 Hast. L. Rev. 219 (1974) . Even if we were inclined 
to adopt such a "nsk capital" approach we would not apply it in 
the present case. Purchasers of apartments in Co-Op City take no 
risk in any significant sen~e. If di~atisfied with their apartments, 
they may recover their initial investment in full. See n. 6, supra. 
Respondents assert that If Co-Op City becomes bankrupt they 
stand to lose their whole investment. But, in view of the fact 
that the State has financed over 92% of the cost of construction 
and carefully regulates the development and operation of the project, 
bankruptcy in the normal sense is an unrealistic possibility. In 
any event, the risk of insolvency of an ongoing housing cooperative 
"differ[s] vastly" from the kind of risk of "fluctuating" value 
associated with securities investments. SEC. v. Variable Annuity 
Life Insurance Co., 395 U. S 65, 90-91 (1959) (BRENNAN, J., con-
curring). See Hannan & Thomas, supra, at 242-249; Long, Intro-
duction to Symposium: Intrrpreting The Statutory Definition of a 
Security: Some Pragmatic ConsideratiOns, 6 St. Mary's L. J. 96, 
126-128 (1974) . 
28 The SEC has filed an amicus brief urging us to hold the federal 
securities laws applicable to this case. Traditionally the views of 
an agency charged with admimstering the governing statute wot~d 
be entitled to coru-nderable weight. See e. g., United States Na-
tional Association of Securtttes Dealers,- U S.- (1975) (slip op., 
at 22); Saxbe v. Bmtos, 419 U.S 65, 74 (1974); Investment Com-
pany Instaute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 620-627 (1971). But in th1s 
case the SEC's pos1tion flatly rontradiets what appear~ to bra rather 
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III 
In holding that there is no federal jurisdiction, we 
do not address the merits of respondents' allegatiOns of 
fraud. Nor do we indicate any view as to whether the 
type of claims here involved should be protected by fed-
eral regulations.~4 We decide only that the type of 
careful statement of the Commission's views in a recent release. 
In Release No. 33-5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (Jan. 18, 1973), appli-
cable to "the sale of condominium units and other units in a real 
estate development," the SEC stated its view that only those real 
estate investments that are "offered and sold with emphasis on the 
economic benefits to the purchaser to be derived from the man-
agerial efforts of the promoter, or a third party designated or 
arranged for by the promoter," are to be considered securities. !d., 
at 1736. In particular, the Commission explained that the Securi-
ties Acts do not apply when "commercial facilities are a part of a 
residential project" if 
"(a) the income from such facilities is used only to offset common area 
expenses and (b) the operation of such facilities is incidental to the 
project as a whole and are not established as a primary income 
source for the individual owners of a. condominium or cooperative 
unit." Ibid. 
See also SEC Real Estate Advisory Committee Report 74-91 
(1972); Dickey & Thorpe, Federal Security Regulation of Condo-
minimum Offerings, 19 N.Y. L. F. 473 (1974) . 
Several commentators have noted the inconsistency between the 
SEC's position in the above release and the decision by the Court of 
Appeals in this case, which the SEC now supports. See Berman 
& Stone, Federal Securities Law and the Sale of Condominiums, 
Homes and Homesites, 30 Bus. Law. 411, 420-425 (1975); Note, 
Condominium Regulation: Beyond Disclosure, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
639, 654-655 (1975). In view of this unexplained contradiction in 
the Commission's position we accord no special weight to its views. 
See Reliance Electnc Co. v Emerson Electric Co., 404 U. S. 418, 
426 (1972); Blue Chtp Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,- U. S.-
(1975) (shp op., at 21 n. 8). 
24 It ha;; been suggested that the sale of housing developments 
such as condominiums and coopPratives IS m need of federal regula -
tion and therefore the "ecurities laws should be construed or· 
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transaction before us, in which the purchasers were in-
terested in acquiring housing rather than making an 
investment for profit, is not within the scope of the fed-
eral securities laws. 
Since respondents' claims are not cognizable in federal 
court, the District Court properly dismissed their com-
plaint.25 The judgment below is therefore 
Reversed. 
amended to reach these transactions. See, e. g., Note, Federal Se-
curities Regulations of Condominiums: A Purchaser's Perspective, 62 
Georgetown L. J. 1403 (1974); Note, Cooperative Housing Corpora-
tions and the Federal Securities Laws, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 118 (1971). 
Others have disagreed, claiming that the extensive body of regula-
tion developed over more than four decades under these Acts would 
be inappropriate and unduly costly to the sellers and buyers of resi-
dential housing. See Berman & Stone, supra, n. 23; Note, Condo-
minimum Regulation: Beyond Disclosure, supra, n. 23. Moreover, 
extension of the securities laws to real estate transactions would in-
volve important questions as to the appropriate balance between 
state and federal responsibility . The determination of whether and 
in what manner federal regulation may be required for housing 
transactions, where the characteristics of an investment in securities 
are not present, is better left to the Congress, which can assess both 
the costs and benefits of any such regulation. Indeed, only recently, 
Congress instructed the Secretary of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment "to conduct a full and complete investigation and study ... 
with respect to . .. the problems, difficulties and abuses or potential 
abuses applicable to condominium and cooperative housing." Pub. 
L. 93-383, 88 Stat. 740 (Aug. 22, 1974). See also Real Estate Set-
tlement Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93---533; Interstate 
Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S. C.§§ 1701-1720. 
25 Besides the Securities Acts claims, respondents also included 
a vague and conclusory allrgation under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against 
petitioner, the New York State Housing Finance Agency. We 
agree with the District Court that "the fPderal secunties allegationff 
represent the only well pleaded underlying basis for jurisdiction 
under [§ 1983]." 366 F . Supp., at 1132. Thus that count must 
also be dismissed. The remaming counts in the complaint were all 
predicated on alleged violations of state law, not independently cog-
niz.able in federal court. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 74-157 ANI> 74-647 
United Housing Founda-
tion, Inc., et al., 
Petitioners, 
74-157 v. 
Milton Forman et al. 
State of New York and the 
New York State Hous-
ing Finance Agency, 
Petitioners, 
74-647 v. 
Milton Forman et al. 
On Writs of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second 
Circuit. 
[June - , 1975] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opm10n of the 
Court. 
The issue in this case is whether shares of stock en-
titling a purchaser to lease an apartment in Co-Op City, 
a state subsidized and supervised nonprofit housing co-
operative, are "securities" within the purview of the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934. 
I 
Co-Op City is a massive housing cooperative in New 
York City. Built between 1965 and 1971, it presently 
houses approximately 50,000 people on a 200-acre site 
containing 35 high rise buildings and 236 town houses. 
The project was organized, financed, and constructed 
under the New York State Private Housing Finance Law, 
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commonly known as the Mitchell-Lama Act, enacted to 
ameliorate a perceived crisis in the availability of decent 
low-income urban housing. In order to encourage pri-
vate developers to build low cost cooperative housing, 
New York provides them with large long-term, low-
interest mortgage loans and substantial tax exemptions. ..eJ_ 
Receipt of such benefits is condition.rl <n"'" a will- -
ingness to have the State review virtually every step in 
the development of the cooperative. See N. Y. Private 
Housing Finance Law §§ 11-37, as amended, (McKinney 
Supp. 1974-1975). The developer also must agree to 
operate the facility "on a nonprofit basis," id., at § 11-a 
(2a), and he may lease apartments only to people whose 
incomes fall below a certain level and who have been 
approved by the State.1 
The United Housing Foundation (UHF), a nonprofit 
membership corporation established for the purpose of 
"aiding and encouraging" the creation of "adequate, safe 
and sanitary housing accommodations for wage earners 
and other persons of low and moderate income," 2 Appen-
dix, at 95a, was responsible for initiating and sponsoring 
the development of Co-Op City. Acting under the 
Mitchell-Lama Act, UHF organized the Riverbay Cor-
poration (Riverbay) to own and operate the land and 
buildings constituting Co-Op City. Riverbay, a non-
profit cooperative housing corporation, issued the stock 
that is the subject of this litigation. UHF also con .. 
1 Eligibility is limited to families whose monthly income does not 
exceed six times the monthly rental charge (or for families of four 
or more, seven times the rental charge) . N. Y. Private Housing 
Finance Law§ 31 (2) (a) (McKinney Supp. 1974-1975). Preference 
in admission must be given to veterans, the handicapped, and the 
elderly. /d., at § 31 (7)-(9) . 
2 UHF is composed of labor unions, housing cooperatives, and 
civic groups. It has sponsored the construction of several major 
housing cooperatives in New York City. 
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tracted with Community Services, Inc. (CSI), its wholly 
owned subsidiary, to serve as the general contractor and 
sales agent for the project.8 As required by the Mitchell-
Lama Act, these decisions were approved by the State 
Housing Commissioner. 
To acquire an apartment in Co-Op City an eligible 
prospective purchaser must buy 18 shares of stock in 
Riverbay for each room desired. The cost per share 
is $25, making the total cost $450 per room, or $1,800 
for a four-room apartment. The sole purpose of a.c-
quiring these shares is to enable the purchaser to 
occupy an apartment in Co-Op City; in effect, their 
purchase is a recoverable deposit on an apartment. The 
shares are explicitly tied to the apartment: they cannot 
be transferred to a nontenant; nor can they be pledged 
or encumbered; and they descend, along with the apart-
ment, only to a surviving spouse. No voting rights at-
tach to the shares as such: participation in the affairs of 
the cooperative appertains to the apartment, with the 
residents of each apartment being entitled to one vote 
irrespective of the number of shares owned. 
Any tenant who wants to terminate his occupancy, or 
who is forced to move out/ must offer his stoclc to River-
hay at its initial selling price of $25 per share. In the ex-
tremely unlikely event that Riverbay declines to repur-
chase the stock/ the tenant cannot sell it for more than 
8 CSI is a business corporation that has acted as the contractor 
on several UHF -sponsored housing cooperatives. 
4 A tenant can be forced to move out if he violates the provisions 
of his "occupancy agreement," which is essentially a lease for the 
apartment, or if his income grows to exceed the eligibility standards. 
6 To date every family that has withdrawn from Co-Op City has 
received back its initial payment in full. Indeed, at the time this 
suit was filed there were 7,000 families on the waiting list for apart-
ment& in this cooperative. In addition, a special fund of nearlv 
74-157 & 74-647-0PINION 
4 UNITED HOUSING FOUNDATION, INC. v. FORMAN 
the initial purchase price plus a fraction of the portion 
of the mortgage that he has paid off, and then only to a 
prospective tenant satisfying the statutory income eligi· 
bility requirements. See N. Y. Private Housing Finance 
Law § 31-a (McKinney Supp. 1974-1975). 
In May 1965, subsequent to the completion of the 
initial planning, Riverbay circulated an Information 
Bulletin seeking to attract tenants for what would some-
day be apartments in Co-Op City. After describing the 
nature and advantages of cooperative housing generally 
and of Co-Op City in particular, the Bulletin informed 
prospective tenants that the total estimated cost of the 
project, based largely on an anticipated construction con-
tract with CSI, was $283,695,550. Only a fraction of this 
sum, $32,795,550, was to be raised by the sale of J 
shares to tenants. The remaining $250,900,000 was to 
be financed by a 40-year low-interest mortgage loan from 
the New York Private Housing Finance Agency. After 
construction of the project the mortgage payments and 
current operating expenses would be met by monthly 
rental charges paid by the tenants. While these rental 
charges were to vary, depending on the size, na-
ture, and location of an apartment, the 1965 Bulletin 
estimated that the "average" monthly cost would be 
$23.02 per room, or $92.08 for a four-room apartment. 
Several times during the construction of Co-Op City, 
Riverbay, with the approval of the State Housing Com-
missioner, revised its contract with CSI to allow for 
increased construction costs. In addition, Riverbay 
incurred other expenses that had not been reflected in the 
1965 Bulletin. To meet these increased expenditures, 
Riverbay, with the Commissioner's approval, repeatedly 
$1 million had been established by small monthy contributions from 
all tenants to insure that those wanting to move out would receive 
full compensation for their shares. 
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secured increased mortgage loans from the State Housing 
Agency. Ultimately the construction loan was $125 
million more than the figure estimated in the 1965 Bul-
letin. As a result, while the initial purchasing price 
remained at $450 per room, the average monthly rental 
charges increased periodically, reaching a figure of $39.68 
per room as of July 1974.6 
These increases in the rental charges precipitated the 
present lawsuit. Respondents, 57 residents of Co-Op 
City, sued in federal court on behalf of all 15,372 apart-
ment owners, and derivatively on behalf of Riverbay, 
seeking upwards of $30 million in damages, forced rental 
reduction{ and other "appropriate" relief. Named as 
defendants (petitioners herein) were UHF, CSI, River-
bay, several individual directors of these organiza-
tions, the State of New York, and the State Private 
Housing Finance Agency. The heart of respondents' 
claim was that the 1965 Co-Op City Information Bulletin 
falsely represented that CSI would bear all subsequent 
cost increases due to factors such as inflation. Respond-
ents further alleged that they were misled in their 
purchases of shares since the Information Bulletin 
failed to disclose several critical facts.7 On these bases, 
6 As the rental charges increased, the income eligibility require-
ments for residents of Co-Op City expanded accordingly. See n. 1, 
sup.ra. 
7 Respondents maintained that the following material facts were 
omitted: (i) the original estimated cost had never been adhered to 
in any of the previous Mitchell-Lama projects sponsored by UHF 
and built by CSI ; (ii) petitioners knew that the initial estimate 
would not be followed in the present project; (iii) CSI was a wholly 
owned subsidiary of UHF ; (iv) CSI's net worth was so small that 
it could not have been legally held to complete the contract within 
the original estimated costs ; ( v) the State Housing Commissioner 
had waived his own rule regarding liquidity requirements in approv-
ing CSI as the contractor ; and (vi) there was an additional undis--
closed contract between CSI and }f.iverbay. 
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respondents asserted two claims under the fraud pro-
visions of the federal Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, 
15 U. S. C. § 77q (a); 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b), and 
17 CFR § 240.10b-5. They also presented a claim 
against the State Financing Agency under the Civil Rights 
Act, 42 U.S. C. § 1983, and 10 pendent state law claims. 
Petitioners, while denying the substance of these alle-
gations,8 moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground 
that federal jurisdiction was lacking. They maintained 
that shares of stock in Riverbay were not "securities" 
within the definitional sections of the federal Securities 
Acts. In addition, the state parties moved to dismiss on 
sovereign immunity grounds. 
The District Court granted the motion to dismiss. 
366 F. Supp. 1117 (1973). It held that the denomina-
tion of the shares in Riverbay as "stock" did not, by 
itself, make them securities under the federal acts. The 
court further ruled, relying primarily on this Court's 
decisions in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 
344 (1943), and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293 
(1946), that the purchase in issue was not a security 
transaction since it was neither induced by an offer of 
tangible material profits, nor could such profits realis-
tically be expected. In the District Court's words, it was 
·"thP- fundamental nonprofit nature of this transaction" 
which presented "the insurmountable barrier to [respond-
ents'] claims in th[e] federal court." Id., at 1128.9 
8 Petitioners asserted that the Information Bulletin warned pur-
chasers of the possibility of rental increases, and denied that it 
omitted material facts. They also argued that prior to occupancy all 
tenants were informed that rental charges had increased. In any 
·event, petitioners claimed that respondents have suffered no damages 
since they may move out and retrieve their initial investments in full. 
9 The District Court also dismissed the § 1983 claim finding that 
the "federar securities allegations represent the only well-pleaded 
lJnderlying basis for jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act." Id.1 
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. 
500 F. 2d 1246 (1974). It rested its decision on two 
alternative grounds. First, the court held that since the 
shares purchased were called "stock" the Securities Acts, 
which explicitly ir.clude "stock" in their definitional sec-
tions, were literally applicable. Second, the Court of Ap-
peals concluded that the transaction was an investment 
contract within the meaning of the Acts and as defined by 
Howey, since there was an expectation of profits from 
three sources: (i) rental reductions r~sulting from the 
income produced by the commercial facilities established 
for the use of tenants at Co-Op City; (ii) tax deductions 
for the portion of the monthly rental charges allocable 
to interest payments on the mortgage; and (iii) savings 
based on the fact that apartments at Co-Op City cost 
substantially less than comparable nonsubsidized hous-
ing. The court further ruled that the immunity claims 
by the State parties were unavailing.10 Accordingly, the 
case was remanded to the District Ccurt for consideration 
of respondents' claims on the merits. 
In view of the importance of the issues presented we 
granted certiorari. 419 U. S. 1120 (1975). As we con-
clude that the disputed transactions are not purchases of 
securities within the contemplation of the federal stat-
ute8, we reverse. 
at 1132. In view of these rulings the court did not reach the 
sovereign immunity claims. 
10 The Circuit Court held that the State Agency was independent 
and distinct from the State itself and therefore was a "person" 
for purposes of § 1983, that both the Agency and the State had 
waived immunity under § 32 (5) of the Private Housing Finance 
Law, and that the State had also implicitly waived its immunity by 
voluntarily participating in the sale of securities, an area subject to 
plenary federal regulation. See Parden v. 7'erminal Ry. of Alabama 
Docks Dept., 377 U. S. 184 (1964) . In view of our disposition of 
this case we do not reach these issues. 
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II 
The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77b (1), de-
'fines a "security" as 
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, 
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or 
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, col-
lateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or 
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, 
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a 
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or 
other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or 
"instrument commonly known as a 'security,' or any 
certificate of interest or participation in, temporary 
or interim certificate for , receipt for, guarantee of, or 
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of 
the foregoing." 11 
In providing this definition Congress did not attempt to 
· articulate the relevant economic criteria for distinguish-
ing "securities" from "non-securities." Rather it sought 
to define "the term 'security' in sufficiently broad and 
general terms so as to include within that definition the 
many types of instruments that in our commercial world 
fall within the ordinary concept of a security." H. R. 
Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1933). The task 
has fallen to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), the body charged with administering the Securi-
ties Acts, and ultimately to the federal courts to decide 
which of the myriad financial transactions in our so-
ciety come within the coverage of these statutes. 
:n The definition of a security in the 1934 Act is virtually identicat 
and, for present purposes, the coverage of the two Acts may be 
considered the same. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 
336, 342 (1967); S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (1934). 
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In making this determination in the present case we 
do not write on a clean slate. Well-settled principles 
enunciated by this Court establish that the shares pur- \ 
chased by respondents do not represent any of the 
"countless and variable schemes devised by those who 
seek the use of the money of others on the promise of 
profits," Howey, supra, 328 U. S., at 299, and therefore 
do not fall within "the ordinary concept of a security." 
A 
We reject at the outset any suggestion that the present 
transaction, evidenced by the sale of shares called 
"stock," 12 must be considered a security transaction sim-
ply because the statutory definition of a security includes 
the words "any . .. stock." Rather we adhere to the 
basic principle that has guided all of the Court's deci-
sions in this area : 
"[I]n searching for the meaning and scope of the 
I 
word 'security' in the Act[s] , form should be disre-
garded for substance and the emphasis should be on 
economic reality." Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 
332, 336 (1967) . See also Howey, supra, 328 U. 8., 
at 298. 
The primary purpose of the Securities Acts of 1933 
and 1934 was to eliminate serious abuses in a largely 
unregulated securities market. The focus of the Acts is 
on the capital market of the enterprise system : the sale \ 
of securities to raise capital for profit-making purposes, 
the exchanges on which securities are traded, and the 
need for regulation to prevent fraud and to protect the 
1 2 While the record does not indicate precisely why the term stock 
was used for the instant transaction, it appears that this form is 
generally used as a matter of tradition and convenience. See 
P. Rohan & M. Reskin, Cooperative Housing Law & Practice, 
§2.01 (4) (1973). 
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interest of investors. Because securities transactions are I 
economic in character Congress intended the application 
pf these statutes to turn ou the economic realities under-
lying a transaction, and not on the name appended 
thereto. Thus, in construing these Acts against the 
background of their purpose, we are guided by a tradi-
tional canon of statutory construction: 
"that a thing tnay be within the ietter of the statute 
:and yet not within the statute, because not within 
,its spirit, nor with,in .the intention of its makers." 
Church of the HoJy Trif!-ity v, United States, 143 
U. S. 457, 459 (1892). See also United States v: 
American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 54~ 
(1940).18 
Respondents' reliance on Joiner as support for a "lit-
eral approach" to defining a security is misplaced. The 
issue in Joiner was whether assignments of interests in 
·oil leases, coupled with the promoters' offer to drill an ex-
·ploratory well, were securities. Looking to the economic 
~nducement provided by the proposed exploratory well, 
the Court concluded that these leases were securities 
even though "leases" as such were not included in the 
list of instruments mentioned in the statutory defini-
tion. In dictum the Court noted that "[i]nstruments 
may be included within [the definition of a security], as 
[a] matter of law, if on their face they answer to the 
13 With the exception of the Second Circuit, every court of ap-
:Peals recently to consider the issue has rejerted the literal approach 
urged by respondents. SPe C. N. S. Enterprises, Inc . v. G. & G. 
Enterprises, Inc., 508 F. 2d 1354 (CA7 1975); McClure v. Ji'irst Na-
tional Bank of Lubbock, 497 F. 2d 490 (CAS 1974) , cert. denied, 420 
U. S. 930 (1975); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F. 2d 689 (CA3 
1973) . See also .} 1.· Loss-, Securities Regulation 493 (2d ed. 1961) 
("substance governs rather than form : ... just as some things 
,which look like real estate are securities, some things which look like: 
Securities are real estate.''), 
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name or description." 320 U. S., at 351 (emphasis sup-
plied) . And later, again in dictum, the Court stated 
that a security "might" be shown "by proving the docu-
ment itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond or 
a share of stock." Id., at 355 (emphasis supplied). By 
using the conditional words "may" and "might" in these 
dicta the Court made clear that it was not establishing 
an inflexible rule barring inquiry into the economic reali-
ties underlying a transaction. On the contrary, the 
Court intended only to make the rather obvious point 
that, in contrast to the instrument before it which was 
not included within the explicit statutory terms, most 
instruments bearing these traditional titles are likely to 
be covered by the statutes.14 
In holding that the name given to an instrument is not 
dispositive, we do not suggest that the name is wholly 
irrelevant to the decision whether it is a security. There 
may be occasions when the use of a traditional name 
such as ustocks" or "bonds" will lead a purchaser justi-
fiably to assume that the federal securities laws apply. 
This would clearly be the case when the underlying 
transaction embodies some of the significant character-
istics typically associated with the named instrument. 
In the present case respondents do not contend, nor 
could they, that they were misled by use of the word 
"stock" into believing that the federal securities laws gov-
erned their purchase. Common sense suggests that peo-
14 Nor can respondents derive any support for a literal approach 
from Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra, which quoted the Joiner dictum. 
Indeed in Tcherepnin the Court explicitly stated that "form should 
be disregardf'd for substance," id., at 336, and only after analyzing 
the economic realities of the transaction at issue did it conclude that 
an instrument called a "withdrawable capital share" was, in sub-
stance, an "investment contract," a share of "stock," a "certificate 
of interest or participation in a profit sharing agreement," and a 
4'transferable share," 
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ple who intend to acquire only a residential apartment in 
a state-subsidized cooperative, for their personal use, are 
not likely to believe that in reality they are purchasing 
investment securities simply because the transaction is 
evidenced by something called a share of stock. These 
shares have none of the characteristics "that in our com-~ 
mercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a se-
curity." H. R. Rep. No. 85, supra, at 11. Despite their 
name, they lack what the Court in Tcherepnin deemed 
the most common feature of stock: the right to receive 
"dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits." 
289 U. S., at 339. Nor do they possess the other charac-
teristics traditionally associated with stock: they are not 
negotiable; they cannot be pledged or hypothecated; 
they confer no voting rights in proportion to the number 
of shares owned; and they cannot appreciate in value. 
In short, the inducement to purchase was solely to ac-
quire subsidized low-cost living space; it was not to 
invest for profit. 
B 
The Court of Appeals, as an alternative ground for its 
decision, concluded that a share in Riverbay was also an 
"investment contract" as defined by the Securities Acts. 
Respondents further argue that in. any event what they 
agreed to purchase is ''commonly known as a 'security'" 
within the meaning of these laws. In considering these 
claims, we again must examine the substance-the 
economic realities of the transaction-rather than the 
names that may have been employed by the parties. 
We perceive no distinction, for present purposes, be-
tween an "investment contract" and an "instrument com-
monly known as a security.' ' In either case, the basic 
test for distinguishing the transaction from other com-
mercial dealings is 
61whether the scheme involves an investment of 
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money in a common enterprise with profits to come 
solely from the efforts of others." Howey, supra, 
328 U. S., at 301.15 
This test, in shorthand form, embodies the essential attri-
butes that run through all of the Court's decisions defin-
ing a security. The touchstone is the presence of an 
investment in a common venture premised on a reason-
able expectation of profits to be derived from the entre-
prenurial or managerial efforts of others. By profits, the 
Court has meant either capital appreciation resulting 
from the development of the initial investment, as in 
Joiner, supra (sale of oil leases conditioned on promoters' 
agreement to drill exploratory well), or a participation in 
earnings resulting frotn the use of investors' funds, as in 
Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra (dividends on the invest-
ment based on savings and loan association's profits). 
In such caees the mvestor is 11attracted solely by the pros-
pects of a return" on his investment. Howey, supra, 
328 U. S., at 300. By contrast, when a purchaser is 
motivated by a desire to use or consume the item pur-
chased-"to occupy the land or to develop it themselves," 
as the Howey Court put it, 328 U. S., at 300-the securi-
ties laws do not apply.16 See Joiner, supra.11 
15 This test speak<> in terms of "profits to come solely from the 
efforts of others." (Emphasis supplied.) Although the issue is not 
presented in this case, we note that the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit ha~ held that "the word "solely' should not be read 
as a strict or literal limitation of the definition of an investment 
contract, but rather must be construed realistically, so as to include 
within the definition those schemes which involve in substance, if 
not form, securities." SEC v. Glenn Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 
F. 2d 476,482 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 821 (1973) . 
·w ln some transactions the investor is offered both a commodity or 
real estate for use and an expectation of profits. See SEC Release 
No. 33-5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (Jan. 18, 1973). See generally 
[Footnote 17 i& em p. t.n 
74-157 & 74.-647-0PINION 
'14 UNITED HOUSING FOUNDATION, INC. v. FORMAN 
In the present case there can be no doubt that investors 
were attracted solely by the prospect of acquiring a place 
to live, and not by financial returns on their invest-
ments. ·The Information Bulletin distributed to pros-
pective residents emphasized the fundamental nature and 
·purpose of the undertaking: 
"A cooperative is a nonprofit enterprise owned 
and controlled democratically by its members-the 
people who are using its services .... 
"People find living in a cooperative community 
enjoyable for more than one reason. Most people 
join, however, for the simple reason that it is a way 
to obtain decent housing at a reasonable price. 
However, there are other advantages. The purpose 
of a cooperative is to provide home ownership, not 
just apartments to rent. The community is de-
signed to provide a favorable environment for family 
and community living .... 
"The common bond of collective ownership which 
you share makes living in a cooperative different. 
It is a community of neighbors. Home ownership, 
Rohan, The Securities Law Implications of Condominium Marketing 
Programs Which Feature a Rental Agency or Rental Pool, 2 Conn. 
L. Rev. 1 (1969). The application of the federal securities laws to 
these transactions may raise difficult questions that are not present 
in this case. 
1 7 In Jmner, the Court stated: 
"Undisputed facts seem to us, however, to establish the conclusion 
that defendants were not, as a practical matter, offering naked 
leasehold rights. Had the offer mailed by defendants omitted the 
economic inducements of the proposed and promised exploration 
well, it would have been quite a different proposition." 320 U. S., 
at 348. 
This distinction was critical because the exploratory drillings gave 
the investments "most of their value and all of their lure." /d., 
at 349. The land itself was purely an incidental consideration in 
the transaction. 
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common interests and the community atmosphere 
make living in a cooperative like living in a small 
town. As a rule there is very little turnover in · a 
cooperative." Appendix, at 162ar-166a. 
Now here does the Bulletin seek to attract investors by 
the prospect of profits resulting from the efforts of the 
promoters or third parties. On the contrary, the Bulletin 
repeatedly emphasizes the "nonprofit" nature of the en~ 
deavor. It explains that if rental charges exceed ex-
penses the difference will be returned as a rebate, not 
invested for profit. It also informs purchasers that they 
will be unable to resell their apartments at a profit since 
the apartment must first be offered back to Riverbay "at 
the price ... paid for it." 18 I d., at 162a. In short, 
neither of the kinds of profits traditionally associated 
with securities were offered to respondents. 
The Court of Appeals recognized that there must be 
an expectation of profits for these shares to be securities, 
and conceded that there is. uno possible profit on a resale 
of [this] stock." 500 F . 2d, at 1254. The court cor-
rectly noted, however, that profit may be derived from 
the income yielded by an investment as well as from 
capital appreciation, and then proceeded to find "an 
expectation of 'income' in at least three ways." Ibid. 
Two of these supposed sources of income or profits may 
be disposed of summarily. We turn first to the Court 
of Appeals' reliance on the deductibility for tax purposes 
of the portion of the monthly rental charge applied to 
18 This requirement effect ively insures that no apartment will be 
sold for more than its original cost. Consonant with the purposes 
of the Mitchell-Lama Act, whenever there are prospective buyers 
willing to pay as much as the imtial purchase price for an 
apartment in Co-Op City, Riverbay will repurchase the apartment 
and resell it at its origmal cost. See Appendix, at 138a. If, for 
some reason, Riverbay does not purchase the apartment the tenant 
still cann.ot make a profit on his sale. See pp. 3-4, supra. 
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interest on the mortgage. We know of no basis in law 
for the view that the payment of interest, with its con .. 
sequent deductibility for tax purposes, constitutes in-. 
come or profits.19 These tax benefits are nothing more 
than that which is available to any homeowner who pays 
interest on his mortgage. See Internal Revenue Code, 
26 U. S. C. § 216; Eckstein v. United States, 452 F. 2d 
1036 (Ct. Cl. 1971). 
The Court of Appeals also found support for its con~ 
cept of profits in the fact that Co-Op City offered space 
at a cost substantially below the going rental charges 
for comparable housing. Again, this is an inappropriate 
theory of "profits" that we cannot accept. The low 1 
rent derives from the substantial financial subsidies pro-
vided by the State of New York. This benefit cannot be 
liquidated into cash; nor does it result from the mana-
gerial efforts of others. In a real sense, it no more 
embodies the attributes of income or profits than do wel-
fare benefits, food stamps or other government subsidies. 
The final source of profit relied on by the Court of 
Appeals was the possibility of net income derived from 
the leasing by Co-Op City of commercial facilities, pro-
fessional offices and parking spaces, and its operation 
of community washing machines. The income, if any, 
from these conveniences, all located within the common 
areas of the housing project, is to be used to reduce 
tenant rental costs. Conceptually, one might readily 
agree that net income from the leasing of commercial 
and professional facilities is the kind of profit tra-
10 Even if these tax deductions were considered profits, they would I 
not be the type associated with a security investment since they do 
not result from the managerial efforts of others·. See Rosenbaum, 
The Resort Condominium and the Federal Securities Law-A Case· 
Study in Government Inflexibility, 60 Va. L. Rev. 785, 795-79& 
(1974); Casenote, 62 Georgetown L. Rev. 1515,1524-1526 (1974) . 
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ditionally associated with a security investment.20 See 
Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra. But in the present case 
this income-if indeed there is any-is far too specula-
tive and insubstantial to bring the entire transaction 
within the Securities Acts. 
Initially we note that the prospect of such income as 
a means of offsetting rental costs is never mentioned in 
the Information Bulletin. Thus it is clear that investors 
were not attracted to Co-Op City by the offer of these 
potential rental reductions. See Joiner, supra, 320 U. S., 
at 353. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that 
the facilities in fact return a profit in the sense that the 
leasing fees are greater than the actual cost to Co-Op /. . ~ 
City of the space rented. 21 The short of the matter is ~ 
that the stores and services in question were established 
not as a means of returning profits to tenants, but for 
the purpose of making essential services available for the 
residents of this enormous complex.22 By statute these 
facilities can only be "incidental and appurtenant" to the 
20 The "income" derived from the rental of parking spaces and the 
operation of washing machines clearly was not profit for respond-
ents since these facilities were provided exclusively for the use of 
tenants. Thns when the income collected from the use of these 
facilities exceeds the cost of their operation the tenants simply 
receive the· return of the initial overcharge in the form of a rent 
rebate·. Indeed, it could be argued that the "income" from the· 
commercial and professional facilities is also, in effect, a rebate on 
the cost of goods and services purchas('d at these facilities since it 
appears likely that they are patronized almost exclusively by Co-Op 
City residents. See Casenote, 53 Tex. L. Rev. 623, 630-631 n. 38: 
(1975). 
21 The Court of Appeals quoted the gross rental income received 
from these facilities. But such figures by themselves are irrelevant 
since the record does not indicate the cost to Co-Op City of pro-
viding and maintaining the rented space. 
22 See Miller, Cooperative Apartments ; l{eal Eetate or Securities?, 
45 B. U. L. Rev. 464,500 (1960}. 
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housing project, N. Y. Private Housing Law § 12 (5) 
(McKinney Supp. 1974-1975). Undoubtedly they make 
Co-Op City a more attractive housing opportunity, but 
the possibility of some rental reduction is not an "expec-
tation of profit" in the sense found necessary in Howey. 23 
There is no doubt that purchasers in this housing 
cooperative sought to obtain a decent home at an attrac~ 
tive price. But that type of economic interest charac-
izes every form of commercial dealing. What dis-
tinguishes a security transaction-and what is absent 
28 Respondents urge us to abandon the element of profits in the 
definition of securities and to adopt the "risk capital" approach 
articulated by the California Supreme Court in Silver Hills Country 
Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. '2d 811, 361 P. 2d 906 (1961). Cf. El 
Khadem v. Equity Securities Corp., 494 F. 2d 1224 (CA9 1974),. 
cert. denied, 419 U. S. 900 (1974). See generally Coffey, The Eco-
nomic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful For-
mula?, 18 Case W. Res. L. Re". 367 (1967); Long, An Attempt to 
Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream oi Securities· 
Regulation, 24 Okla. L. Rev. 135 (1971); Hannan & Thomas, 
The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal 
Securities, 25 Hast. L. Rev. 219 (1973). Even if we were inclined: 
to adopt such a "risk capital" approach we would not apply it in 
the present case. Purcha,sers of apartments in Co-Op City take no 
risk in any significant sense. If dissatisfied with their apartments,. 
they may recover their initial investment in full. See n. C supra. 
Respondents assert that if Co-Op City becomes bankrupt they 
stand to lose their whole investment. But, in view of the fact 
that the State has financed over 92% of the cost of construction 
and carefully regulates the development and operation of the project, 
bankruptcy in the normal sense is an unrealistic possibility. In 
any event, the risk of insolvency of an ongoing housing cooperative 
"differ[s] vastly" from the kind of risk of "fluctuating" value 
associated with securities investments. SEC. v. Variable Annuity 
Life Insurance Co., 359 U. S. 65, 90-91 (1959) (BRENNAN, J., con-· 
curring) . See Hannan & Thomas, supra, at 242-249; Long, Intro-
duction to Symposium : Interpreting The Statutory Definition of a 
Security: Some Pragmatic Considerations, 6 St. Mary's L. J. 96.,. 
126-128 (1974). 
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here-is an investment where one parts with his money 
in the hope of receiving profits from the efforts of others, 
and not where he purchases a commodity for personal 
consumption or living quarters for personal use.24 
24 The SEC has filed an amicus brief urging us to hold the federal 
securities laws applicable to this case. Traditionally the views of 
an agency charged with administering the governing statute would 
be entitled to considerable weight. See, e. g., United States Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers,- U.S.- (1975) (slip op., 
at 22); Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U. S. 65, 74 (1974); Investment Com-
pany Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626--627 (1971). But in this 
case the SEC's position flatly contradicts what appears to be a rather 
careful statement of the Commission's views in a recent release. 
In Release No. 33-5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (Jan. 18, 1973), appli-
cable to "the sale of condominium units and other units in a real 
estate development," the SEC stated its view that only those real 
estate investments that are "offered and sold with emphasis on the 
economic benefits to the purchaser to be derived from the man-
agerial efforts of the promotf'!r, or a third party designated or 
arranged for by the promoter," are to be considered securities. !d., 
at 1736. In particular, the Commission explained that the Securi-
ties Acts do not apply when "commercial facilities are a part of the 
common elements of a residential project" jf 
"(a) the income from such facilities is used only to offset common area 
expenses and (b) the operation of such facilities is incidental to the 
projf'!ct as a whole and are not established as a primary income 
source for the individual owners of a condominium or cooperative 
unit." Ibid. 
See abo SEC Real Estate Advisory Committee Report 74-91 
(1972); Dickey & Thorpe, Federal Security Regulation of Condo-
minium Offerings, 19 N.Y. L. F. 473 (1974). 
Several commentators have noted the inconsistency between the 
SEC's position in the above release and the decision by the Court of 
Appeals in this case, which the SEC now supports. See Berman 
& Stone, Federai Securities Law and the Sale of Condominiums, 
Homes and Homesites, 30 Bus. Law. 411, 420-425 (1975); Note, 
Condominium Regulation : Beyond Disclosure, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
639, 654--655 (1975); Casenote, supra, 11. 20, at 628. In view of this 
unexplained contradiction# in the Commission's position we accord 
no special weight to its views. See Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson. 
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III 
In holding that there is no federal jurisdiction, we 
do not address the merits of respondents' allegations of 
fraud. Nor do we indicate any view as to whether the 
type of claims here involved should be protected by fed-
eral regulations.25 We decide only that the type of 
transaction before us, in which the purchasers were in-
terested in acquiring housing rather than making an 
investment for profit, is not within the scope of the fed-
eral securities laws. 
Electric Co., 404 U.S. 418, 426 (1972); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Dru,g Stores,- U.S.- (1975) (slip op., at 21 n. 8). 
25 It has been suggested that the sale of housing developments 
such as condominiums and cooperatives is in need of federal regula-
tion and therefore the securities laws should be construed or 
amended to reach these transactions. See, e. g., Note, Federal Se-
curities Regulations of Condominiums: A Purchaser's Perspective, 62 
Georgetown L. J. 1403 (1974); Note, Cooperative Housing Corpora-
tions and the Federal Securities Laws, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 118 (1971). 
Others have disagreed, claiming that the extensive body of regula-
tion developed over more than four decades under these Acts would 
be inappropriate and unduly costly to the sellers and buyers of resi-
dential housing. See Berman & Stone, supra, n. 24; Casenote, supra, 
n. 20. Moreover, extension of the securities laws to real estate 
transnctions would involve important questions as to the appropriate 
balance between state and federal responsibility. The determination 
of whether and in what manner federal regulation may be required 
for housing transactions, where the characteristics of an investment 
~llBB l!e!h ths oo11*s nnd honofi€s ef IU!:) etteh 1 e~ttl:ation. l!!Eisoa,, 
in securities are not present, is better left to the Congress, which can 
assess both the costs and benefits of any such regulation. Indeed 
only recently, Congress imrtructed the Secretary of Housing and 
Urban Development "to conduct a full and complete investigation 
and study . .. with respect to . . . the problems, difficulties and 
abuses or potential abuses applicable to condominium and coopera-
tive housing." Pub. L. 93-3&1, 88 Stat. 740 (Aug. 22, 1974) . See 
also Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, Pub. L. Nt 93-533 / S"'" 
(Dec. 22, 1974); Interstate Land. Sales Full Disclosure Ac U. S. C. 
§~ 1701-17.2.0 .. 
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Since respondents' claims are not cognizable in federal 
court, the District Court properly dismissed their com-
plant.2'6 The judgment below is therefore 
Reversed. 
MR. JFSTICE DouGLAS took no part in the considera- I 
tion or decision of this case. 
20 Besides the Securities Acts claims, respondents also included 
a vague and conclusory allegation under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against 
petitioner, the New York State Housing Finance Agency. We 
agree with the District Court that this count must also be dismissed . , 
See n. 9, supra. The remaining counts in the complaint were all 
predicated on alleged violations of state law, not independently cog-
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The issue in this case is whether shares of stock en-
titling a purchaser to lease an apartment in Co-Op City, 
a state subsidized and supervised nonprofit housing co-
operative, are ((securities" within the purview of the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934. 
][ 
Co-Op City is a massive housing cooperative in New 
York City. Built between 1965 and 1971, it presently 
houses approximately 50,000 people on a 200-acre site 
containing 35 high rise buildings and 236 town houses. 
The project was organized, financed, and constructed 
under the New York State Private Housing Finance Law, 
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commonly known as the Mitchell-Lama Act, enacted tO' 
ameliorate a perceived crisis in the availability of decent 
low-income urban housing. In order to encourage pri-
vate developers to build low-cost cooperative housing, 
New York provides them with large long-term, low., 
interest mortgage loans and substantial tax exemptions. 
Receipt of such be11efits is conditioned on a will ~ 
ingness to have the State review virtually every step in 
the development of the cooperative. See N. Y. Private 
Housing Finance Law§§ 11-37, as amended, (McKinney 
Supp. 1974-1975) . The developer also must agree to· 
operate the facility "on a nonprofit basis," id., at § 11- a 
(2a), and he may lease apartments only to people whose 
incomes fall below a certain level and who have been 
approved by the State.1 
The United Housing Foundation (UHF), a nonprofit 
membership corporation established for the purpose of 
'~aiding and encouraging" the creation of "adequate, safe 
and sanitary housing accommodations for wage earners 
&nd other persons of low and moderate income," 2 Appenw 
dix, at 95a, was responsible for initiating and sponsoring 
the development of Co-Op City. Acting under the 
Mitchell-Lama Act, UHF organized the Riverbay Cor., 
poration (Riverbay) to own and operate the land and 
buildings constituting Co-Op City. Riverbay, a non-
profit cooperative housing corporation, issued the stock 
that is the subject of this litigation. UHF also con~ 
1 Eligibility is limited to families whose monthly income does not 
exceed six times the monthly rental charge (or for families of four 
or more, seven times the rental charge). N. Y Private Housing 
Finance Law§ 31 (2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1974-1975). Preference 
in admission must be given to veterans, the handicapped, and the 
elderly. /d., at § 31 (7)- (9) . 
2 UHF is composed of labor unions, hou~ing cooperatives, and 
civic groups. It. has sponsored the construction of several major 
housing cooperatives in New York City. 
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tracted with Community Services, Inc. (CSI), its wholly 
owned subsidiary, to serve as iihe general contractor and 
sales agent for the project.8 As required by the Mitchell-
Lama Act, these decisions were approved by the State 
Housing Commissioner, 
To acquire an apartment in Co-Op City an eligible 
prospective purchaser must buy 18 shares of stock in 
Riverbay for each room desired. The cost per share 
is $25, making the total cost $450 per room, or $1,800 
for a four-room apartment. The sole purpose of ac-
quiring these shares is to enable the purchaser to 
occupy an apartment in Co-Op City; in effect, their 
purchase is a recoverable deposit on an apartment. The 
shares are explicitly tied to the apartment: they cannot 
be transferred to a nontenant; nor can they be pledged 
or encumbered; and they descend, along with the apart-
ment, only to a surviving spouse. No voting rights at~ 
tach to the shares as such : participation in the affairs of 
the cooperative appertains to the apartment, with the 
residents of each apartment being entitled to one vote 
irrespective of the number of shares owned. 
Any tenant who wants to terminate his occupancy, or 
who is forced to move out/ must offer his stock to River-
bay at its initial selling price of $25 per share. In the ex-
tremely unlikely event that Riverbay declines to repur~ 
chase the stock,5 the ten~:tnt cannot sell it for more than 
3 CSI is a business corporation that has acted as the contractor 
on several UHF -sponsored housing cooperatives. 
4 A tenant can be forced to move out if he violates the provisions 
of his "occupancy agreement," which is essentially a lease for the 
apartment, or if his income grows to exceed the eligibility standards. 
6 To date every family that has withdrawn from Co-Op C1ty has 
received back its initial payment in full. Indeed, at the time thu~ 
suit was filed there were 7,000 families on the waiting list for apart-
ments in this cooperative. In a.dd.it10n, a special fund of nearhr 
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the initial purchase price plus a fraction of the portion 
of the mortgage that he has paid off, and then only to a 
prospective tenant satisfying the statutory income eligi"'· 
bility requirements. SeeN. Y" Private Housing Finance· 
Law § 31-a (McKinney Supp. 1974-1975). 
In May 1965, subsequent to the completion of the 
initial planning, Riverbay circulated an Information 
Bulletin seeking to attract tenants for what would some-
. day be apartments in Co-Op City. After describing the· 
nature and advantages of cooperative housing generally 
- and of Co-Op City in particular, the Bulletin informed 
prospective tenants that the total estimated cost of the 
project, based largely on an anticipated construction con~ 
tract with CSI, was $283,695,550. Only a fraction of this 
Bum, $32,795,550, was to be raised by the sale of 
shares to tenants. The remaining $250,900,000 was to 
be financed by a 40-year low-interest mortgage loan from 
'the New York Private Housing Finance Agency. After 
'construction of the project the mortgage payments and 
·current operating expenses would be met by monthly 
rental charges paid by the tenants. While these rental 
·charges were to vary, depending on the size, na~ 
ture, and location of an apartment, the 1965 Bulletin 
·estimated that the "average" monthly cost would be 
$23.02 per room, or $92.08 for a four-room apartment. 
Several times during the construction of Co-Op City, 
Riverbay, with the approval of the State Housing Com-
missioner, revised its contract with CSI to allow for 
increased construction costs. In addition, Riverbay 
incurred other expenses that had not been reflected in the 
1965 Bulletin. To meet these increased expenditures, 
Riverbay, with the Commissioner's approval, repeatedly 
$1 million had been established by small monthy contributions from 
all tenants to inr.ure that those wanting to move out would receive 
full compensation for their shares. 
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secured increased mortgage loans from the State Housing 
Agency. Ultimately the construction loan was $125 
million more than the figure estimated in the 1965 Bul-
letin. As a result, while the initial purchasing price 
remained at $450 per room, the average monthly rental 
charges increased periodically, reaching a figllre of $39.68 
per room as of July 1974.6 
These increases in the rental charges precipitated the 
present lawsuit. Respondents, 57 residents of Co-Op 
City, sued in federal court on behalf of all 15,372 apart~ 
ment owners, and derivatively on behalf of Riverbay, 
seeking upwards of $30 million in damages, forced rental 
reductions, and other "appropriate" relief. Named M 
defendants (petitioners herein) were UHF, CSI, River-
bay, several individual directors of these organiza~ 
tions, the State of New York, and the State Private 
Housing Finance Agency. The heart of respondents* 
claim was that the 1965 Co-Op City Information Bulletin 
falsely represented that CSI would bear all subsequent 
cost increases due to factors such as inflation. Respond .. 
ents further alleged that they were misled in their 
purchases of shares since the Information Bulletin 
failed to disclose several critical facts.7 On these bases, 
6 As the rental charges increased, the income eligibility require-
ments for residents of Co-Op City expanded accordingly. See n. 1, 
supra. 
7 Respondents maintained that the following material facts were 
omitted: (i) the original estimated cost had never been adhered to 
in any of the previous Mitchell-Lama projects sponsored by UHF 
and built by CSI ; (ii) petitioners knew that the initial estimate 
would not be fOllowed in the present project; (hi) CSI was a wholly 
owned subsidiary of UHF ; (iv) CSI's net worth was so small that 
it could not 'have been legally held to complete the contract within 
the original estimated costs; (v) the State Housing Commissioner 
had waived his own rule regardmg liquidity requirements in approv-
ing CSI as the contractor; and (vi) there was an additional undis .. 
closed contract between CSI and Riverbay. 
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respondents asserted two claims under the fraud pro .. 
visions of the federal Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, 
15 U. S. C. § 77q (a); 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b), and 
17 CFR § 240.10b-5. They also presented a claim 
~ainst the State Financing Agency under the Civil Rights 
Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and ' 10 pendent state law claims. 
Petitioners, while denying the substance of these alle-
g.ations,8 moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground 
that federal jurisdiction was lacking. They maintained 
that shares of stock in Riverbay were not "securities" 
within the definitional sections of the federal Securities 
Acts. In addition, the state parties moved to dismiss on 
sovereign immunity grounds. 
The District Court granted the motion to dismiss. 
366 F. Supp. 1117 (1973). It held that the denomina-
tion of the shares in Riverbay as "stock" did not, by 
itself, make them securities under the federal Acts. The 
court further ruled, relying primarily on this Court's 
decisions in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing CO'I'p., 320 U.S. 
·344 (1943), and SEC·v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 
(1946), that the purchase in issue was not a security 
transaction since it was neither induced by an offer of 
tangible material profits, nor could such profits realis-
tically be expected. In the District Court's words, it was 
"the fundamental nonprofit nature of this transaction" 
which presented "the insurmountable barrier to [respond-
ents'] claims in th[e] federal court." !d., at 1128.9 
8 Petitioners asserted that the Information Bulletin warned pur-
cthasers of the possibility of rental increases, and dt>nied that it 
qmitted material facts. They also argued that pnor 1 o occupancy all 
tenants were informed that rental charges had increased. In any 
event, petitioners claimed that respondents have suffered no damages 
since they may move out and retrieve their uutial investments in full. 
8 The District Court also dismissed the § 1983 claim finding that 
the "federat securities allegations represent the only well-pleaded 
underlying basis for jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act." ld, 
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. 
500 F. 2d 1246 (1974). It rested its decision on two 
alternative grounds. First, the court held that since the 
shares purchased were called "stock" the Securities Acts, 
which explicitly include "stock" in their definitional sec-
t ions, were literally applicable. Second, the Court of Ap-
peals concluded that the transaction was an investment 
contract within the meaning of the Acts and as defined by 
Howey, since there was an expectation of profits from 
three sources: ( i) rental reductions resulting from the 
income produced by the commercial facilities established 
for the use of tenants at Co-Op City; (ii) tax deductions 
for the portion of the monthly rental charges allocable 
to interest payments 0n the mortgage; and (iii) savings 
based on the fact that apartments at Co-Op City cost 
substantially less than comparable nonsubsidized hous-
ing. The court further ruled that the immunity claims 
by the State parties were unavailing.10 Accordingly, the 
case was remanded to the District Court for consideration 
of respondents' claims on the merits. 
In view of the importance of the issues presented we 
granted certiorari. 419 U. S. 1120 (1975). As we cone 
elude that the disputed transactions are not purchases of 
securities within the contemplation of the federal stat-
utes, we reverse. 
at 1132. In view of these rulings the court did not reach the 
sovereign immunity claims. 
10 The Circuit Court held that the State Agency was independent 
and distinct from the State itself and therefore was a "person" 
for purposes of § 1983, that both the Agency and the State had 
waived immunity under § 32 (5) of the Private Housing Finance 
Law, and that the State had also implic1tly waived its immunity by 
voluntarily participating in the sale of securities, an area subject to 
plenary federal regulation. Set> Parden v Terminal Ry. of Alabama 
Docks Dept., 377 U. S. 184 (1964) . In view of our disposition of 
this case we do not reach these issues 
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The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77b (1), de"' 
fines a "security" as 
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, 
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or 
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, col-
lateral:.trust certificate, preorganization certificate or 
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, 
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a 
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or 
other · mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or 
instrument commonly known as a 'security,' or any 
certificate of interPst or participation in, temporary 
or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or 
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of 
the foregoing." 11 
Ih providing this definition Congress did not attempt to 
articulate the relevant economic criteria for distinguish-
ing "securities" from "non-securities." Rather it sought 
to define "the term 'security' in sufficiently broad and 
general terms so as to include within that definition the 
many types of instruments that in our commercial world 
fall within the ordinary concept of a security." H. R. 
Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1933). The task 
has fallen to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), the body charged with administering the Securi= 
ties Acts, and ultimately to the federal courts to decide 
which of the myriad financial transactions in our s<F 
ciety come within the coverage of these statutes. 
11 The definition of a security in the 1934 Act is virtually identicat 
and, for present purposes, the coverage of the two Acts may be 
considered the same. See Tcherepnin v. Kmght, 389 U. S. 332, 
.'386, 342 (1967); S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (1934) •. 
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In making this determination in the present case we 
do not write on a clean slate. Well-settled principles 
enunciated by this Court establish that the shares pur-
chased by respondents do not represent any of the 
"countless and variable schemes devised by those who 
seek the use of the money of others on the promise of 
profits," Howey, supra, 328 U. S., at 299, and therefore 
do not fall within "the ordinary concept of a security." 
A 
We reject at the outset any suggestion that the present 
transaction, evidenced by the sale of shares called 
"stock," 12 must be considered a security transaction sim-
ply because the statutory definition of a security includes 
the words "any ... stock." Rather we adhere to the 
basic principle that has guided all of the Court's deci~ 
sions in this area: 
"[I]n searching for the meaning and scope of the 
word 'security' in the Act[s], form should be disre-
garded for substance and the emphasis should be on 
economic reality." Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 
332, 336 (1967). See also Howey, supra, 328 U. S., 
at 298. 
The primary purpose of the Securities Acts of 1933 
and 1934 was to eliminate serious abuses in a largely 
unregulated securities market. The focus of the Acts is 
on the capital market of the enterprise system: the sale 
of securities to raise capital for profit-making purposes, 
the exchanges on which securities are traded, and the 
need for regulation to prevent fraud and to protect the 
12 While the record does not indicate precisely why the term stock 
was used for the instant transaction, it appears that this form is 
generally used as a matter of tradition and convenience. See 
P. Rohan & M. Reskin, CooperatJVl' Hou~mg Law & PrartiC~ 
§ 2.01 (4) (1973) • 
. . 
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interest of investors. Because securities transactions are 
economic in character Congress intended the application 
of these statutes to turn on the economic realities under~ 
lying a transaction, and not on the name appended 
thereto. Thus, in construing these Acts against the 
background of their purpose, we are guided by a tradi-" 
tional canon of statutory com~truction : 
"that a thing may be within the letter of the statute 
and yet not within the statute, because not within 
its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers." 
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 
U. S. 457, 459 (1892) . See also United States v. 
American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 543 
(1940).18 
Respondents' reliance on Joiner as support for a "lit~ 
eral approach" to defining a security is misplaced. The 
issue in Joiner was whether assignments of interests in 
oil leases, coupled with the promoters' offer to drill an ex-
ploratory well, were securities. Looking to the economic 
inducement provided by the proposed exploratory well, 
the Court concluded that these leases were securities 
even though "leases'' as such were not included in the 
list of instruments mentioned in the statutory defini-
tion. In dictum the Court noted that "[i] nstruments 
may be included within [the definition of a security], as 
[a] matter of law, if on their face they answer to the 
18 With the exception of the Second Circuit, every court of ap-
peals recently to consider the issue has rejected the literal approach 
urged by respondents. See C. N. S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. 
Enterprises, Inc., 508 F. 2d 1354 (CA7 1975); McClure v. First Na-
tional Bank of Lubbock, 497 F. 2d 490 (CAS 1974), cert. denied, 420 
U. S. 930 (1975); Lino v City Investing Co., 487 F 2d 689 (CA3 
1973). See also 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 493 (2d ed. 1961) 
("substance governs rather than form · . . . just as some things 
which look like rral estate are secuntles, some things which look like 
:securities are real estate."). 
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name or description." 320 U. S., at 351 (emphasis sup-
plied). And later, again in dictum, the Court stated 
that a security "might" be shown "by proving the docu-
ment itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond or 
a share of stock." !d., at 355 (emphasis supplied) . By 
using the conditional words "may" and "might" in these 
dicta the Court made clear that it was not establishing 
an inflexible rule barring inquiry into the economic reali-
ties underlying a transaction. On the contrary, the 
Court intended only to make the rather obvious point 
that, in contrast to the instrument before it which was 
not included within the explicit statutory terms, most 
instruments bearing these traditional titles are likely to 
be covered by the statutes.14 
In holding that the name given to an instrument is not 
dispositive, we do not suggest that the name is wholly 
irrelevant to the decision whether it is a security. There 
may be occasions when the use of a traditional name 
such as "stocks" or "bonds" will lead a purchaser justi-
fiably to assume that the federal securities laws apply. 
This would clearly be the case when the underlying 
transaction embodies some of the significant character~ 
istics typically associated with the named instrument. 
In the present case respondents do not contend, nor 
cuuld they, that they were misled by use of the word 
~'stock" into believing that the federal securities laws gov-
erned their purchase. Common sense suggests that peo-
14 Nor can respondents derive any support for a literal approach 
from Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra, which quoted tlJe Joiner dictum. 
Indeed in Tche1·epnin the Court explicitly stated that "form should 
be disregarded for substance," id., at 336, and only after analyzing 
the economic realities of the transaction at issue did it conclude that 
an instrument called a "withdrawable capital share" was, in sub-
stance, an "investment contract," a share of "stock,'' a "certificate-
of interest or participation in a profit sharing agreement," and a. 
~'transferable share." 
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ple who intend to acquire only a residential apartment in 
a state-subsidized cooperative, for their personal use, are 
not likely to believe that in reality they are purchasing 
investment securities simply because the transaction is 
evidenced by something called a share of stock. These 
shares have none of the characteristics "that in our com-
mercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a se-
curity." H. R. Rep. No. 85, supra, at 11. Despite thmr 
name, they lack what the Court in Tcherepnin deemed 
the most common feature of stock: the right to receive 
"dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits" 
289 U.S., at 339. Nor do they possess the other charac-
teristics traditionally associated with stock: they are not 
negotiable; they cannot be pledged or hypothecated; 
they confer no voting rights in proportion to the number 
of shares owned; and they cannot appreciate in value, 
In short, the inducement to purchase was solely to ac-
quire subsidized low-cost living space; it was not to 
invest for profit. 
B 
The Court of Appeals, as an alternative ground for its 
decision, concluded that a share in Riverbay was also an 
"investment contract" as defined by the Securities Acts, 
Respondents further argue that in any event what they 
agreed to purchase is "commonly known as a 'security'" 
within the meaning of these laws. In considering these 
claims we again must exanune the substance-the 
economic realities of the transaction-rather than the 
names that may have been employed by the parties. 
We perceive no distinction, for present purposes, be~ 
tween an "investment contract" and an "instrument com-
monly known as a security." In either case, the basic 
test for distinguishing the transaction from other com-
mercial dealings is 
«'whether the scheme involves an investment of 
: 
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money in a common enterprise with profits to come 
solely from the efforts of others." Howey, supra, 
328 U. S., at 30J.l5 
This test, in shorthand form, embodies the essential attri-
butes that run through all of the Court's deciEJions defin-
ing a security. The touchstone is the presence of an 
investment in e common venture premised on a reason-
able expectation of profits to be derived from the entre-
prenurial or managerial efforts of others. By profits, the 
Court has meant either capital appreciation resulting 
from the development of the initial investment, as in 
Joiner, supra (sale of oil leases conditioned on promoters' 
agreement to drill exploratory well), or a participation in 
earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds, as in 
Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra (dividends on the invest-
ment based on savings and loan association's profits). 
In such cases the investor is "attracted solely by the pros-
pects of a return" on his investment. Howey, supra, 
328 U. S., at 300. By contrast, wl1en a purchaser is 
motivated by a desire to use or consume the item pur-
chased-"to occupy the land or to develop it themselves," 
as the Howey Court put it, 328 U. S., at 300-the securi-
ties laws do not apply 16 See also J o·iner, supra.17 
15 This test speaks in terms of "profits to come solely from the 
efforts of others." (Emphasis supplied.) Although the issue is not 
presented in this case, we notll that the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit has held that ''the word 'solely' should not be read. 
as a strict or literal limitation of the definition of an investment 
contract, but rather must be construed realistically, so as to mclude 
within the definition those schemes which involve in substance, if 
not form, securities." SEC v. Glenn Turner E.nterprises, Inc ., 474 1 
F. 2d 476, 482 (197:3) , cert. denied, 414 U S 821 (1973) . We ex· 
press no view, however, a::; to the holdmg of thu; case. 
u In some transactions the investor is offered both a commodity or 
Teal estate for use and an expectation of profits. See SEC Release 
NQ, .33-5347, 3.8 Fed. Reg. 1735 (Jan. 18, 1973) See generally 
[Footnote 17 is on p . 14] 
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In the present case there can be no doubt that investors 
were attracted solely by the prospect of acquiring a place 
to live, and not by financial returns on their invest-
ments. The Information Bulletin distributed to pros--
pective residents emphasized the fundamental nature and 
purpose of the undertakmg: 
"A cooperative is a nonprofit enterprise owned 
and controlled democratically by its members-the 
people who are using its services .... 
"People find living in a cooperative community 
enjoyable for more than one reason. Most people 
join, however, for the simple reason that it is a way 
to obtain decent housing at a reasonable price. 
However, there are other advantages. The purpose 
of a cooperative is to provide home ownership, not 
just apartments to rent. The community is de-
signed to provide a favorable environment for family 
·and community living .... 
"The common bond of collective ownership which 
you share makes living in a cooperative different. 
It is a community of neighbors. Home ownership, 
Rohan, The Securities Law Implications of Condominium Marketing 
Programs WhiCh Feature a Rental Agency or Rental Pool, 2 Conn. 
L. Rev. 1 (1969). The applicatiOn of the federal securities laws to 
these transactions may raise difficult questions that are not present 
in this case. 
17 In Joiner, the Court stated : 
"Undisputed facts seem to us, however, to establish the conclusion 
that defendants were not, as a practical matter, offering naked 
leasehold rights. Had the offer mailed by defendants omitted the 
economic inducements of the proposed and promised exploratioiJ 
well, it would have been quite a d1fferP-nt proposition." 320 U. S., 
at 348. 
This distinction was critical because the exploratory drillings gave 
the investments "most of their value and all of their lure." Id., 
:at 349. The l:.md itself was purely an mcidental consideration in 
ihe transaction, 
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common interests and the community atmosphere 
make living in a cooperative like living in a small 
town. As a rule there is very little turnover in a. 
cooperative." Appendix, at 162ar-166a. 
Now here does the Bulletin seek to attract inve::;tors by 
the prospect of profits resulting from the efforts of the· 
promoters or third parties. On the contrary, the Bulletin 
repeatedly emphasizes the "nonprofit" nature of the en-
deavor. It explains that if rental charges exceed ex-
penses the difference will be returned as a rebate, not 
invested for profit. It also informs· purchasers that they 
will be unable to resell their apartments at a profit since· 
the apartment must first be offered back to Riverbay "at 
the price ... paid fo .. it." 18 Jd., at 162a. In short, 
neither of the kinds of profits traditionally associated· 
with securities were offered to respondents. 
The Court of Appeals recognized that there must be 
an expectation of profits for these shares to be securities, 
and conceded that there is "no possible profit on a resale 
of [this] stock." 500 F. 2d, at 1254. The court cor-
rectly noted, however, that profit may be derived from· 
the income yielded by an investment as well as from 
capital appreciation, and then proceeded to find "an 
expectation of 'income' in at least three ways." Ibid; 
Two of these supposed sources of income or profits may 
be disposed of summe,rily. We turn first to the Court 
of Appeals' reliance on the deductibility for tax purposes 
of the portion of the monthly rental charge applied t(} 
18 This requirement effectively ins-ures that no apartment will be 
sold for more than its original cost. Consonant with the purposes 
of the M1tcheli-Lama Act, whenever there are pro~pect1ve buyer& 
willmg to pay as much as the imtial purchase pnce for an 
apartment in Co-Op City, Riverbay will repurchaRe the apartment 
and resell it at its original cost. See Append1x, at 138a. If, for 
some reason, Riwrbay does not purchase the apartment the tenant 
$tlll cannot make a profit on hi.S sale. See pp. 3-4, supra; 
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interest on the mortgage. We know of no basis in law 
for the view that the payment of interest, with its con~ 
sequent deductibility for tax purposes, constitutes in-
come or profits.19 These tax benefits are nothing more 
than that which 1s available to any homeowner who pays 
interest on his mortgage. See Internal Revenue Code, 
26 U. S. C. § 216; Ecksteir" v. United States, 452 F. 2d 
1036 (Ct. Cl. 1971). 
The Court of Appeals also found support for its con-
cept of profits in the fact that Co-Op City offered space 
at a cost substantially below the going rental charges 
for comparable housing. Again, this is an inappropriate 
theory of "profits" that we cannot accept. The low 
rent derives from the substantial financial subsidies pro-
vided by the State of New York. This benefit cannot be 
liquidated into cash; nor does it result from the mana-
gerial efforts of others. In a real sense, it no more 
embodies the attributes oi income or profits than do wel-
fare benefits, food stamps or other govP-rnment subsidies. 
The final source of profit relied on by the Court of 
Appeals was the possibility of net income derived from 
the leasing by Co-Op City of commercial facilities, pro-
fessional offices and parking spaces, and its operation 
of community washing machines. The income, if any, 
from these conveniences, all located within the common 
areas of the housing project, is to be used to reduce 
tenant rental costs. Conceptually, one might readily 
agree that net income from the leasing of commercial 
and professional facilities is the kind of profit tra-
10 Even if these tax deductions were considered profits, they would 
not be the type associated with a security investment since they do 
not result from the managerial efforts of others. See Rosenbaum, 
The Resort Condominium and the Federal Securities Law-A Case 
Study in novernmrntal Inflrx1bility, 60 Va. L Rev. 785, 795-796-
(1974) , Ca~enote, 62 Geor!,!;etown L. Rev 1515, 1524-1526 (1974) . 
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ditionally associated with a security investment.20 See 
Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra. But in the present case 
this income-if indeed there is any-is far too specula-
tive and insubstantial to bring the entire transaction 
within the Securities Acts. 
Initially we note that the prospect of such income as 
a means of offsetting rental costs is never mentioned in 
the Information Bulletin. Thus it is clear that investors 
were not attracted to Co-Op City by the offer of these 
potential rental reductions. See Joiner, supra, 320 U. S., 
at 353. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that 
the facilities in fact return a profit in the sense that the 
leasing fees are greater than the actual cost to Co-Op 
City of the space rented. 21 The short of the matter is 
that the stores and services in question were established 
not as a means of returning profits to tenants, but for 
the purpose of making essential services available for the 
residents of this enormous complex.22 By statute these 
facilities can only be "incidental and appurtenant" to the 
20 The "income" derived from the rental of parking spaces and the 
operation of washing machines clearly was not profit for respond-
ents since these facilities were provided exclusively for the use of 
tenants. Thus when the income collected from the use of these 
facilities exceeds the cost of their operation the tenants simply 
rect:ive the return of the mitial overcharge in the form of a rent 
rebate. Indeed, it could be argued that the "income" from the 
commercial and professional facilities is also, in effect, a rebate on 
the cost of goods and services purchased at these facilities since it 
appears likely that they are patronized almost exclusively by Co-Op 
City residents. See Casenote 53 Tex. L. Rev. 623, 63{}-631 n. 38 
(1975). 
21 The Court of Appeals quoted the gross rental income received 
from these facilities. But such figures by themselves are irrelevant 
since the record does not indicate the cost to Co-Op City of pro-
viding and maintaining the rented space. 
22 Sre generally Miller, CoopPrativf.' Apartment:s . Heal Estate ox· 
Secuntie:s? 4.5B. U L Rev.464,500 (1965) . 
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housing project. N. Y. Private Housing Law § 12 (5)' 
(McKinney Supp. 1974-1975) . Undoubtedly they make 
Co-Op City a more attractive housing opportunity, but 
the possibility of some rental reduction is not an uexpec-
tation of profit" in the sense found necessary in Howey.23 
There is no doubt that purchasers in this housing 
cooperative sought to obtaiP a decent home at an attrac-
tive price. But that type of economic interest charac-
izes every form of commercial dealing. What dis-
tinguishes a security transaction-and what is absent 
23 Respondents urge us to abandon the element of profits in the 
definition of securities and to adopt the "risk capital" approach 
articulated by the California Supreme Court in Silver Hills Country 
Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P. 2d 906 (1961). Cf. El 
Khadem v. Equity Securities Co.rp ., 494 F. 2d 1224 (CA9 1974), 
cert. denied, 419 U. S. 900 (1974) . See generally Coffey, The Eco-
nomic Realities of a "Security" : Is There a More Meaningful For-
mula?, 18 Case W. Res. L. RcY. 367 (1967); Long, An Attempt to 
Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities 
Regulation, 24 Okla. L. Rev. 135 (1971); Hannan & Thomas, 
The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal 
Securities, 25 Hast. L. Rev. 219 (1973). Even if we were inclined 
to adopt such a "risk capital" approach we would not apply it in 
the present case. Purchasers of apartments in Co-Op City take no 
risk in any significant sense. If dissatisfied with their apartments, 
they may recover their mit1al investment m full. See n. 5, supra. 
Respondents assert that if Co-Op City becomes bankmpt they 
stand to lose their whole investment. But, in view of the fact 
that the State has financed over 92% of the cost of construction 
and carefully regulates the development and operation of the project, 
bankmptcy in the normal sense is an unrealistic possibility. In 
any event, the risk of insolvency of an ongoing housing cooperative 
"differ[s] vastly" from the kind of risk of "fluctuating" value· 
associated with securities investments. SEC. v. Variable Annuity 
Life Insurance Co., 359 U. S. 65, 90-91 (1959·) (BRENNAN, J., con~ 
cur ring) . See Hannan & Thomas, supra, at 242-249; Long, Intro· 
duction to Symposium: Interpreting The Statutory Definition of a 
Security : Some Pragmatic Considerations, 6 St. Mary's L. J. 96,. 
126-128 (1974). 
74-157 & 74-647-0PINION 
UNITED HOUSING FOUNDATION, INC. v. FORMAN 19 
here-is an investment where one parts with his money 
in the hope of receiving profits from the efforts of others, 
and not where he purchases a commodity for personal 
consumption or living quarters for personal use.24 
24 The SEC has filed an amicus brief urging us to hold the federal 
securities laws applicable to this case. Traditionally the views of 
an agency charged with administering the governing statute would 
be entitled to considerable weight. See, e. g., United States Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers,- U.S.- (1975) (slip op., 
at 22); Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U. S. 65, 74 (1974); Investment Com-
pany Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S. 617, 626-627 (1971) . But in this 
case the SEC's position flatly contradicts what appears to be a rather 
careful statement of the Commission's views in a recent release. 
In Release No. 33-5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (Jan. 18, 1973), appli-
cable to "the sale of condominium units and other units in a real 
estate development," the SEC stated its view that only those real 
estate investments that are "offered and sold with emphasis on the 
economic benefits to the purchaser to be derived from the man-
agerial efforts of the promot~r, or a third party designated or 
arranged for by the promoter," are to be considered securities. Id., 
at 1736. In particular, the Commission explained that the Securi-
ties Acts do not apply when "commercial facilities are a part of the 
common elements of a residPntial project" if 
"(a) the income from such facilities ie. used only to offset common area 
expenses and (b) the operation of such facilities is incidental to the 
project as a whole and are not established as a primary income 
source for the individual owners of a condominium or cooperative 
unit." Ibid. 
See also SEC Real Estate Advisory Committee Report 74-91 
(1972); Dickey & Thorpe, Federal Security Regulation of Condc-
minium Offerings, 19 N. Y. L. F . 473 (1974) . 
Several commentators have noted the inconsistency between the 
SEC's position in the above release and the decision by the Court of 
Appeals in this case, which the SEC now supports. See Berman 
& Stone, Federal Securities Law and t.he Sale of Condominiums, 
Homes and Homesites, 30 Bus. Law. 411, 42G-425 (1975) ; Note, 
Condominium Regulation : Beyond Disclosure, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
639, 654-655 (1975); Casenote, supra, n. 20, at 628. In view of this 
unexplained contradictwn m the Commission's position wt> accont 
no special weight to its views. See Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson 
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III 
In holding that there is no federal jurisdiction, we 
do not address the merits of respondents' allegations of 
fraud. Nor do we indicate any view as to whether the 
type of claims here involved should be protected by fed-
eral regulation.25 We decide only that the type of 
transaction before us, in which the purchasers were in-
terested in acquiring housing rather than making an 
investment for profit, is not within the scope of the fed-
-eral securities laws. 
Electric Co., 404 U. S. 418, 426 (1972); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores,- U.S.- (1975) (slip op., at 22-23, n. 10) 
·26 It has been suggested that the sale of housing developments 
such as condominiums and cooperatives is in need of federal regula~ 
tion and therefore the securities laws should be construed or 
amended to reach these transactions. See, e. g., Note, Federal s~ 
curities Regulations of Condominiums: A Purchaser's Perspective, 62 
Georgetown L. J. 1403 (1974); Note, Cooperative Housing Corpora-
tions and the Federal Securities Laws, 71 Colurr.. L. Rev. 118 (1971). 
Others have disagreed, claiming that the extensive body of regula-
tion developed over more than four decades under these Acts would 
be inappropriate and unduly costly to the sellers and buyers of resi-
dential housing. See Berman & Stone, supra, n. 24; Casenote, supra, 
n. 20. Moreover, extension of the securities Jaws to real estate 
transactions would involve important questions as to the appropriate 
balance between state and federal responsibility. The determination 
. of whether and in what manner federal regulation may be reqUired 
for housing transactions, where the characteristics of an investment 
in securities are not present, is better left to the Congress, which can 
assess both the costs and benefits of any such regulation. Indeed 
only recently Congress instructed the Secretary of Housmg and 
Urban Development "to conduct a full and complete investigation 
and study ... with respect to .. the problems, difficulties and 
abuses or potential abuses applicable to condominium and coopera-
tive housing." Pub. L. 93-383, 88 Stat. 740 (Aug. 22, 1974). See 
also Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, Pub. L . No. 93-533 
(DE'c. 22, 1974) ; InterstatE' Land SalE'l:l FulL Disclosure Act, 15· 
v. s. c. §§ 1701- 1720. 
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Since respondents' claims are not cognizable in federal 
court, the District Court properly dismissed their com-
plant.26 The judgment below is therefore 
Reversed. 
MR. JtrSTICE DouGLAS took no part in the considera-
tion or dec1sion of this case. 
·26 Besides the Securities Acts claims, respondents also included 
a vague and conclusory allegation under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against 
petitioner, the New York State Housing Finance Agency. We 
agree with the District Court that this count must also be dismissed. 
See n. 9, supra. The remaining counts in the complaint were all 
predicated on alleged violations of state law, not independently cog-
nizable in federal court. 
1'0'1'1!1: 'Wbere tt ts feutble, a e:rttabua (headnote) wtt1 be re-
1eaeed, ae Ia being done In connection with thle caae, at the time 
the opinion Ia Issued. Tbe syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion 
of the Court but bas been prepared by tbe Reporter of Declslone for 
the convenience of the reader. See Un~fed Bfofea v. DefroU Lll•lltr 
Oo., 200 U.S. 321, 337. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Syllabus 
UNITED HOUSING FOUNDATION, INC., ET AL. v. 
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THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
No. 74-157. Argued April 22, 1975-Decided June 16, 1975* 
Respondents are 57 residents of Co-op City, a massive cooperative 
housing project in New York City, organized, financed, and 
constructed under the New York Private Housing Finance Law 
(Mitchell-Lama Act). They brought. this action on behalf of all 
the apartment owners and derivatively on behalf of the housing 
corporation, alleging, inter alia, violations of the antifraud pro-
visions of the Securities Act of 1933 and of the Securities Ex~ 
change Act of 1934 (hereafter collectively Securities Acts), in 
connection with the sale to respondents of Rhares of the common 
stock of the cooperative housing corporation. Citing substan~ 
tial increases in the tenants' monthly rental charges as a result 
of higher construction costs, respondents' claim centered on a 
Co-op City Information Bulletin issued in the project's initial 
st::-.ges, which allegedly misrepresented that the developers would 
absorb future cost mcreasc::s due to such factors as inflation. 
Under the Mitchell-Lama Act, which was designed to encourage 
private developers to build low-cost cooperative housing, the 
State provides large, long-ter'll low-interest mortgage loans and 
substantial tax exemptions, conditioned on step-by-step state 
supervision of the cooperative's development. Developers must 
agree to operate the facilities "on a nonprofit basis" and may 
lease apartments to only state-approved lessees whose incomes-
are below a. certain level. The corporate petitioners in this case 
built. promoted, and presently control Co-op City: United Hous-
ing Foundation (UHF) , a nonprofit membership corporation, in-
"'Together with No . 74-647, New York et al. v. Forman et al.,. 
1.1lso on certiorari to the same court. 
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Ryllalm~ 
Hiatrd and ~ponsorrd tl1r pro,irrt; Riverbay, a nonprofit coopera-
tive hou~ing corporation, wai< orll'nnizrd b~· UHF to own and 
operatr thr land and bmlding~ and iKsue the stork that is the 
subjrct of thr in~tant action, and Community Srcuritirs, Inc. 
(CSI) , UHF'i< wholly ownrd ~ub~idiary, was thr project 's general 
contractor and ~alr~ agrnt. To ll('quire a Co-op City apartment 
a prospective purchaser must bu~· 18 shnres of Riverbay stock 
for rach room desired at $25 per shnrr. The shares eannot be 
transfrrred to a nontcnnnt, plrdged, encumbered, or bequeathed. 
(except to a ~urviving spouse), and do not. convey voting rights 
based on the number owned (the residents of each npartment 
having one vote) . On termination of occupancy a tenant must 
offer his stock to Hiverbay at $25 per share, and in the unhkely 
event that Riverbay does not repurchase, the tenant cannot sell 
his shares for more than their original price, plus a fraction of 
the mortgage amortization that he has paid during his tenancy, 
and then only to a prospective tenant satisfying the statutory 
income elig1bility requirements. Under the Co-op City lease 
arrangement the res1dent is committed to make monthly rental 
payments in accordance with the size, nature, and location of 
the apartment. The Srcurities Acts define a "seclJfity" as 
"any ... stock, ... inve~tment contract, ... or, in general, any 
instrument commonly known as a 'security.' " Petitioners moved 
to dism1ss the complamt for lack of federal jurisdiction, main-
taining that the Riverbay stock did not constitute securities as 
thus defined. The District Court granted the motion to dis-
miss. The Court of Appeals reversed, holdmg that (1) since the 
shares purchased were called "stock" the definitional srctions of 
the Securities Acts were literally appltcablP and (2) the trans-
action was an investment contract under the Securities Acts, 
there being a profit expectation from rental reductions resulting 
from (i) the income produced by commercutl facilitieo; established 
for the use of Co-op C1ty tenants; (ii) tax deductions for the 
portion of monthly rental charges allocable to interest payments 
on the mortgage, and (iii) savmgs basE-d on the fact that Co-op 
City apartments co"t sub~tantmlJ~r le:;s than comparable non-
subsidized housing. Held The ~han'~ of stock involved in this 
litigation do not conshtut(' "secunhet;'· w1thm the purview of the 
Securities Acts, and since respondents' claimt-1 are not cognizablA 
in federal court, the D1Rtnct Court properly dismissed their-
•complaint. Pp. 8-18 
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Syllabus 
(a) When viewed as they must be in terms of their substance 
(the economic realities of the transaction) rather than their form, 
the instruments involved hrre were not shares of stock in the 
ordinary sense of conferring the right to receive "dividends con-
tingent upon an apportionment of profits," Tcherepnin v. Knight, 
389 U. S. 332, 339, with the traditional characteristics of being 
negotiable, subject to pledge or hypothecation, conferring voting 
rights proportional to the number of shares owned, and possi-
bility of appreciating in value. On the contrary, these instru-
ments were purchased not for making a profit, but for acquiring 
subsidized low-cost housing. Pp. 8-12. 
(b) A share in Riverbay does not constitute an "investment 
contract" as defined by the Securities Acts, a term which, like 
the term "any instrument commonly known as a security," in-
volves investment in a common venture premised on a reason-
able expectation of profits to be derived from the et!trepreneurial 
or managerial efforts of others. Here neither of the kinds of 
profits traditionally associated with securities were offered to 
respondents; instead, as indicated in the Information Bulletin, 
which stressed the "non-profit" nature of the project, the focus 
was upon the acquisition of a place to Jive. Pp. 12-15. 
(c) Deductibility for tax purposes of ~he portion of rental 
charges applied to interest on the mortgage (benefits generally 
available to horne mortgagors) are not "profits," and, in any 
event, do not derive from the efforts of third parties. Pp. 15-16. 
(d) Low rent attributable to state financial subsidies no more 
embodies income or profit attributes than other types of govern-
ment subsidies. P. 16. 
(e) Such income as might derive from Co-op City's leasing of 
commercial facilities within the housing project to be used to 
reduce tenant rentals (the prospect of which was never mentioned 
in the Information Bulletin) is too speculative and insubstantial 
to bring the entire tran~action within the Securities Acts. These 
facilities were established, not for profit purposes, but to make 
essential services available to residents of the huge complex. 
Pp. 16-18. 
500 F. 2d 1246, reversed. 
PowELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BuRGEit, 
C. J., and STEWART, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., 
joinPd. BRENNAN, J ., filed a dissenting opinion, m which DouGLAS 
and WHI'l'E, .TJ., joined. 
NOTICE: Thle opinion Ia subject to formal revision before publication 
In the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Renders are re-
quested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the 
United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of nny typographical or other 
formal errors, In order that corrections may be made before the pre-
liminary prln t goes to press. 
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United Housing Founds,.. 
tion, Inc., et al., 
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Milton Forman et al. 
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New York State Hous-
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Milton Forman et al. 
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Circuit. 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The issue in this case is whether shares of stock en· 
titling a purchaser to lease an apartment in Co-Op City, 
a state subsidized and supervised nonprofit housing co· 
operative, are "securities" within the purview of the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934. 
I 
Co-Op City is a massive housing cooperative in New 
York City. Built between 1965 and 1971, it presently 
houses approximately 50,000 people on a 200-acre site 
containing 35 high rise buildings and 236 town houses. 
The project was organized, financed, and constructed 
under the New York State Private HQusing Finance Law90 
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commonly known as the Mitchell-Lama Act, enacted to 
ameliorate a perceived crisis in the availability of decent 
low-income urban housing. In order to encourage pri-
vate developers to build low-cost cooperative housing, 
New York provides them with large long-term, low-
interest mortgage loans and substantial tax exemptions. 
Receipt of such benefits is conditioned on a will-
ingness to have the State review virtually every step in 
the development of the cooperative. See N. Y. Private 
Housing Finance Law§§ 11-37, as amended, (McKinney 
Supp. 1974-1975) . The developer also must agree to 
operate the facility "on a nonprofit basis," id., at § 11-a 
(2a), and he may lease apartments only to people whose 
incomes fall below a certain level and who have been 
approved by the State.1 
The United Housing Foundation (UHF), a nonprofit 
membership corporation established for the purpose of 
"aiding and encouraging" the creation of "adequate, safe 
and sanitary housing accommodations for wage earners 
and other persons of low and moderate income," 2 Appen-
dix, at 95a, was responsible for initiating and sponsoring 
the development of Co-Op City. Acting under the 
Mitchell-Lama Act, UHF organized the Riverbay Cor-
poration (Riverbay) to own and operate the land and 
buildings constituting Co-Op City. Riverbay, a non-
profit cooperative housing corporation, issued the stock 
that is the subject of this litigation. UHF also con-
1 Eligibility is limited to families whose monthly income does not 
exceed six times the monthly rental charge (or for families of four 
or more, seven times the rent'tl charge) . N. Y. Private Housing· 
Finance Law § 31 (2) (a) (McKinney Supp. 1974-1975) . Preference 
in admission must be given to veterans, the handicapped, and th& 
eWerly. I d., at § 31 (7)-(9) . 
2 UHF is composed of labor unions, housing cooperatives, and'. 
civic groups. It has sponsorro the construction of several major· 
ho1:1sillg cooperatives m New York City. 
• 
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tracted with Community Services, Inc. (CSI), its wholly 
owned subsidiary, to serve as the general contractor and 
sales agent for the project.8 As required by the Mitchell~ 
Lama Act, these decisions were approved by the State 
Housing Commissioner, 
To acquire an apartmP-nt in Co-Op City an eligible 
prospective purchaser must buy 18 shares of stock in 
Riverbay for each room desired. The cost per share 
is $25, making the total cost $450 per room, or $1,800 
for a four-room apartment, The sole purpose of ac-
quiring these shares is to enable the purchaser to 
occupy an apartment in Co-Op City; in effect, their 
purchase is a recoverable deposit on an apartment. The 
shares are explicitly tied to the apartment: they cannot 
be transferred to a nontenant; nor can they be pledged 
or encumbered; and they descend, along with the apart~ 
ment, only to a surviving spouse. No voting rights at-
tach to the shares as such : participation in the affairs of 
the cooperative appertains to the apartment, with the 
residents of each apartment being entitled to one vote 
irrespective of the number of shares owned, 
Any tenant who wants to terminate his occupancy, or 
who is forced to move out/ must offer his stock to River· 
bay at its initial selling price of $25 per share. In the ex-
tremely unlikely event that Riverbay declines to repur-
chase the stock,5 the tenant cannot sell it for more than 
8 CSI is a business corporation that has acted as the contractor 
on several UHF -sponsored housing cooperatives. 
~ A tenant can be forced to move out if he violates the provisions 
of his "occupancy agreement," which is essentially a lease for the 
apartment, or if his income grows to exceed the eligibility standards . 
5 To date every family that has withdrawn from Co-Op City has 
received back its initial payment in full. Indeed, at the time this 
suit was filed there were 7,000 families on the waiting list for apart. 
ments in this cooperative. In addition, a special fund of nearbl 
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the initial purchase price plus a fraction of the portion 
of the mortgage that he has paid off, and then only to a 
prospective tenant satisfying the statutory income eligi-
bility requirements. SeeN. Y. Private Housing Finance 
Law § 31-a (McKinney Supp. 1974-1975) . 
In May 1965, subsequent to the completion of the 
initial planning, Riverbay circulated an Information 
Bulletin seeking to attract tenants for what would some-
day be apartments in Co-Op City. After describing the 
nature and advantages of cooperative housing generally 
and of Co-Op City in particular, the Bulletin informed 
prospective tenants that the total estimated cost of the 
project, based largely on an anticipated construction con-
tract with CSI, was $283,695,550. Only a fraction of this 
sum, $32,795,550, was to be raised by the sale of 
shares to tenants. The remaining $250,900,000 was to 
be financed by a 40-year low-interest mortgage loan from 
the New York Private Housing Finance Agency. After 
construction of the project the mortgage payments and 
current operating expenses would be met by monthly 
rental charges paid by the tenants. While these rental 
charges were to vary, depending on the size, na-
ture, and location of an apartment, the 1965 Builetin 
estimated that the "average" monthly cost would be 
$23.02 per room, or $92.08 for a four-room apartment. 
Several times during the construction of Co-Op City, 
Riverbay, with the approval of the State Housing Com-
missioner, revised its contract with CSI to allow for 
increased construction costs. In addit,ion, Riverbay 
incurred other expenses that had not been reflected in the· 
1965 Bulletin. To meet these increased expenditures, 
Riverbay, with the Commissioner's approval, repeatedly 
$1 million had been established by small monthy contributions from 
all tenants to insure that those wanting to move out would receive-
full compensation for their shares" 
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secured increased mortgage loans from the State Housing 
Agency. Ultimately the construction loan was $125 
million more than the figure estimated in the 1965 Bul-
letin. As a result, while the initial purchasing price 
remained at $450 per room, the average monthly rental 
charges increased periodically, reaching a figure of $39.68 
per room as of July 1974.0 
These increases in the rental charges precipitated the 
present lawsuit. Respondents, 57 residents of Co-Op 
City, sued in federal court on behalf of all 15,372 apart-
ment owners, and derivatively on behalf of Riverbay, 
seeking upwards of $30 million in damages, forced rental 
reductions, and other 11appropriate" relief. Named as 
defendants (petitioners herein) were UHF, CSI, River-
bay, several individual directors of these organiza-
tions, the State of New York, and the State Private 
Housing Finance Agency. The heart of respondents' 
claim was that the 1965 Co-Op City Information Bulletin 
falsely represented that CSI would bear all subsequent 
cost increases due to factors such as inflation. Respond-
ents further alleged that they were misled in their 
purchases of shares since the Information Bulletin 
failed to disclose several critical facts.7 On these bases, 
6 As the rental charges increased, the income eligibility require-
ments for residents of Co-Op City expanded accordingly. See n. 1, 
sup.ra. 
1 Respondents maintained that the following material facts were 
omitted: (i) the original estimated cost had never been adhered to 
in any of the previous Mitchell-Lama projects sponsored by UHF 
and built by CSI; (ii) petitioners knew that the initial estimate 
would not be followed in the present project ; (iii) CSI was a wholly 
owned subsidiary of UHF; (iv) CSI's net worth was so small that 
it could not have been legally held to complete the contract within 
the original estimated costs ; (v) the State Housing Commissioner 
had waived his own rule regarding liquidity requirements in approv-
ing CSI as the contractor ; and (vi) there was an additional undis· 
closed contract between CSI and Riverbay. 
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respondents asserted two claims under the fraud pro• 
visions of the federal Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, 
15 U. S. C. § 77q (a); 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b), and 
17 CFR § 240.10b-5. They also presented a claim 
against the State Financing Agency under the Civil Rights 
Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and 10 pendent state law claims. 
Petitioners, while denying the substance of these alle-
gations,8 moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground 
that federal jurisdiction was lacking. They maintained 
that shares of stock in Riverbay were not "securities" 
within the definitional sections of the federal Securitiee 
Acts. In addition, the state parties moved to dismiss on 
sovereign immunity grounds. 
The District Court granted the motion to dismiss. 
366 F. Supp. 1117 (1973) . It held that the denomina-
tion of the shares in Riverbay as "stock" did not, by 
itself, make them securities under the federal Acts. Thet 
court further ruled, relying primarily on this Court's 
decisions in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 
344 (1943), and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293 
(1946), that the purchase in issue was not a security 
transaction since it was neither induced by an offer of 
tangible material profits, nor could such profits realis-
tically be expected. In the District Court's words, it was 
"the fundamental nonprofit nature of this transaction" 
which presented "the insurmountable barrier to [respond-
ents'] claims in th[e] federal court." ld., at 1128.9 
a Petitioners asserted that the Information Bulletin warned pur-
chasers of the possibility of rental increases, and denied that it 
omitted material facts. They also argued that prior to occupancy all 
tenants were informed that rentat charges had increased. In any 
event, petitioners claimed that respondents have suffered no damages 
since they may move out and retrieve their initial investments in full. 
o The District Court also dismissed the § 1983 claim finding that 
the "federat securities allegations represent the only well-pleaded 
und!'lrlying basi{! for jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act." Id.1 
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. 
'500 F. 2d 1246 (1974). It rested its decision on two 
alternative grounds. First, the court held that since the 
shares purchased were called ''stock" the Securities Acts, 
which explicitly include "stock" in their definitional sec-
tions, were literally applicable. Second, the Court of Ap· 
peals concluded that the transaction was an investment 
contract within the meaning of the Acts and as defined by 
Howey, since there was an expectation of profits from 
three sources: (i) rental reductions resulting from the 
income produced by the commercial facilities established 
for the use of tenants at Co-Op City; (ii) tax deductions 
for the portion of the monthly rental charges allocable 
to interest payments en the mortgage; and (iii) savings 
based on the fact that apartments at Co-Op City cost 
substantially less than comparable nonsubsidized hous-
ing. The court further rnled that the immunity claims 
by the State parties were unavailing.10 Accordingly, the 
case was remanded to the District Court for consideration 
of respondents' claims on the merits. 
In view of the importance of the issues presented we 
granted certiorari. 419 U. S. 1120 (1975). As we con· 
elude that the disputed transactions are not purchases of 
securities within the contemplation of the federal stat-
utes, we reverse. 
at 1132. In view of these rulings the court did not reach the 
sovereign immunity claims. 
10 The Circuit Court held that the State Agency was independent 
and distinct from the State itself and therefore was a "person" 
for purposes of § 1983, that both the Agency and the State had 
waived immunity under § 32 (5) of the Private Housing Finance 
Law, and that the State had also Implicitly waived its immunity by 
voluntarily participating in the sale of securities, an area subject to 
plenary federal regulation. See Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Alabama 
l>ocks Dept., 377 U. S. 184 (1964). In view of our disposition o! 
this case we do not reach these issues 
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The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77b (1), de .. 
fines a "security'1 as 
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, 
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or 
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, col-
lateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or 
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, 
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a 
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or 
other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or 
instrument commonly known as a 'security,' or any 
certificate of interest or participation in, temporary 
or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or 
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of 
the foregoing." 11 
In providing this definition Congress rlid not attempt to 
articulate the relevant economic criteria for distinguish-
ing "securities" from "non-securities." Rather it sought 
to define "the term 'security' in sufficiently broad and 
general terms so as to include within that definition the 
many types of instruments that in our commercial world 
fall within the ordinary concept of a security." H. R. 
Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1933). The task 
has fallen to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), the body charged with administering the Securi-
ties Acts, and ultimately to the federal courts to decide 
which of the myriad financial transactions in our so~ 
ciety come within the coverage of these statutes. 
11 The definition of a security in the 1934 Act is virtually identical 
and, for present purposes, the coverage of the two Acts may be 
.considered the same. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 
336, 342 (1967); S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (1934). 
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In making this determination in the present case we 
do not write on a clean slate. Well-settled principles 
enunciated by this Court establish that the shares pur-
chased by respondents do not represent any of the 
"countless and variable schemes devised by those who 
seek the use of the money of others on the promise of 
profits," Howey, supra, 328 U. S., at 299, and therefore 
do not fall within "the ordinary concept of a security." 
A 
We reject at the outset any suggestion that the present 
transaction, evidenced by the sale of shares called 
"stock," 12 must be considered a security transaction sim-
ply because the statutory definition of a security includes 
the words "any ... stock." Rather we adhere to the 
basic principle that has guided all of the Court's deci-
sions in this area: 
"[I]n searching for the meaning and scope of the 
word 'security' in the Act[s], form should be disre-
garded for substance and the emphasis should be on 
economic reality." Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 
332, 336 (1967). See also Howey, supra, 328 U. S., 
at 298. 
The primary purpose of the Securities Acts of 1933 
and 1934 was to eliminate serious abuses in a largely 
unregulated securities market. The focus of the Acts is 
on the capital market of the enterprise system: the sale 
of securities to raise capital for profit-making purposes, 
the exchanges on which securities are traded, and the 
need for regulation to prevent fraud and to protect the 
12 While the record does not indicate precisely why the term stock 
was used for the instant transaction, it appears that this form is 
generally used as a matter of tradition and convenience. See 
P. Rohan & M. Reskin, Cooperative Housing Law & Practice 
§ 2.01 (4} (1973). 
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interest of investors. Because securities transactions are 
economic in character Congress intended the application 
of these statutes to turn on the economic realities under-
lying a transaction, and not on the name appended 
thereto. Thus, jn construing these Acts against the 
background of their purpose, we are guided by a tradi-
tional canon of statutory conatruction: 
"that a thing may be within the letter of the statute 
and yet not within the statute, because not within 
its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers." 
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 
U. S. 457, 459 (1892). See also United States v. 
American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 543 
(1940).13 
Respondents' reliance on Joiner as support for a "lit-
eral approach" to defining a security is misplaced. The 
issue in Joiner was whether assignments of interests in 
oil leases, coupled with the promoters' offer to drill an ex-
ploratory well, were securities. Looking to the economic 
inducement provided by the proposed exploratory well, 
the Court concluded that these leases were securities 
even though "leases" as such were not included in the 
list of instruments mentioned in the statutory defini-
tion. In dictum the Court noted that "[i]nstruments 
may be included within [the definition of a security], as 
[a] matter of law, if on their face they answer to the 
13 With the exception of the Second Circuit, every court of ap-
peals recently to consider the issue has rejected the literal approach 
urged by respondents. See C. N . S. Enterprises, Inc . v. G. & G. 
Enterprises, Inc ., 508 F. 2d 1354 (CA7 1975); McClure v. First Na-
tional Bank of Lubbock, 497 F. 2d 490 (CA5 1974), cert. denied, 420 
U. S. 930 (1975); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F . 2d 689 (CA3 
1973). See also 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 493 (2d ed. 19tH) 
("substance governs rather than form : ... just as some things; 
which look like r~al estate are securities, some things which look like 
~ecurities are real estate."). 
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name or description." 320 U. S., at 351 (emphasis sup-
plied). And later, again in dictum, the Court stated 
that a security "might" be shown "by proving the docu-
ment itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond or 
a share of stock." !d., at 355 (emphasis supplied). By 
using the conditional words "may" and "might" in these 
dicta the Court made clear that it was not establishing 
an inflexible rule barring inquiry into the economic reali-
ties underlying a transaction. On the contrary, the 
Court intended only to make the rather obvious point 
that, in contrast to the instrument before it which was 
not included within the explicit statutory terms, most 
instruments bearing these traditional titles are likely to 
be covered by the statutes.14 
In holding that the name given to an instrument is not 
dispositive, we do not suggest that the name is wholly 
irrelevant to the decision whether it is a security. There 
may be occasions when the use of a traditional name 
such as "stocks" or "bonds" will lead a purchaser justi-
fiably to assume that the federal securities laws apply. 
This would clearly be the case when the underlying 
transaction embodies some of the significant character-
istics typically associated with the named instrument. 
In the present case respondents do not contend, nor 
could they, that they were misled by use of the word 
"stock" into believing that the federal securities laws gov-
erned their purchase. Common sense suggests that peo-
H Nor can respondents derive any support for a literal approach 
from Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra, which quoted the Joiner dictum. 
Indeed in Tcherepnin the Court explicitly stated that "form should 
be disregarded for substance," id., at 336, and only after analyzing 
the economic realities of the transaction at issue did it conclude that 
an instrument called a "withdrawable capital share" was, in sub. 
stance, an "investment contract," a share of "stock," a "certificat~ 
of interest or participation in a profit sharing agreement," and a 
"transferable share.'' 
,. 
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ple who intend to acquire only a residential apartment in 
a state-subsidized cooperative, for their personal use, are 
not likely to believe that in reality they are purchasing 
investment securities simply because the transaction is 
evidenced by something called a share of stock. These 
shares have none of the characteristics "that in our com-
mercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a se-
curity." H. R. Rep. No. 85, supra, at 11. Despite their 
name, they lack what the Court in Tcherepnin deemed 
the most common feature of stock: the right to receive 
"dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits." 
289 U.S., at 339. Nor do they possess the other charac-
teristics traditionally associated with stock: they are not 
negotiable; they cannot be pledged or hypothecated; 
they confer no voting rights in proportion to the number 
of shares owned; and they cannot appreciate in value. 
In short, the inducement to purchase was solely to ac-
quire subsidized low-cost living space; it was not to 
invest for profit. 
B 
The Court of Appeals, as an alternative ground for its 
decision, concluded that a share in Riverbay was also an 
"investment contract" as defined by the Securities Acts. 
Respondents further argue that in any event what they 
agreed to purchase is "commonly known as a 'security'" 
within the meaning of thes~ laws. In considering these 
claims we again must examine the substance-the 
economic realities of the transaction-rather than the 
names that may have been employed by the parties. 
We perceive no distinction, for present purposes, be-
tween an "investment contract" and an "instrument com-
monly known as a security." In either case, the basic 
test for distinguishing the transaction from other com-
mercial dealings is 
"whether the scheme involves an investment of 
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money in a common enterprise with profit.<~ to come 
solely from the efforts of others." Howey, supra, 
328 U. S., at 301.13 
This test, in shorthand form, embodies the essential attri-
butes that run through all of the Court's decisions defin-
ing a security. The touchstone is the presence of an 
investment in a common venture premised on a reason-
able expectation of profits to be derived from the entre-
prenurial or managerial efforts of others. By profits, the 
Court has meant either capital appreciation resulting 
from the development of the initial investment, as in 
Joiner, supra (sale of oil leases conditioned on promoters' 
agreement to drill exploratory well), or a participation in 
earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds, as in 
Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra (dividends on the invest-
ment based on savings and loan association's profits). 
In such caees the investor is "attracted solely by the pros-
pects of a return" on his investment. Howey, supra, 
328 U. S., at 300. By contrast, when a purchaser is 
motivated by a desire to use or consume the item pur-
chased-"to occupy the land or to develop it themselves," 
as the Howey Court put it, 328 U. S., at 300-the securi-
ties laws do not apply.16 See also Joiner, supra.11 
15 This test speakg in terms of "profits to come solely from the 
efforts of others." (Emphasis supplied.) Although the issue is not 
presented in this case, we note that the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit has held that "the word 'solely' should not be read 
as a strict or literal limitation of the definition of an investment 
contract, but rather must be construed realistically, so as to include 
within the definition those schemes which involve in substance, if 
not form, securities ." SEC v. Glenn Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 
F. 2d 476, 482 (1973), cert. drmcd, 414 U. S. 821 (1973) . We ex-
press no view, however, as to the holdmg of this case. 
1~ In some transactions the investor is offered both a commodity or 
real estate for use and an expectation of profits. See SEC Release 
No. 33-5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (Jan. 18, 1973) . See generally 
[Footnote 17 is on p. 14] 
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In the present case there can be no doubt that investorS 
were attracted solely by the prospect of acquiring a place 
to live, and not by financial returns on their invest-
ments. The Infc,rmation Bulletin distributed to pros-
pective residents emphasized the fundamental nature and 
purpose of the undertaking: 
"A cooperative is a nonprofit enterprise owned 
and controlled democratically by its members-the 
people who are using its services .... 
"People find living in a cooperative community 
enjoyable for more than one reason. Most people 
join, however, for the simple reason that it is a way 
to obtain decent housing at a reasonable price. 
However, there are other advantages. The purpose 
of a cooperative is to provide home ownership, not 
just apartments to rent. The community is de~ 
signed to provide a favorable environment for family 
and community living .... 
"The common bond of collective ownership which 
you share makes living in a cooperative different. 
It is a community of neighbors. Home ownership, 
Rohan, The Securities Law Implications of Condominium Marketing 
Programs Which Feature a Rental Agency or Rental Pool, 2 Conn. 
L. Rev. 1 (1969). The application of the federal securities laws to 
these transactions may raise difficult questions that are not present 
in this case. 
17 In Joiner, the Court stated : 
"Undisputed facts seem to us, however, to establish the conclusion 
that defendants were not, as a practical matter, offering naked 
leasehold rights. Had the offer mailed by defendants omitted the 
economic inducements of the proposed and promised exploration 
well, it would have been quite a different proposition." 320 U. S., 
at 348. 
This distinction was critical because the exploratory drillings gave 
the investments "most of their value and all of their lure." !d., 
-at 349. The land itself was pure1y an incidental consideration i~ 
1he transaction. 
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common interests and the community atmosphere 
make living in a cooperative like living in a small 
town. As a rule there is very little turnover in a 
cooperative." Appendix, at 162a-166a. 
Now here does the Bulletin seek to attract investors by 
the prospect of profits resulting from the efforts of the 
promoters or third parties. On the contrary, the Bulletin 
repeatedly emphasizes the "nonprofit" nature of the en~ 
deavor. It explains that if rental charges exceed ex~ 
penses the difference will be returned as a rebate, not 
invested for profit. It also informs purchasers that they 
will be unable to resell their apartments at a profit since 
the apartment must first be offered back to Riverbay "at 
the price ... paid for it." 18 I d., at 162a. In short, 
neither of the kinds of profits traditionally associated 
with securities were offered to respondents. 
The Court of Appeals recognized that there must be 
an expectation of profits for these shares to be securities, 
and conceded that there is "no possible profit on a resale 
of [this] stock." 500 F. 2d, at 1254. The court cor~ 
rectly noted, however, that profit may be derived frorn 
the income yielded by an investment as well as from 
capital appreciation, and then proceeded to find ~'an 
expectation of 'income' in at least three ways." Ibid. 
Two of these supposed sources of income or profits may 
be disposed of summarily. We turn first to the Court 
of Appeals' reliance on the deductibility for tax purposes 
of the portion of the monthly rental charge applied to 
18 This requirement effectively insures that no apartment will be 
sold for more than its original cost. Consonant with the purposes 
of the Mitchell-Lama Act, whenever there are prospective buyers 
willing to pay as much as the initial purchase price for an 
apartment in Co-Op City, Riverbay will repurchase the apartment 
and resell it at its original cost . See Appendix, at 138a. If, for 
some reason, Riverbay does not purchase the apartment the tenant 
still cannot make a profit on his sale. See pp. 3-4, supra. 
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interest on the mortgage. We know of no basis in law 
for the view that the payment of interest, with its con .. 
sequent deductibility for tax purposes, constitutes in• 
come or profits.19 These tax benefits are nothing more 
than that which is available to any homeowner who pays 
interest on his mortgage. See Internal Revenue Code, 
26 U. S. C. § 216; Eckstein v. United States, 452 F. 2d 
1036 (Ct. Cl. 1971). 
The Court of Appeals also found support for its con-
cept of profits in the fact that Co-Op City offered space 
at a cost substantially below the going rental chargeB 
for comparable housing. Again, this is an inappropriate 
theory of "profits" that we cannot accept. The low 
rent derives from the substantial financial subsidies pro-
vided by the State of New York. This benefit cannot be 
liquidated into cash; nor does it result from the mana-
gerial efforts of others. In a real sense, it no more 
embodies the attributes of income or profits than do wel-
fare benefits, food stamps or other government subsidies. 
The final source of profit relied on by the Court of 
Appeals was the possibility of net income derived from 
the leasing by Co-Op City of commercial facilities, pro-
fessional offices and parking spaces, and its operation 
of community washing machines. The income, if any, 
from these conve::J.iences, all located within the common 
areas of the housing project, is to be used to reduce 
tenant rental costs. Conceptually, one might readily 
agree that net income from the leasing of commercial 
and professional facilities is the kind of profit tra-
1n Even if these tax deductions were considered profits, they woul<f 
not be the type associated with a security investment since they do 
not result from the managerial efforts of others. See Rosenbaum, 
The Resort Condominium and the Federal Secunties Law-A Case 
Study in Governmental Inflexibility, 60 Va. L. Rev. 785, 795-79(). 
(1974); Casenote, 62 Georgetown L. Rev. 1515, 1524-1526 (1974). 
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ditionally associated w1th a security investment.20 See· 
Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra. But in the present case 
this income-if indeed there is any-is far too specula-
tive and insubstantial to bring the entire transaction 
within the Securities Acts. 
Initially we note that the prospect of such income as 
a means of offsetting rental costs is never mentioned in 
the Information Bulletin. Thus it is clear that investors 
were not attracted to Co-Op City by the offer of these 
potential rental reductions. See Joiner, supra, 320 U. S., 
at 353. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that 
the facilities in fact return a profit in the sense that the 
leasing fees are greater than the actual cost to Co-Op 
City of the space rented.21 The short of the matter is 
that the stores and services in question were established 
not as a means of returning profits to tenants, but for 
the purpose of making essP.ntial services available for the 
residents of this enormous complex.22 By statute these 
facilities can only be "incidental and appurtenant" to the 
20 The "income" derived from the rental of parking spaces and the 
o)!>eration of washing machines clearly was not profit for respond-
ents since these facilities were provided exclusively for the use of 
tenants. Thus when the income collected from the use of these 
facilities exceeds the cost of their operation the tenants simply 
receive the return of the initial overcharge in the form of a rent 
rebate. Indeed, it could be argued that the "income" from the 
commercial and professional facilitieR is also, in effect, a rebate on 
the cost of goods and services purchased at these facilities since it 
appears likely that they are patronized almost exclusively by Co-Op 
City residents. See Casenote, 53 Tex. L. Rev. 623, 630--631 n. 38 
(1975). 
21 The Court of Appeals quoted the gross rental income received 
from these facilities. But such figures by themselves are irrelevant 
since the record does not indicate the cost to Co-Op City of pro-
viding and maintaining the rented space. 
:22 See· generally lVTilleP, Coo1)erative Apartments: Real Estate or 
S~curi.ties?. 45 B. U .. L. Rev .. 4611, 500 (1965 ).. 
,· 
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housing project. N. Y. Private Housing Law § 12 (5) 
(McKinney Supp. 1974-1975). Undoubtedly they make 
Co-Op City a more attractive housing opportunity, but 
the possibility of some rental reduction is not an "expec-
tation of profit" in the sense found necessary in Howey.23 
There is no doubt that purchasers in this housing 
cooperative sought to obtain a decent home at an attrac-
tive price. But that type of economic interest charac-
izes every form of commercial dealing. What dis-
tinguishes a security transaction-and what is absent 
23 Respondents urge us to abandon the element of profits in the 
definition of securities and to adopt the "risk capital" approach 
articulated by the California Supreme Court in Silver Hills Country 
Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P. 2d 906 (1961). Cf. El 
Khadem v. Equity Securities Corp., 494 F. 2d 1224 (CA9 1974), 
cert. denied, 419 U. S. 900 (1974). See generally Coffey, The Eco-
nomic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful For-
mula?, 18 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 367 (1967); Long, An Attempt to 
Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities 
Regulation, 24 Okla. L. Rev. 135 (1971); Hannan & Thomas, 
The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal 
Securities, 25 Hast. L. Rev. 219 (1973) . Even if we were inclined 
to adopt such a "risk capital" approach we would not apply it in 
the present case. Purchasers of apartments in Co-Op City take no 
risk in any significant sense. If dissatisfied with their apartments, 
they may recover their initial investment in full . See n. 5, supra. 
Respondents assert, that if Co-Op City becomes bankrupt they 
stand to lose their whole investment. But, in view of the fact 
that the State has financed over 92% of the cost of construction 
and carefully regulates the development and operation of the project, 
bankruptcy in the normal sense is an unrealistic possibility. In 
any event, the risk of insolvency of an ongoing housing cooperative 
"differ[s] vastly" from the kind of risk of "fluctuating" value 
associated with securities investments. SEC. v. Variable Annuity 
Life Insurance Co., 359 U. S. 65, 90-91 (1959) (BRENNAN, J., con-
curring). See Hannan & Thomas, supra, at 242-249; Long, Intro-
duction to Symposium: Interpreting The Statutory Definition of a 
Security: Some Pragmatic Considerations, 6 St. Mary's L. J. 96 .. 
12(}-128 (1974). 
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here-is an investment where one parts with his money 
in the hope of receiving profits from the efforts of others, 
and not where he purchases a commodity for personal 
consumption or living quarters for personal use. 24 
24 The SEC has filed an amicus brief urging us to hold the 
federal securities laws applicable to this case. Traditionally the 
views of an agency charged with administering the governing 
statute would be entitled to considerable weight . See, e. g., 
Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U. S. 65, 74 (1974); Investment Com-
pany Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626--627 (1971) . But in this 
case the SEC's position flatly contradicts what appears to be a rather 
careful statement of the Commission's views in a recent release. 
In Release No. 33-5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (Jan. 18, 1973), appli-
cable to "the sale of condominium units and other units in a real 
estate development," the SEC stated its view that only those real 
estate investments that are "offered and sold with emphasis on the 
economic benefits to the purchaser to be derived from the man-
agerial efforts of the promot.er, or a third party designated or 
arranged for by the promoter," are to be considered securities. !d., 
at 1736. In particular, the Commission expl&ined that the Securi-
ties Acts do not apply when "commercial facilities are a part of the 
common elements of a residential project" if 
"(a) the income from such facilities is used only to offset common area. 
expenses and (b) the operation of such facilities is incidental to the 
project a.s a whole and are not established as a primary income 
source for the individual owners of a condominium or cooperative 
unit." lbia. 
See also SEC Real Estate Advisory Committee Report 74-91 
{1972); Dickey & Thorpe, Federal Security Regulation of Condo-
minium Offerings, 19 N.Y. L. F. 473 (1974). 
Several commentators have noted the inconsistency between the 
SEC's position in the above release and the decision by the Court of 
Appeals in this case, which the SEC now supports. See Berman 
& Stone, Federal Securities Law and the Sale of Condominiums, 
Homes and Homesites, 30 Bus. Law. 411, 420-425 (1975); Note, 
Condominium Regulation: Beyond Disclosure, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
639, 654-655 (1975); Casenote, supra, n. 20, at 628. In view of thi& 
unexpiained contradiction in the Commission's position we accord! 
oo special we~ht to its vimv&. s~e Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson 
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III 
In holding that there is no federal jurisdiction, we 
do not address the merits of respondents' allegations of 
fraud. Nor do we indicate any view as to whether the 
type of claims here involved should be protected by fed-
eral regulation.25 We decide only that the type of 
transaction before us, in which the purchasers were in-
terested in acquiring housing rather than making an 
investment for profit, is not within the scope of the fed-
eral securities laws. 
Electric Co., 404 U. S. 418, 426 (1972); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores,- U.S.- (1975) (slip op., at 22-23, n. 10). 
26 It has been suggested that the sale of housing developments 
such as condominiums and cooperatives is in need of federal regula-
tion and therefore the securities laws should be construed or 
amended to reach these transactions. See, e. g., Note, Federal Se-
curities Regulations of Condominiums: A Purchaser's Perspective, 62 
Georgetown L. J. 1403 (1974); Note, Cooperative Housing Corpora-
tions and the Federal Securities Laws, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 118 (1971). 
Others have disagreed, claiming that the extensive body of regula-
tion developed over more than four decades under these Acts would 
be inappropriate and unduly costly to the sellers and buyers of resi-
dential housing. See Berman & Stone, supra, n. 24; Casenote, supra, 
n. 20. Moreover, extension of the securities laws to real estate 
transactions would involve important questions as to the appropriate 
bala,nce between state and federal responsibility. The determination 
of whether and in what manner federal regulation may be required 
for housing transactions, where the characteristics of an investment 
in securities are not present, is better left to the Congress, which can 
assess both the costs and benefits of any such regulation. Indeed 
only recently Congress instructed the Secretary of Housing and 
Urban Development "to conduct a full and complete investigation 
and study .. . with respect to . . . the problems, difficulties and 
abuses or potential abuses applicable to condominium and coopera-
tive housing." Pub. L. 93-383, 88 Stat. 740 (Aug. 22, 1974). See 
also Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 93-533 
(Dec. 22, 1974); Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 
u. s. c. §§ 1701-1720. 
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Since respondents' claims are not cognizable in federal 
court, the District Court properly dismissed their com-
plant.2il The judgment below is therefore 
Reversed. 
26 Besides the Securities Acts claims, respondents also included 
a vague and conclusory allegation under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against 
petitioner, the New York State Housing Finance Agency. We 
agree with the District Court that this count must also be dismissed. 
See n. 9, supra. The remaining counts in the complaint were all 
predicated on alleged violations of state law, not independently cog-
nizable in federal court. 
